Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, France has shifted its foreign policy to strengthen ties with Central and Eastern European (CEE) states. Historically distant due to strategic divergences, France now views the region as essential for European security and for advancing its long-standing goal of European strategic autonomy. President Macron seeks to reconcile France's traditional foreign policy behavior with NATO's pre-eminence in the defense of the European continent. He has acknowledged past neglect and is promoting a multi-institutional approach involving NATO, the EU, and the European Political Community, while also seeking deeper bilateral relations. Despite a warmer reception from CEE partners and increased defense engagement on NATO's Eastern Flank, tangible outcomes remain limited. France's ambitions are complicated by institutional overlaps and skepticism from CEE countries, which continue to prioritize U.S. security guarantees. To gain credibility, France could clarify its strategic proposals, promote industrial cooperation, and potentially provide new security guarantees—such as troop deployments or nuclear-sharing framework.
Introduction
"We didn't listen enough to you, and your calls for your history and painful memories to be acknowledged […]. Some said you missed opportunities to stay silent; I say we sometimes missed opportunities to listen to you. That time is over."
Pronounced by Emmanuel Macron at the GLOBSEC summit on May 31, 2023, these words sum up three decades of a complicated relationship between France and the states of Central and Eastern Europe. This concept refers to the states between Germany and Russia and Belarus, between the Baltic Sea and the Balkans. It includes Poland, the Baltic States, the Czech Republic, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Croatia. After the end of the Cold War, these states, now independent of Soviet tutelage, gradually joined the two central institutions for European governance: the European Union and NATO. Their relations with France were limited during this period, alternating between phases of neglect and strong political tensions. France's relations with the region go back a long way and have sometimes been very close, especially during the interwar period. After the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1917, France, along with Great Britain, played a central role in defining the borders of the newly created states.1 This was achieved through various treaties signed in the wake of the Treaty of Versailles (Treaty of Saint-Germain en Laye and Treaty of Trianon). Following their independence, France strongly supported the economic and, above all, military development of Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia, forming the "Petite Entente."
Relations between France and Central and Eastern Europe lost in intensity after World War II. During the Cold War, Central and Eastern Europe states freedom to conduct their foreign policy was limited by the Soviet tutelage and bipolarization. France's foreign policy during the post-war period.
The defeat of 1940 marked a major break in French foreign policy. Humiliated and weakened both militarily and politically, Frédéric Bozo2 explains that since 1945, French policy makers have constantly sought to restore this lost rank. Bozo identifies two constants that contribute to this goal. The first is France's strong support for European integration, seen as the only lever enabling France to influence world affairs. Secondly, France has consistently promoted a stable, balanced international order. Although the short- and medium-term objectives of French foreign policy have been updated as the international order has evolved, Bozo maintains that they are still part of the three constants described. In addition, Lequesne3 underlines France's preference for small alliances and bilateral ties. As a result, within large multilateral organizations, France usually develop smaller "clubs" with likeminded states.
Following the end of the Cold War, France diverged with the Central and Eastern European states over the organization of the European security framework and the degree of Russian integration. France wanted Europe to assume greater autonomy from the USA in foreign policy matters, and wanted to involve Russia in defining the continent's security framework. Part I will go into more detail on these divergences.
Countries of Central and Eastern Europe share similar political preferences, as we shall see in greater detail. Following the end of the Cold War, all aspired to democratization, economic liberalization and integration into the Atlantic Alliance, resulting from a mistrust of Russia. However, these preferences have gradually diverged regarding Russia. Two states, Hungary and Slovakia, have broken away from the common distrust of Russia. Therefore, while this work will generally mention the Central and Eastern European states (abbreviated as CEE states), Hungary and Slovakia are not included unless specifically mentioned.
Following the geopolitical upheaval caused by Russia's invasion of Ukraine, France decided to deepen its strategic relations with these states. This apparent shift is accompanied of the recognition of the centrality of NATO for the defense of the European continent. The process is recent, beginning in 2022 and intensifying in 2023. However, it is still in its infancy, with few concrete results to show.
Be that as it may, France's strategic reorientation might appear as a shift in its post-war foreign policy behavior.
The aim of this paper is to analyze how France intends to forge closer ties with the states of this region and if this apparent shift also constitutes a shift with its traditional foreign policy preferences.
The multilateral institutions of which France and the CEE states belong play a central role in their relations. Both the EU and NATO provide a framework for the common definition of all forms of security on the European continent. As member states, France and the CEE countries have delegated to them part of their decision-making autonomy, and sometimes part of their sovereignty. The institutions provide a framework for the development of security policies which both France and the CEE States fully recognize, and outside which they cannot imagine acting.
The issues addressed in this report are as follows: To what extent has France's strategic relationship with Central and Eastern Europe shifted after the war in Ukraine? Does this shift represent a breach with French traditional foreign policy preferences?
This paper argues that France strategic reorientation to the east is real, but does not constitute a breach in its post-war behavior. Rather this is a pragmatic update of this behavior, without being an Atlanticist turn. The first part looks back over the three decades of mistrust and strategic divergence that preceded the invasion of Ukraine. The second part analyzes the nature of the French shift and the reaction of the CEE states. Finally, the last part will analyze the feasibility of the cooperation framework proposed by France.
