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Introduction

Ever since the events of 9/11, terrorist organizations have had a certain impact on the international community and how it operates in some areas of the world. Two of the largest of these organizations are al-Qaeda and the ‘Islamic state’ (IS), which claim to work in the name of the Islamic faith and for the creation of a transnational Muslim community – the Ummah1. Despite similar ideology and long-term goals, the two groups are distinctly at odds with each other. Considering how IS started off as an affiliate of al-Qaeda, this is a very interesting point. As a matter of fact, IS’s existence in Syria is an open challenge to al-Qaeda central leadership and in clear defiance of them as an al-Qaeda affiliate group already existed in the country when IS arrived there2. This sense of  competition between the two groups is probably a result of the major differences that have shown themselves between them in recent years3

The two groups are distinctly distinguishable through key aspects of their doctrines and strategies. This essay will look into three major differences between the two groups. First, the purpose they attribute to the concept of jihad . Both groups are engaged in jihad, an Islamic concept with two significant understandings; the struggle within oneself against sin and the struggle or fight against the enemies of Islam4. For the purpose of this essay, the latter of these understandings will be used as this is how these groups define jihad – a struggle against the asymmetric power relations between Muslim and non-Muslim countries that has led to constant attacks on Islam by the ‘West’5. They do however view jihad differently based on doctrines from their origins, and therefore have different goals. Second, how they identify the enemy to their cause; whether it is a far enemy or those standing in their way back home. And lastly, how they consider the Islamic concept of al-wala’ wa al-bara’, which means ‘loyalty and disavowal’ and can be explained as loving and hating in the name of Allah, and in turn how that informs the methods they use in their struggle6.

There are some notable similarities between al-Qaeda and IS, and one of them is their trajectory from when they were founded until now and their current relevance in international security which will be looked at towards the end7. Another important similarity is the context of their origins, which has influenced both groups and how they have acted. These two similarities are important to note because they give the necessary historical context that partially explains the many differences between the groups. To understand their history is to understand their present. Al-Qaeda was founded as a direct response to the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union. Osama bin Laden and his co-founders Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abdullah Azzam rejected the notion of a foreign power on Afghan soil and considered it a direct threat to Islam. The foundation of al-Qaeda in 1988 therefore had the explicit the purpose of channeling funds and combatants to the Afghan resistance8. After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, the struggle shifted from simply helping the Afghani get free from occupation and to "accompany the struggles of Muslims around the world, including rebellions against regimes considered apostates"9. A few years after the end of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, bin Laden returned back to his native Saudi Arabia only to find that his country was now, by his standards, under occupation by U.S. troops that had been stationed there since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. He considered this especially grievous, as Saudi Arabia is particularly sacred for Muslims and the presence of foreigners there was unacceptable10. Though bin Laden and his followers already represented a strong opposition this event sharpened the feeling of anger towards the U.S. considerably and has played a large part in informing how the group acts in its jihad. The hatred of the U.S. was also accompanied by a strong opposition to the Al Saud monarchy in Saudi Arabia, which made bin Laden "persona non grata" in his home country and his finances were cut off by the monarchy forcing him into exile and, by extension, informing al-Qaeda’s view on apostate monarchies in the Middle East11.

Al-Qaeda kept growing and creating more franchises, despite its leadership being on the move due to exiles, and one of these franchises was the al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) established in 2004. The establishment of this group was rather inevitable, considering the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the al-Qaeda leadership’s hatred of the U.S. and forces occupying Muslim land, but it was not inevitable that it would become one of the most successful, and brutal, franchises of al-Qaeda. This success was down to the AQI leader, Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Zarqawi used brutal tactics and his view on takfir – which essentially means to unilaterally excommunicate Muslims to justify their killing – was much more extreme than the al-Qaeda leadership, leading him to attack other Muslims that he considered non-believers, diverging from the advice of the al-Qaeda and bin Laden12. Shortly before his death in 2006, Zarqawi founded a council of the different jihadist groups that were operating in Iraq so that they would not be competing. They announced themselves to be the ‘Islamic State of Iraq’ and after Zarqawi’s demise they were led by Abu Omar al-Baghdadi who continued on with the brutal tactics designed by Zarqawi, at this point they were no longer connected to the al-Qaeda core13. The group was significantly weakened by U.S. operations for the next four years, but found their salvation in the outbreak of civil war in Syria in 2011. Now under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi the group moved into Syria and changed its name to the ‘Islamic State in Iraq and Syria’ (ISIS) by 201314. The al-Qaeda affiliate group already operating in Syria was Jabat al-Nusra and ISIS tried to fuse with them, but this led al-Qaeda leadership to publicly denounce ISIS and any previous connection between the two in 2014, shortly before al-Baghdadi declared the new caliphate in the territory they had captured in Syria and Iraq15.  