From 1989 to 2022: an era of mutual mistrust due to divergent objectives of foreign policy
French limited interest and reciprocal mistrust
Throughout the period from the fall of both the Berlin Wall and the USSR to the invasion of Ukraine, relations between France and the states of Central and Eastern Europe remained limited. The relationship suffered from divergent and sometimes competing political objectives.
The end of the bipolar era was expected and sought by France, which had built its foreign policy during the Cold War on the quest to overcome bipolarity. Skeptical of unipolarity, France, particularly since the Chirac presidency, has sought to foster the emergence of a multipolar world.4 This was a logical behavior given the post-war French preference for a balanced and stable world order. This policy coincided with a new phase of globalization, marked by increased intercontinental trade and the emergence of new economic power poles, particularly in Asia and South America.5 From then on, the priority of the various French presidents since Jacques Chirac has been to develop relations between France (and the European Union) with the world's various poles of power, especially Asia and South America. President Chirac encouraged a European Union-Americas summit, which was held in Rio in 1999. With Asia, an EU-Asia dialogue was established at the Bangkok summit in 1996, resulting also from a French initiative. In the 2010s, the strategic importance of the Indo-Pacific region became even greater. France indeed adopted two strategic documents in 2019 and in 2021.6 France also made considerable efforts in the Africa-Middle East zone during this period. These included the fight against terrorism in Afghanistan, the Sahel and, to a lesser extent, Iraq, as well as the development of economic partnerships in the region, notably with the wealthy Gulf States.7 It is in this region that France will be concentrating the bulk of its military forces over the period. To this end, it has adopted an army format geared towards external operations and the fight against insurgent movements. This format is quite different from that of the armies of the CEE countries, which are geared towards conventional warfare.81 Lastly, as part of this drive to develop relations with the various poles of power, France has endeavored to draw closer to Russia, no longer regarding it as hostile.9
The states of Central and Eastern Europe, for their part, aimed to ensure their security vis-à-vis Russia10 and their economic development by opening to capitalism.11
As a result of these divergent objectives, bilateral relations have remained limited. Economically, these countries turned more to Germany, whose conglomerates bought up many large Eastern companies.12 A certain mistrust prevailed in France towards these states, perceived as too close to the United States. This led France to adopt a particularly disrespectful attitude toward them. In February 2003, at a summit on the response of the European Union and its future members to the United States' planned invasion of Iraq, President Chirac felt that the CEE states, by supporting the invasion, had missed an opportunity to remain silent. 13
However, relations were not absent. Aware of the need to prepare for the enlargement of the European Union, President Chirac made several visits to the region during this period.15 Notably, in 1991, the Weimar Triangle was established, a trilateral framework between France, Germany and Poland. Its aim was to prepare for Poland's entry into NATO and the EU, and to involve France in German-Polish reconciliation. More broadly, it was intended to serve as a bridge between France and Germany on one side, and Central and Eastern Europe on the other. 15
France also expanded its economic relations with the region. Without reaching Germany's level, French companies have established themselves in the region and did high investments in the region.16 France was the fourth foreign investor in the Czech Republic in 2004 and even the first in 2005. The most involved economic sectors the auto industry, banking sector water and the environment glass transportation, dairy products, and construction. The classical example of French economic investment was the purchase of Romanian national car manufacturer Dacia by Renault in 1999.
Institutional and strategic disagreement
As a consequence of these competing and opposed post-Cold War objectives, France and CEE countries shared divergent views on the security and on the political architecture of the Euro- Atlantic area.
France has consistently favored small multilateral frameworks over large alliances, often creating smaller groups within larger organizations.17 France apprehended with skepticism the possibility of an enlargement towards the East of both NATO and the EU following the end of the Cold War. It indeed feared both a dilution of its influence and that newcomers favor American interest. The issue of the strategic independence of Europe was indeed key for the French European policy during the period. France had never demonstrated much interest in NATO since its founding. When the bipolarization, along with the Russian hostility, disappeared, France was hoping for a long-term replacement of NATO by a European equivalent structure. France had always conceived a sort of competition or long-term incompatibility between NATO and the EU. In its 1994 White Paper on Defense, France sought to remain strategically autonomous from the dependency on NATO guarantees and applied this concept also to the EU.18
On the other hand, CEE States considered, from the beginning, the EU and NATO as complementary, NATO being the most appropriate framework to ensure the safety of the Euro- Atlantic area and the EU carrying out economic development and market policies. Indeed, the CEE states did not consider the European states as being able to ensure without the American support the security of the continent. The United States were, and still are, perceived as the ultimate guarantee of security.19
Aware of these divergences, French President Mitterrand proposed in 1989 the European Confederation. This project aimed at constituting a final hurdle for CEE countries before an eventual adhesion to NATO and the EU.20 The project was received with a strong skepticism by the concerned states, which were concerned that it was a French way to postpone sine die the enlargement of NATO and the EU. The project ultimately failed and only aroused mistrust towards France. This mistrust was strengthened in 1991 by the refusal of France to reintegrate NATO's integrated command in 1991 at the Rome summit.21 Although Jacques Chirac's France attempted to return to the integrated command in 1996, negotiations failed and were not resumed until 2007. After the failure of the European confederation, France's handling of NATO enlargement once again gave rise to fictions with the CEE states. On the one hand, wishing to avoid Russia feeling insulted, France lobbied for a NATO-Russia cooperation agreement to be signed before enlargement to the east. This led to the NATO-Russia Founding Act in 1997, which preceded the 1999 enlargement to include the first former members of the Warsaw Pact. On the other hand, France was able to arouse the mistrust of the three new members in 1999 (Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary) by proposing to integrate Romania and Slovenia as well, to counterbalance the alleged American tropism of the first three. 22