Ideologies

These little pieces of history are important to keep in mind, because how these groups were created does inform their doctrines and it shows a certain degree of differences from the very creation of these groups. Their origins inform how they view the world and what they consider the purpose of their jihad. In a sense, these two groups share their most important aspect: the jihadist ideology. Both groups share the same view of the jihad, in that it is a fight against an enemy of Islam. But what purpose the two groups attribute to this ideology are radically different. Both groups may be aiming to alter the power relations between Muslim countries and ‘the West’, but whilst al-Qaeda’s main focus is hurting the enemy, IS focuses on consolidation of power in a controlled territory.

Al-Qaeda’s view is that the main purpose of jihad is to hurt those who are seen as enemies of the Islamic way of life , as this will, in a long term scenario, lead to more symmetrical power relations.This can be considered their medium term goal, and what they are distinctly focused on currently16. However, when this strategy has played out and been successful they consider the long term goals to be the reunification of the Islamic transnational community also known as the Ummah and creating conditions for the emergence of authentic Muslim governance and also allowing Muslims to thrive through this process by trying to provide for them17. IS’s view on the jihad is much more direct and immediate. For them the purpose is to pursue territory and consolidate power, and purifying Islam to be strictly following the word of the Prophet and Allah18. The need for territory is based on the belief in the creation of the transnational caliphate, which can only happen with a strong, local starting point; an idea given to Zarqawi by the ideologue Muhammad al-Maqdisi; a famous Islamist thinker, who has since knowing Zarqawi in the 90s admonished him for his brutal tactics in the pursuit of this territory (Sing 2016, 309)19. Interestingly, IS is considered a large international security threat, but the purpose of their jihad currently leaves them rather stuck in their area in the Middle East – not to say that they are not a threat because they are present in shape of franchises in the Sinai Peninsula amongst other places, but their focus is not on the international community. At least not yet. One interesting quote that goes to this distinction between the two groups is that "al- Qaeda is an organisation; ISIS is a state"20



Enemies

The bigger threat to international security, or ‘the West’, is then al-Qaeda. This stems from the historical perspective of who the two groups consider the enemy. In the course of jihad, identifying the enemy is a large issue for the groups pursuing it. Historically, al-Qaeda’s biggest enemy, and target, has been the U.S. and it continues to be so21. This is because al-Qaeda focuses on beating the far enemy first, and it allows the group to avoid the contentious issues of takfir22. Certainly, al-Qaeda is also very much aware of the near enemy, like apostate monarchies in the Middle East such as Saudi Arabia, but the belief is that the only solution to the issue of oppression of Muslim countries and their occupation is to defeat the U.S. By defeating this large, far enemy one can more easily achieve victory in local conflicts such as Palestine-Israel because the occupying and/or oppressing force is being supported by the far enemy23

IS however, identifies an enemy far closer to home. Essentially, anyone who stands in the way of their consolidation of territory. This does not mean that the far enemy, like the U.S. and the rest of‘the West’ is not on their radar, but they are currently not a priority24. There are far bigger threats to be dealt with; like the Shi’a community and the Kurds amongst others. The lines between far and near enemies become a little blurred in the case of IS, seeing as their main objective is to control territory. U.S. troops in Syria or Iraq are considered enemies that needs to be eliminated, but IS is not conducting attacks on U.S. soil – just inspiring, and sometimes participating in planning the – because it would not help them claim territory locally. They instead choose to focus on any groups that do not adhere to their strict interpretation of Islam and regimes like the Syrian government that is fighting against it in its battle for territory. In this way, IS poses a threat to stability in the Middle East and U.S. interests there, which is why the U.S. is fighting it so vigorously, whilst al-Qaeda poses a larger threat to actual U.S. territory25.