After joining NATO and then the EU, the CEE states regularly had major disagreements with France. In strategic terms, France and the CEE states have differed widely on the respective roles of the EU and NATO. While the latter have always given precedence to NATO for defense, France has regularly promoted the reinforcement of the European Union's strategic autonomy. However, the CEE states have never placed their trust in the European Union when it comes to defense. On the contrary, they tend to consider that developing NATO-like capabilities within the Union would only weaken the latter.23 While the concept is regularly promoted within the academic world in France, it is virtually absent from the theoretical thinking of academics in Central and Eastern Europe.24
As a result, the respective investment in the Atlantic Alliance by France and the CEE states was opposed. Keen to show their attachment to the Alliance, the Central and Eastern European states were among the first to reach the threshold of 2% of GDP spent on their military budget. Conversely, France, even after its return to the integrated command, has limited its commitment to the Alliance, both in financial and human terms. By 2024, France had filled only 75% of the officer positions to which it was entitled—well below the level of similarly sized states.25 Financially, France has never reached the 2% threshold. In addition, France's general behavior within the Alliance is also a source of irritation. Lacking a clear strategy on what it wants to achieve within the Alliance, France tends to adopt a "red line" posture. This involves blocking any Alliance policy it opposes, without proposing an alternative. A parliamentary report by the French National Assembly notes the strong mistrust this arouses among its Allies.26 Above all, it has regularly prioritized its foreign policy objectives over those of the Atlantic Alliance. Thus, in 2017, France refused to take command of one of the Battlegroups of the enhanced Forward Presence, wishing to preserve its forces for its intervention in the Sahel. This low level of investment was greatly regretted by Central and Eastern European allies, who, while not sharing France's geostrategic orientations, widely recognize the quality of its armed forces and were hoping for a greater French commitment.27
Finally, the divergence in strategic priorities between France and the CEE states had a strong influence on their attachment to the Alliance (and still does, albeit to a lesser extent). Seeing Russia as a threat, the CEE states regard the existence of a collective defense alliance as absolutely vital. As a result, they have accepted numerous compromises within NATO with the United States to ensure their support. On the other hand, France does not feel the same need for a defense alliance, and assume disagreeing strongly with the United States. France believes that NATO should limit itself to protecting the Euro-Atlantic area. It is therefore, for instance, strongly opposed to any Alliance involvement in the Indo-Pacific, while CEE countries accept to gradually involve NATO in the Indo-Pacific only to ensure in exchange the support of the US in Europe.28
On Russia: divergent perceptions after 2007
Undoubtedly, Russia constituted the most significant source of tension between France and CEE States. After the end of the Cold War, France favored implementing a partnership with Russia over NATO's and EU enlargement to the East.
However, tensions over Russia came to the fore after 2007, when Russia began to show signs of hostility towards the post-Cold War international order. In a speech at the Munich Security Conference in 2007, Vladimir Putin lashed out at the West, criticizing a unipolar order dominated by the United States that paid little heed to Russia's security.29 Following this speech, Russia intervened in Georgia in 2008, an operation strongly criticized by the international community. Then in 2014, following the Ukrainian revolution, Russia invaded Crimea and actively supported separatist movements in the Donbass.
From then on, France and the CEE countries began to differ in their assessment of Russia. France condemned the invasion, imposed sanctions against Russia and cancelled the sale of two Mistral-class helicopter carriers. However, its strategy focused on maintaining contact with Russia and negotiate a cessation of hostilities in Ukraine. Quite early in 2014, a four-way negotiation process was set up between France, Germany, Russia and Ukraine. Divergences between France and CEE states started to emerge when it became clear that the provisions of the Minsk agreement were not being respected.30 The differences became particularly sharp once Emmanuel Macron came to power. The latter was convinced that he will be able to reason with Russia by establishing a close, almost personal, bilateral relationship with Vladimir Putin. At the time, Emmanuel Macron considered it necessary to anchor Russia to Europe by offering it an alternative to China, and by showing that it was considered by Europe.31 Thus, on May 29, 2017, Emmanuel Macron invited Vladimir Putin to Versailles and displayed a willingness to engage in dialogue, albeit firmly. His first contacts with the French president were appreciated by his Central and Eastern European partners.32 However, his plans for Russia run counter to those of his Central and Eastern European partners. Emmanuel Macron believed it was necessary to offer Russia security guarantees, and that it was essential to maintain close contact. Above all, he wanted Europeans to play an active role in the organization of the continent's security, which he regularly deplored being decided by the US- Russia binomial.33 On the other hand, the CEE states were primarily interested in protecting themselves from Russia.
After initial positive exchanges with Vladimir Putin, President Macron unilaterally decided in 2019 to propose a reset of Europe-Russia relations. The aim was to set up a "new architecture of security and trust between the European Union and Russia." This initiative was particularly badly received by Central and Eastern European partners, who rejected not only its substance, but also its unilateral nature, as France had not warned them of the initiative.34 The initiative failed, due to the joint skepticism of the European partners and Russia's lack of determination.
This initiative, which strongly displeased the Eastern partners, was followed by another in June 2021, this time led by Germany but supported by France, which also provoked strong rejection from the CEE states. The idea was to organize an EU + Russia summit. Given the tensions in Ukraine at the time, the initiative was roundly rejected.35
This desire for dialogue persisted even after Russia's invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022. Emmanuel Macron believed that Russia must not be humiliated, and that negotiations were essential to ending the crisis.36 He telephoned Vladimir Putin more than a dozen times in the first weeks after the invasion of Ukraine. Once again, his words aroused great mistrust among his Central and Eastern European partners.37
A long overdue but expected French shift
Apologies and recognition of the Russian threat
President Macron's foreign policy gradually shifted regarding both Russia and Central and Eastern European States. President Macron has acknowledged the failure of Russia's integration into the European security order, which he, like his predecessors, has pursued. Several factors influenced this shift.
First, the discovery of mass graves in several towns liberated in March-April 2022, notably Irpin and Boutcha, made the violence of the Russian invasion obvious.38 France sent forensic units to assist the Ukrainian forces. Moreover, France itself was the target of several Russian hybrid campaigns, the most significant actions consisting of a large-scale disinformation campaign. Dubbed "RRN" or "Doppelgänger", the campaign involved the creation of fake news sites shared on social networks, some usurping the identity of real French media outlets. All shared false information aimed at undermining French confidence in their authorities and in the Ukrainian resistance.39 Finally, the stalemate in the Ukrainian conflict also contributed to the change in the French position. The hypothesis of a long-term conflict, with a constant Russian threat on European borders, quickly became credible.
France's policy evolution unfolded gradually. In November 2022, the government published its National Strategic Review (Revue nationale stratégique), which served as a de facto national strategy in lieu of a traditional defense white paper. The document proclaims France's determination to act as an "exemplary ally" within the Atlantic Alliance, which is described as the central pillar in the defense of the European continent.40 France pledges to increase its commitment to the Alliance, considering in particular the target of 2% of GDP for military spending as a threshold. Finally, it announces that it will increase its efforts on the Eastern flank as a framework nation, by taking command of a NATO Battlegroup, in this case in Romania.
"France wishes to confirm the Alliance's key role in the defense of Europe. NATO strengthens the potential of our armed forces, and is the forum where the challenges of interoperability, as well as capability, technological and operational expectations, are taken into account."41
"Concerned about the coherence and cohesion of the Alliance, France will continue to contribute proactively, realistically and sustainably to strengthening the posture on the eastern flank -including as a framework nation - and to adapting NATO's command structure."42
Affirming France's commitment to NATO and to the collective defense promoted by the Alliance was an essential condition for rapprochement with the CEE states, insofar as the Alliance represents their fundamental guarantee of security. This is also an apparent breach with French traditional approach to NATO.
However, while the document describes the desire to make a greater contribution to NATO, there is little mention of Central and Eastern Europe, and it is not one of France's priority regions - unlike the Mediterranean, the Balkans and the Indo-Pacific. 43
The real turning point came in May 2023, at the GLOBSEC summit, when Emmanuel Macron focused his speech on the relationship between France and the CEE states. In it, he acknowledged and apologized for France's lack of interest in the region in recent decades. He also apologized for France's sometimes disrespectful attitude.
"We have not always heard enough of your voice, calling for you to acknowledge your history and painful memories. Some said that you were losing opportunities to remain silent. I also believe that we have sometimes lost opportunities to listen. Those days are gone, and today that voice must be the voice of all of us."44
Above all, Emmanuel Macron acknowledged France's poor assessment of the threat represents and represented before the invasion of Ukraine. He acknowledged an imperialist policy that poses a lasting threat to European security.
"And indeed, Ukraine's aggression is fundamentally the extreme, fragile manifestation of a challenge to our European unity that has been played out over the last 15 years. 15 years during which Russia's [attempted] to shake up the whole edifice of European security and reshape it, in its own words." 45
Above all, contrary to his initial statements after the beginning of the conflict, he sees victory for Ukraine as a necessity and rejects any peace negotiation that would result in Ukraine losing territory.46
Emmanuel Macron is also changing his tune on the enlargement of NATO and, above all, the EU, to the East. Whereas he had previously been strongly opposed to this47 he now sees the dynamic of EU membership as the best way of thwarting attempts to interfere by rival great powers such as Russia, but also China.48 Emmanuel Macron even accepted in 2023 to grant to Ukraine and Moldavia the status of candidate to the EU. This significantly contrasts with its attitude only a year before, at the Versailles Summit. He then apprehended the enlargement with great skepticism, considering the integration of Ukraine being not a matter of years, but of decades. 49
While the President has regularly been criticized for a certain lack of consistency, his position on the need for France to increase its commitment to NATO, and his support for Ukraine's resistance, has been reaffirmed on several occasions since. This was notably the case in April 202450, during his "second Sorbonne speech", as well as in November 2024 at the European Political Community Summit.51 Also in the same month, he expressed skepticism about expecting to negotiate with Russia, following German Chancellor Scholz's call with Vladimir Putin.52 President Macron implied he disagreed with Chancellor Scholz's method.