It seems, though, that by identifying their enemy as the near enemy IS has taken a very extreme stance on the concept of al-wala’ wa al-bara’, which makes for a third major difference between the two groups. Al-wala’ wa al-bara’ means ‘loyalty and disavowal’ and can be shortly explained as loving and hating in the name of Allah26. This concept, and what the groups attribute to it, informs who are labelled as takfir; essentially labelling someone as non-Muslims and justifying their murder. IS uses takfir rather indiscriminately, in that anyone refusing to prescribe to their interpretation of Islam is a non-Muslim and will face execution. This view is considered to be inspired by the writing of famous Islamic ideologue Sayyid Qutb and Muhammad Ibn Abdul-Wahhab, who re- popularised using takfir against other Muslims27. Loyalty to Allah can, according to IS, only stem from following their way of life and living under an extreme version of sharia law. This indiscriminate use of takfir has led to an indiscriminate use of violence, and has alienated a lot of Muslims from IS28. Ayman al-Zawahiri, bin Ladens second in command, once urged Zarqawi to be more careful with his tactics saying that "we are in a battle, and that more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media."29

IS’s brutal behavior has meant that a lot of locals resent them, as their tactics usually include mass casualty urban attacks that target minority groups30. Even Sunni Muslims are distancing themselves from the group after severe retaliation against Sunni communities. However, IS tends to attract radicalised Muslims from Western countries and it openly welcomes foreign fighters that are willing to fight for its cause, leading the group to be mostly foreigners. This is also resented by the local Muslim communities, as the group does not live up to the identity of local resistance against oppression31. Some have even argued that IS is close to being seen as just another occupying force made up of foreigners to the local population; especially in the territory it controls32. It can be hard to distinguish between an occupying force like the U.S. and IS, especially when IS is mostly made up of foreigners forcing a radical world view on a local population with the threat of execution if one refuses to adapt. In this way IS can be said to be using terror mostly to control the population it is occupying33



Tactics

This is the main method of action used by IS and it is informed by the fact that they view alwala’wa al-bara’ in its very extremes. As mentioned, loyalty to Allah can only be proven by following their interpretation of the faith and anyone who does not follow them are disavowed and labelled as non-Muslim. Some other methods used by IS will be explored further down, but first it is important to look at how al-Qaeda views al-wala’ wa al-bara’. For al-Qaeda, this concept is a lot less extreme and they are much more strategic in their use of violence and takfir because of it. They have a more prudent approach and are more aware of their image34. They are not forcing a certain version of their faith on others and they are certainly not engaged in the active killing of Muslims, with certain exceptions like the fighting in Yemen and Syria. In the case of al-Qaeda loyalty to Allah is through the practice of monotheism and following the Prophet’s words. Disavowal only happens if one does not practice Islam at all35. This however is becoming more and more a matter of degrees for al-Qaeda as well and less black and white as it used to.

Historically, bin Laden may have had more extreme views, but the current leadership are seeing how unpopular IS is becoming amongst Muslims and have adapted a more strategic approach that is more likely to allow the long-term plan to come to fruition. What al-Qaeda has understood is that they need a certain amount of popular support amongst Muslims to be able to continue their attacks on the far enemy and potentially overthrow apostate regimes in the Middle East36. Whilst IS believes that the only way to save the Ummah is by purging it, al-Qaeda does not believe that other Muslims are the problem, but that the apostate institutions are and these can only be changed by winning hearts and minds and creating a large base of support37. The al-Qaeda method of action then is to direct its attacks against the apostate regimes and the far enemy. It does so mostly by having affiliate groups in target countries and areas, and by supporting these groups and their attacks38. In some ways, the links between terrorist attacks and al-Qaeda are more indirect, in that they are funding them and may be the inspiration behind them but al-Qaeda’s central leadership has very little to do with planning and executing specific attacks. Al-Qaeda also differs in that, in the areas they operate, they attempt to offer services to the local populations and make attempts at improving the lives of Muslims. Some claim that they try to avoid exploiting the Muslim faith and causing harm to local populations39

This is different in IS’s methods of action. They are a much more direct group because of their more extreme views. It is more about a totalitarian regime and other physical forms of violence like decapitation or sexual slavery40. As mentioned above, this is done mostly to control the local population but also helps them incentivise terrorist violence in the West by spreading these radical views on social media and in their magazine Dabiq41. However, in recent years IS have been losing ground in its occupied territories in Syria and Iraq and they are spreading themselves very thinly by fighting on a lot of fronts42. This is weakening its achievement of consolidation power and territory, which could very well lead to it changing its methods radically to align more with those of al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda, by virtue of its franchised nature, is more capable of fighting on several fronts at the same time, but focuses more on just a few areas and countries – and just the one enemy. If IS continues to lose territory, it is possible that they too will focus on one or two fronts and that will likely be the far enemy as well, mainly Europe and the U.S.43