However, France's traditional objective of strengthening Europe's strategic autonomy has not been forgotten. Alongside NATO, whose central role is recognized by each of the documents cited, the reinforcement of European strategic autonomy is mentioned each time. In each case, it is a question of deepening European industrial cooperation and improving cooperation between European states within NATO, in order to create there a European pillar. Finally, Emmanuel Macron also promotes the development of bilateral ties53, in keeping with the traditional French habit of creating bilateral ties within major alliances. A comprehensive cooperation agreement is being negotiated with Poland.54
France improved its commitment in the Eastern flank
President Macron's promises have been followed by concrete action. The first and foremost manifestation of this voluntarism was the significant increase in the deployment of French troops on the Alliance's Eastern flank, as part of the enhanced Forward Presence (eFP). The aim of this process is to implement reassurance measures for NATO members sharing a border with Russia. Two types of deployment followed: the establishment of a reinforced air police force, comprising fighter jets pledged by the various members, which rotate every three to four months. Above all, ground troops have been deployed on the eastern flank. Limited to battalion size between the introduction of eFP in 2017 and the invasion of Ukraine, battlegroups are now ramping up to brigade or even division scale. After 2022, four new battlegroups have been deployed, in addition to the initial four. France, which was already participating as a minority contributor in the UK-led Battlegroup in Estonia, maintained this initial deployment, while taking command of the newly- formed Battlegroup deployed in Romania. France has thus adopted the NATO concept of framework nation (FNC), which consist in integrating foreign military units into military planning. The aim is to create small coalitions between NATO allies, generally with a specific geographic focus, within the larger NATO coalition. The concrete form this integration takes is left to the discretion of the participating states. It can take the form of a fairly vertical integration of units within the command structures of another state (the German FNC model), or a more agile coalition aimed at rapid deployment of troops on an operational terrain (the British FNC model).55
Furthermore, not only has France assumed the role expected of it, but it is also providing the resources required for this mission. Indeed, it plans to deploy an entire brigade from its national territory to Romania within ten days, during the Dacian Spring 2025 exercise, scheduled for April 2025. The rapid deployment of such a large unit, with its consequent logistical challenges, would be a real demonstration of its commitment to Romania and the enhanced Forward Presence. In addition, the French armed forces have reorganized their structure to integrate specialized command and control resources for the Eastern flank. Thus, an operational staff specialized in Europe ("Commandement Terre Europe") has been created in 2023 to reinforce the coherence of the French land commitment on the Eastern flank.56 In addition, France has maintained its participation in air policing missions and permanently deploys at least one ship in the Eastern Mediterranean and at least one between the North Sea and the Baltic Sea.57 Thus, France deploys capacities for every military dimension (land, air and sea) on the Eastern flank.
Beyond Dacian Spring 2025, the French armed forces are stepping up their participation in NATO exercises on the Eastern flank. France has been criticized in the past for its low level of participation in Alliance exercises.58 At the end of 2024 France deployed 600 soldiers to exercise Pikne in Estonia, designed to demonstrate the responsiveness and commitment of it forces within the Alliance. In 2025, France plans to take part in Exercise Diodore and Exercise Warfighter, as well as deploying a battalion in Estonia for Exercise Hedgehog alongside Dacian Spring. In 2026, it plans to take command of the land component of NATO's Allied Reaction Force (ARF) for the first time.59
Planning for this deployment reflects a real change of mindset in France, at both political and military levels. The possibility of a conflict on the Eastern flank is now taken seriously.
The French rapprochement is also reflected in increased support for the Ukrainian armed forces. Although Ukraine is outside the scope of this brief, the CEE states are particularly sensitive to the support it receives. Between February 24, 2022 and May 1, 2024, France delivered 5 billion euros worth of armaments to Ukraine (3 billion directly, and 2 billion paid via the European Peace Facility).60 In terms of military support, France was only the 7th largest provider of direct military aid to Ukraine.61 Nevertheless, France has delivered equipment with a significant impact to Ukraine, such as Amx 10 Rc light tanks, Caesar artillery guns and Scalp missiles. Above all, France has significantly reduced its own capabilities in order to support Ukraine. This is particularly true of artillery. France has parted with 30 of its 77 guns62 which is not insignificant, especially as it will not be receiving replacement guns immediately. In addition, France signed a bilateral cooperation agreement with Ukraine in February 2024, committing the country to a military and civilian partnership and including 3 billion euros in aid.63
Emmanuel Macron also distinguished himself by proposing in February 2024 to deploy Western troops in Ukraine, although the concrete terms of deployment were not specified. This declaration, reaffirmed a few months later, was rather positively received by the CEE states, even if their reaction remained pretty discrete.64
This shift was expected
France's contribution to the Atlantic Alliance, and in particular to the defense of its Eastern flank, has been eagerly awaited, especially by the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. France has a comprehensive military apparatus, with capabilities that no other European country can boast. French forces also benefit from rare and recognized operational experience.65 Like very few other countries in Europe, France has an army that can be deployed outside its territory and is ready to engage an enemy, whatever the type of conflict.66 These are all capabilities that NATO members know benefit the Alliance.67 In joining the Framework Nation concept within NATO, France is thus adopting a concept that has enabled Germany, since 2014, to integrate European armies into its military planning, in this case, the Netherlands, Lithuania, and to a lesser extent the Czech Republic.68 This concept, which is in fact the closest thing to a European army, had until now been treated with skepticism by France. Now, by adopting it, it is opening up the possibility of greatly improving its cooperation with the Central and Eastern European states, which are quite open to integrating this type of concept. Because of the small size of their military forces (with the exception of Poland), and their lack of command and control structures and fire experience, they are keen to learn from armies such as France's.69 As a result, Emmanuel Macron's various speeches, particularly his GLOBSEC speech, were very well received.
French recognition of NATO's centrality was particularly eagerly awaited. Indeed, several states viewed its attempts to promote only European strategic autonomy with great skepticism, seeing it simply as a means of maximizing its own interests.70 Recognition of the importance of the Atlantic Alliance is a way to allay these fears.
Finally, the shift on the enlargement of the EU and NATO, which is now supported by France was also expected by the CEE states, and disagreements on this issue prior to 2023 were among the most significant tensions between France and Eastern Europe.71
This shift fits in with the traditional objectives of French foreign policy, but risks incoherence
NATO, EU, European Political Community, bilateralism : a multiple framework promoted by France
The recognition by France of the centrality of NATO and this shift towards Central and Eastern Europe remains in the continuity of French post-war foreign policy preferences. What can appears at first sight as a breach in France's traditional behavior is rather a pragmatic update of its geographical priority rather than a change in its doctrine. France does not abandon its quest for a more integrated European foreign and defense policy. Quite the contrary, French policy makers see in the Russian threat and in the American partial withdrawal a confirmation of their preference for a more integration European Union. Likewise, France seeks to deepening bilateral ties. French policymakers act pragmatically, realizing that the traditional objective of strengthening the European Union in the field of defense cannot be achieved without taking NATO into account. For all that, France intends to develop its ties with Central and Eastern Europe on the basis of the concept of European strategic autonomy. This leads to the promotion of a multiple institutional framework, at the risk of a lack of coherence.
President Macron's France continues to seek to deepen Europe's strategic autonomy. The concept is promoted in every speech. While the United States remains an essential ally of France, its reliability as an ally is questioned by President Macron. Describing Europe as threatened by China and Russia, he considers that it must be able to do without American support.72 In fact, despite the relegitimization of NATO in French discourse, Europe's strategic autonomy remains a long-term objective, but the modus operandi for achieving it has been modified.
The doctrine that Europe, and particularly the European Union, should be able to decide its own destiny alone remains an imperative for France. With particular regard to the security architecture of the European continent, President Macron considers that Europeans have not been sufficiently involved in defining the security framework of their own continent, and have been subjected to decisions negotiated between the United States and Russia. This is particularly the case regarding treaties governing the possession and use of different types of armaments.73 Thus, with regard to Russia, Emmanuel Macron considers that it is the duty of European states to provide security guarantees to member states sharing a border with Russia. With Russia, he believes that Europeans should have included Russia in a security dialogue on an equal footing back in the early 2000s. He believes that European states must be at the initiative of the future treaties that will regulate the continent's security after the end of the Russo-Ukrainian war. He even believes that NATO's involvement in defining this security framework, rather than the EU's, was a mistake.
"And we lacked coherence as Europeans. We gave insufficient guarantees to certain countries on our borders. We did not engage Russia in a security dialogue for ourselves. Basically, we delegated this dialogue to NATO, which was probably not the best way to go about it. And at the same time, we have not moved away from our dependence on Russia, which we have instead continued to reinforce, particularly in terms of energy."74
Whereas the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union tended to be seen as competitors, France would like to see greater cooperation between EU Allies, in order to create a European pillar within the Alliance.75
Outside NATO, France urges EU Member States to provide the EU with more instruments of strategic autonomy. First and foremost, the EU should have its own strategic concept. He also seeks to strengthen European industrial cooperation, particularly in the arms industry and in breakthrough technologies such as artificial intelligence.76 To this end, he promotes the creation of a large common loan, an idea shared by Poland77, as well as a mechanism to encourage the purchase of European military equipment. Finally, in his GLOBSEC speech, Emmanuel Macron mentions the following areas of cooperation: energy, the fight against hybrid attacks, cyber, space and maritime.78
In addition, Emmanuel Macron attaches great importance to involving all EU member states in this more autonomous EU, particularly the CEE states. Poland in particular is cited as a partner of choice.
"I do not want to replace NATO with some kind of Franco-German condominium. I think it is a broad, powerful Europe, with countries like yours, like Poland and many others, which must play their part in this Europe of defense, but which is increasingly responsible for its own security and neighborhood issues."79
However, in parallel with NATO and the EU, a third framework for cooperation has been added, the European Political Community (EPC). Created in 2022, it aims to integrate states that are not members of either NATO or the EU, or neither.80 Its creation is a direct consequence of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The institution is intended to enable the integration of several Eastern European states that are not members of NATO or the EU. France also promotes the development of European strategic autonomy within this body. In his speech to an EPC meeting on November 7, 2024, Emmanuel Macron promoted sovereignty measures similar or identical to those he supports within the European Union. Indeed, he wishes to deepen European cooperation for joint interventions (via the European intervention initiative), in the fields of energy, innovation, immigration management and the fight against hybrid activities.81 The framework within which he wishes to develop European strategic autonomy also appears unclear.