Conclusion

The three major and over-arching differences between the two groups are very interesting, considering the fact that IS grew out of al-Qaeda’s ideology. Still, it seems IS might be forced to realign itself more towards al-Qaeda again as it is losing territory and, seemingly, fighting power. But what does that mean for the international community? One similarity of the two groups are their trajectory – a rapid rise into their glory days and an equally rapid fall into disarray and being forced into changing their objectives. Mueller and Stewart (2016) argue that this quick rise and fall has given the two groups a rather scarier reputation than they necessarily deserve. They do not claim that the groups are not dangerous, but that Western communities do not need to be as scared of local terrorist attacks by these groups. The base this, partially, on the fact that more people are killed in bath-tub accidents than by Muslim terrorist attacks in the U.S. every year44. Most terrorist attacks in Western countries are not planned or funded by either of the two groups rather just inspired by them. As a matter of fact, though not eradicated and though the ideology lives on, al- Qaeda and IS are essentially eliminated as a security threat to Western societies. They live on mostly through the propaganda they have spread and the radicalisation this leads too. Still, Western society keep their terrorist threat-levels at ‘high’ or ‘likely’, feeding into a persistent fear of the ‘ghost’ left behind by these groups in the international community45. And al-Qaeda and IS are not hesitant to use this fear by claiming responsibility for attacks that they neither funded nor planned. For example, IS took immediate responsibility for the 2016 Brussels bombing, despite their declaration of responsibility having several factual mistakes proving that they were not behind it46. Similarly, when a car bomb went off in the government quarter of Oslo, al-Qaeda claimed responsibility immediately. Only a few hours later, the apprehension of a Norwegian born right-wing extremist targeting Muslims and immigrants proved that al-Qaeda most certainly had nothing to do with this attack47. But the easiest way for these groups to stay relevant and keep recruiting radicalised youth from the West is too claim responsibility for attacks that they either had nothing to do with or that they only have an indirect link to.

Al-Qaeda and the ‘Islamic state’ are the results of strikingly similar historical events – both groups’ context of origin being an invasion by foreign powers in a country in the Middle East48. But whilst Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abdullah Azzam, the founders of al-Qaeda, was fueled by their hatred for the U.S. as an oppressor of the Islamic faith, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi led IS on a path of indiscriminate brutality in its home region. After the foundation of al-Qaeda in Iraq, the group quickly diverged from the al-Qaeda leaderships’ strategies. The objectives of the new group "reflect both the murderous sectarian bigotries of its founder as well as the global preoccupation of itsnominal patrons"49. The global preoccupations of IS however took the form of grabbing territory for a starting point for the transnational caliphate. This is considered by IS to be the main purpose of jihad – consolidation of territory for the caliphate – whilst al-Qaeda’s jihad is focused on hurting the enemy which in their case is the U.S.50 The two groups also diverge on who should be considered the enemy. Al-Qaeda, as mentioned, focuses on the far enemy and feels that it should be defeated first to ease the battle for Muslims all over. IS however see a much larger threat in minority groups and regimes that oppose their land-grabbing tendencies and refuse their governing power in the lands they occupy51. This has led IS to be a group that is generally much more brutal, as they use more violence locally to consolidate power and territory, and focusing on the purification of Islam, with some quite extreme views on who is to be labelled takfir. Meanwhile, al-Qaeda has a more strategic use of violence and attributes a more strategic meaning to al-wala’ wa al-bara’; loyalty and disavowal, in the hopes of winning support for their cause rather than brutally executing those who do not support them52.

In conclusion, the three major doctrinal differences between the groups al-Qaeda and the ‘Islamic state’ are the purpose they give to their jihad, who they identify as the most pressing enemy, and what meaning they attribute to al-wala’ wa al-bara’. All of these three things then inform the strategic decisions and methods of action used by these groups, as can be clearly seen in the discussion above. However, it is impossible to study the two groups without noticing that they share a very important starting point and have simply had different reactions to a similar situation. It is also impossible to avoid the fact that both groups seem to be losing relevance in terms of security in ‘Western’ countries. Both groups seem to have had a sudden rise in ability and support, and quite sudden downfalls that now leave them being less of a threat to ‘the West’ than ever before. Both groups are capable of destabilising the region in which they operate, especially the IS as they have captured areas of land that contain a lot of resources and threaten U.S. interests, but in terms of attacks on U.S. and European territory they seem to only be a threat due to propaganda spread on social media radicalising young Muslims. ‘Western’ countries need no longer fear al-Qaeda and IS themselves, but rather the ghost of their glory days that are left behind in the nooks and crannies of the internet.