Finally, in keeping with its traditional foreign policy preferences, France is seeking to develop bilateral links with the CEE states, through bilateral friendship and cooperation agreements or treaties. To date, this practice has only involved Western European states: Germany (Elysée Treaty in 1963, then Aachen Treaty in 2019), Italy (Quirinal Treaty in 2021) and Spain (Barcelona Treaty in 2023). These friendship and cooperation treaties are generally comprehensive, including cooperation in a wide range of fields beyond the military. France is now negotiating with Poland to sign a similar treaty. It should cover subjects as varied as defense, migration policy, transport, nuclear energy, culture and sport. Defense cooperation, however, is central for France, which notably wants to make up for Poland's cancellation in 2016 of a helicopter contract with Airbus, worth over 3 billion euros. 82
Significant obstacles to this institutional framework
Despite France's determination and relative change of stance, the deepening of relations with the CEE states, based on the concept of strategic autonomy, is encountering a number of obstacles. Indeed, neither France nor the CEE states have changed their traditional foreign policy behavior. Obstacles range from the divergent foreign policy doctrines to contingent administrative weaknesses.
In the first place, France lacks a strategy for the precise modalities of its relations with the CEE states. The decision-making process for French foreign policy suffers from excessive centralization at the level of the President of the Republic. However, the latter has only a small administration at its disposal, with only a dozen advisors. The relevant ministries - Foreign Affairs, Defense and, to a lesser extent, the Economy - are insufficiently involved in defining French foreign policy. As a result, they are forced to implement a strategy that is regularly insufficiently defined, and subject to changes in posture. 83 In the specific case of the rapprochement between France and the CEE states, the means that France intends to invest to achieve this still suffer from imprecision. For example, although France has set itself the goal of becoming an exemplary ally within NATO in 2022, this goal is not backed up by a sufficient strategy, according to a parliamentary report by the French National Assembly. 84 Similarly, Emmanuel Macron's proposal for the deployment of troops in Ukraine was very imprecise and made without any consultation with his European allies. 85 In industrial terms, France still suffers from a weak presence in the East, with none of its companies having subsidiary there86. Yet, a physical presence is expected in Central and Eastern Europe, and France would benefit from a strategy in this area too.
In addition, the institutional framework proposed by France is insufficiently precise, with the risk of duplication. In particular, President Macron is proposing that the European Union adopt a strategic concept, similar to a document already in existence within NATO. Skepticism about American reliability tends towards the development of a parallel institution. However, while the justifications for this duplication hypothesis are pertinent, duplication is still traditionally rejected by most NATO allies.87 Therefore, a project along these lines is unlikely to succeed.
Moreover, this lack of strategy is compounded by the CEE states' continued skepticism about the concept of European strategic autonomy. The Atlantic Alliance remains to their eyes the privileged and prioritized framework within which Europe's collective defense is carried out. On the one hand, the United States remains by far the most trusted provider of "hard" security. They do not consider that any other European state, particularly France and Germany, can provide similar support, nor even the European states grouped together.88 While France's military capabilities are acknowledged, it cannot compete in numerical terms with American forces. Indeed, it has only a small quantity of each piece of equipment, a far cry from the great American capabilities. This leads CEE states not only to reject an institutional framework that would not include the United States, but also to favor the purchase of American equipment to secure American support. This does not mean that they see no value in the European Union. They recognize its usefulness for innovation and military mobility, but do not trust it to provide "hard" security guarantees equivalent to those of the United States.89 On the other hand, since coordination structures already exist within NATO, these states reject any duplication. The position can be summed up by the speech given by Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski in November 2024 at a conference celebrating 25 years of Polish membership of the Atlantic Alliance:
"The modernisation of European defence obviously should not take place to the detriment of engagement in NATO. By strengthening the defence dimension of the European Union, which is an inevitable thing to do, we are not by any means looking to undermine NATO's unique role for Poland and the entire system of European security."90
More concretely, these states still contribute little to European strategic empowerment. According to Lilei91, the CEE member states of the Visegrad group "have insufficient resources and commitment in several areas of sovereignty and no role in strengthening European sovereignty". Beyond the institutional framework, the very concept of European strategic autonomy remains little considered within the political and academic communities of Central and Eastern European states.92
Finally, in terms of "small clubs", developments are also still a long way from the targets set. The Weimar Triangle, formed in 1991 with Poland and Germany, remains little used. Originally set up to help Poland and Eastern Europe join the EU, it has been proposed on several occasions.93 Yet meetings are held irregularly and too infrequently. The last summit at Head of State level was held in June 2023, the Foreign Affairs Summit in March 2022 and the Economic Ministers' Summit in May 2023. Only one meeting was held in 2024, in December, between Minister for European Affairs.94 It could, however, represent a very useful framework for European coordination and governance.
Positive dynamics towards the French proposals
The reliability of the United States as a security guarantee influences and will influence the reception of the French proposals. For the time being, the USA is the ultimate security guarantee for the CEE states. However, recent trends are tending to legitimize French positions in the eyes of the CEE states.
French preferences, and above all the very concept of European strategic autonomy, have long been viewed with skepticism in Central and Eastern Europe. They were seen as useless, or as jeopardizing the continuity of American support.