Footnotes

1 Karmon, Ely. 2015. «Islamic State and al-Qaeda Competing for Hearts & Minds.» Perspectives on Terrorism , April: 71-79; pp. 71

2 al-Tamimi, Aymen Jawad. 2014. «The Dawn of the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham.» Current Trends in Islamist Ideology , March: 5-15; pp. 12

3 Karmon, Ely. 2015. «Islamic State and al-Qaeda Competing for Hearts & Minds.» Perspectives on Terrorism, April: 71-79.

4 Zeidan, David. 2002. «The Islamist View of Life as a Prennial Battle.» I Anti-American Terrorism and the Middle East: A Documentary Reader , av Barry Rubin og Judith Colp Rubin, 11-27. New York: Oxford University Press; pp. 13-14

5 Gomes, Aureo de Toledo, og Michelle Mitri Mikhael. 2018. «Terror or Terrorism? Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in Comparative Perspective.» Journal of the Brazilian Political Science Association, 1-27.

6 Arosoaie, Aida. 2015. «Doctrinal Differences between ISIS and Al Qaeda An Account of Ideologues.» Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, August: 31-37.

7 Mueller, John, Mark G. Stewart. 2016. «Misoverestimating ISIS comparisons with al-Qaeda.» Perspectives on Terrorism, August: 30-39.

8 Bergen, Peter, Paul Cruickshank. 2012. «Revisiting the Early Al Qaeda: An Updated Account of its Formative Years.» Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 1-36.

9 Gomes, Aureo de Toledo, og Michelle Mitri Mikhael. 2018. «Terror or Terrorism? Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in Comparative Perspective.» Journal of the Brazilian Political Science Association, 1-27.

10 Bergen, Peter, Paul Cruickshank. 2012. «Revisiting the Early Al Qaeda: An Updated Account of its Formative Years.» Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 1-36., Gomes, Aureo de Toledo, og Michelle Mitri Mikhael. 2018. «Terror or Terrorism? Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in Comparative Perspective.» Journal of the Brazilian Political Science Association, 1-27.

11 Ibid.

12 Gerges, Fawaz A. 2016. ISIS: A History. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

13 Gomes, Aureo de Toledo, og Michelle Mitri Mikhael. 2018. «Terror or Terrorism? Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in Comparative Perspective.» Journal of the Brazilian Political Science Association, 1-27.

14 Gerges, Fawaz A. 2016. ISIS: A History. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

15 Gomes, Aureo de Toledo, og Michelle Mitri Mikhael. 2018. «Terror or Terrorism? Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in Comparative Perspective.» Journal of the Brazilian Political Science Association, 1-27.

16 Byman, Daniel. 2015. Comparing al-Qaeda and ISIS: different goals, different targets. 29 April. Accessed August 3, 2018, link.

17 Phillips, Andrew. 2009. «How al Qaeda lost Iraq.» Australian Journal of International Affairs, March: 64-84.

18 Arosoaie, Aida. 2015. «Doctrinal Differences between ISIS and Al Qaeda An Account of Ideologues.» Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, August: 31-37.

19 Sing, Manfred. 2016. «Dis/connecting Islam and Terror: the 'Open Letter to Al-Baghdadi' and the Pitfalls of Condemning ISIS on Islamic Grounds.» Journal of Religious and Political Practice, October: 296-318.

20 Gomes, Aureo de Toledo, og Michelle Mitri Mikhael. 2018. «Terror or Terrorism? Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in Comparative Perspective.» Journal of the Brazilian Political Science Association, 1-27.

21 Bergen, Peter, Paul Cruickshank. 2012. «Revisiting the Early Al Qaeda: An Updated Account of its Formative Years.» Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 1-36.

22 Byman, Daniel. 2015. Comparing al-Qaeda and ISIS: different goals, different targets. 29 April. Accessed August 3, 2018, link.

23 Arosoaie, Aida. 2015. «Doctrinal Differences between ISIS and Al Qaeda An Account of Ideologues.» Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, August: 31-37.

24 Gomes, Aureo de Toledo, og Michelle Mitri Mikhael. 2018. «Terror or Terrorism? Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in Comparative Perspective.» Journal of the Brazilian Political Science Association, 1-27.

25 Ibid.

26 Wagemakers, Joas. 2012. «The Enduring Legacy of the Second Saudi State: Quietist and Radical Wahhabi Contestations of Al-Wala' wa-l-bara'.» International Journal of Middle East Studies, 93-110.

27 Zeidan, David. 2002. «The Islamist View of Life as a Prennial Battle.» I Anti-American Terrorism and the Middle East: A Documentary Reader, av Barry Rubin og Judith Colp Rubin, 11-27. New York: Oxford University Press.

28 Zelin, Aaron Y. 2014. «The War Between ISIS and al-Qaeda for Supremacy of the Global Jihadist Movement.» Research Notes: The Washington Insititue for Near East Policy, June: 1-11.

29 Ibid.

30 Lister, Charles. 2014. «Profiling the Islamic State.» Brookings Doha Center Analysis Paper, November: 1-57.

31 Mueller, John, og Mark G. Stewart. 2016. «Misoverestimating ISIS comparisons with al-Qaeda.» Perspectives onTerrorism, August: 30-39.

32 Gomes, Aureo de Toledo, og Michelle Mitri Mikhael. 2018. «Terror or Terrorism? Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in Comparative Perspective.» Journal of the Brazilian Political Science Association, 1-27.

33 Ibid.

34 Arosoaie, Aida. 2015. «Doctrinal Differences between ISIS and Al Qaeda An Account of Ideologues.» Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, August: 31-37.

35 Ibid.

36 Turner, John. 2015. «Strategic Differences: Al Qaeda's Split with the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham.» Small Wars & Insurgencies, 208-225.

37 Zelin, Aaron Y. 2014. «The War Between ISIS and al-Qaeda for Supremacy of the Global Jihadist Movement.» Research Notes: The Washington Insititue for Near East Policy, June: 1-11.

38 Gomes, Aureo de Toledo, og Michelle Mitri Mikhael. 2018. «Terror or Terrorism? Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in Comparative Perspective.» Journal of the Brazilian Political Science Association, 1-27.

39 Arosoaie, Aida. 2015. «Doctrinal Differences between ISIS and Al Qaeda An Account of Ideologues.» Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, August: 31-37.

40 Gomes, Aureo de Toledo, og Michelle Mitri Mikhael. 2018. «Terror or Terrorism? Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in Comparative Perspective.» Journal of the Brazilian Political Science Association, 1-27.

41 Styszynski, Marcin. 2014. «ISIS and Al Qaeda Expanding the Jihadist Discourse .» Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, September: 9-14

42 al-Tamimi, Aymen Jawad. 2014. «The Dawn of the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham.» Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, March: 5-15.

43 Gomes, Aureo de Toledo, og Michelle Mitri Mikhael. 2018. «Terror or Terrorism? Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in Comparative Perspective.» Journal of the Brazilian Political Science Association, 1-27.

44 Mueller, John, og Mark G. Stewart. 2016. «Misoverestimating ISIS comparisons with al-Qaeda.» Perspectives on Terrorism, August: 30-39.

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid.

47 Mala, Eliza, og J. David Goodman. 2011. At least 80 Dead in Norway Shooting. 22 July. Accessed August 15, 2018, link.

48 Gomes, Aureo de Toledo, og Michelle Mitri Mikhael. 2018. «Terror or Terrorism? Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in Comparative Perspective.» Journal of the Brazilian Political Science Association, 1-27.

49 Phillips, Andrew. 2009. «How al Qaeda lost Iraq.» Australian Journal of International Affairs, March: 64-84.

50 Arosoaie, Aida. 2015. «Doctrinal Differences between ISIS and Al Qaeda An Account of Ideologues.» Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, August: 31-37.

51 Gomes, Aureo de Toledo, og Michelle Mitri Mikhael. 2018. «Terror or Terrorism? Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in Comparative Perspective.» Journal of the Brazilian Political Science Association, 1-27.

52 Arosoaie, Aida. 2015. «Doctrinal Differences between ISIS and Al Qaeda An Account of Ideologues.» Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, August: 31-37.



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