US policy towards Europe is therefore central. Strong, long-term American support renders French preferences for European strategic autonomy illusory and almost superfluous. Yet the United States has embarked on a long-term strategic pivot towards the Indo-Pacific region. The United States' substantial defense investments in Europe are regularly questioned, on both Democratic and Republican sides95, although they have been maintained by President Biden. Criticism of Europeans' lack of commitment to their own defense is now constant, again, on both sides of the political spectrum. This criticism has intensified on the Republican side since the first Trump presidency. In 2017, for example, on the occasion of the inauguration of the NATO headquarters and then the G7, President Trump voiced strong criticism of the European Allies' low contribution to their defense and raised fears of a weakening of American support.96 These criticisms were repeated by candidate Trump during the 2024 presidential campaign and have been intensified since his inauguration. He notably requested NATO's member states to scale up their defense spending to 5% of their GDP -a sum that no NATO member State, US included, has reached since the 1980s. Above all, he has started bilateral negotiations with Vladimir Putin on Ukraine without involving Europeans, nor Ukrainians, which are only consulted after American-Russian bilateral talks. The US-governlent pursue the objective of a peace in Ukraine, and is ready to give up Ukrainian territory, especially Crimea. Yet, a peace agreement in advance of Russia would be a real danger for states bordering Russia.97 The Trump administration has also tried to obtain an agreement to supply mineral, mining and hydrocarbon resources at knock-down prices, which would have been a humiliation for Ukraine. Although a final agreement has been reached, it is much more balanced and respects Ukrainian sovereignty, but it was only obtained at the cost of bitter negotiations.98
The reliability of American support has been questioned since Donald Trump's first election, which has legitimized French preferences. The CEE states are now aware that the guarantee of security provided by the USA is not assured. Several strategies have been put in place to ensure this. The first has been to reject any alternative to the United States, whether in arms procurement or in the NATO decision-making process. When it comes to armaments, the majority of CEE countries favor American equipment. This has been all the more the case since the election of Donald Trump. On several occasions, tenders for heavy equipment between European and American companies have been won by the latter. In August 2024, Poland purchased 96 AH-64E Apache combat helicopters for $10 billion. While two European manufacturers had proposed their equipment (Airbus Helicopter's Tiger and Leonardo's AW129), the final round was decided between two American aircraft, the AH-64 E and Bell's AH-1Z Viper.99 Within NATO, CEE states accept the gradual involvement of the Alliance in the Indo-Pacific Region.
However, since the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian war, a change in rhetoric and actions can be underlined.
In terms of capabilities and armaments, there has been acquisitions of significant quantities of non-American equipment, with speed of delivery being a priority. Indeed, the American arms industry has revealed an insufficient production capacity since the start of the invasion of Ukraine. It has been unable to produce enough to replace the large quantities of equipment handed over to Ukraine or ordered by European states.100 These shortcomings have become all the more acute since the outbreak of the Israeli-Hamas conflict, which is characterized by the Israeli army's heavy consumption of American equipment.101 Moreover, the technological complexity of this equipment makes it very difficult, if not impossible, to mass-produce.102 Consequently, Poland ordered 1,000 K2 Black Panther tanks and several hundred howitzers from South Korea in July 2022.103 Furthermore, several CEE states, such as Poland and Lithuania recognize the importance for the EU to be more autonomous in the technological field, whether for arms projects, cyber, resilience or health.104
This interest was underlined when CEE states approved the EU's industrial strategy, which explicitly promotes preference for European military equipment. Although not mandatory, the strategy sets three arms sovereignty objectives: (1) to acquire at least 40% of defense equipment collaboratively by 2030; (2) to ensure that, by 2030, the value of defense-related intra-EU trade represents at least 35% of the value of the Union's defense market; (3) to steadily increase their purchases of defense equipment within the EU so that at least 50% of the defense budget is spent within the Union by 2030 and 60% by 2035.105 As part of its presidency of the European Union in the first half of 2025, Poland plans to improve European defense through deeper integration of EU military industries, including with the United Kingdom, streamlined bureaucracy, and enhanced financing.106 The interest of CEE states in European industrial cooperation is growing, and they are now open to and interested in integrating joint armaments programs.107
On a bilateral level, negotiations with Poland on a bilateral cooperation agreement have been completed, with the signing of a treaty scheduled for Nancy on May 9, 2025. While this treaty covers a wide range of policy areas, security cooperation is expected to be central.108
French recognition of NATO's centrality was particularly eagerly awaited. Indeed, several states viewed its attempts to promote only European strategic autonomy with great skepticism, seeing it simply as a means of maximizing its own interests.109 Recognition of the importance of the Atlantic Alliance goes some way to allaying these fears.
Beyond armaments issues, the discourse of Central and Eastern European states on European strategic autonomy has evolved, becoming less skeptical of the concept. The CEE states have approved the Strategic Compass, the document defining the EU's strategic environment and its strategic priorities.110 In particular, the document calls for the creation of a 5,000-strong European Union Rapid Deployment Capability and the intensification of armaments cooperation. Above all, the concept explicitly states the need to increase the EU's capacity for action in the context of a more hostile strategic environment.
The more hostile security environment requires us to make a quantum leap forward and increase our capacity and willingness to act, strengthen our resilience and ensure solidarity and mutual assistance."111
A more pronounced promotion of European strategic autonomy can perhaps be observed since the re-election of Donald Trump to the Presidency of the United States. Donald Tusk, Prime Minister of Poland, declared the day after his victory, "Some claim that Europe's future depends on the American elections, when it depends first and foremost on us (...) Whatever the outcome, the era of geopolitical outsourcing is over."112 In the Czech Republic, both the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Speaker of the House felt that Europe would have to step up its independent defense efforts.113
Conclusion – a shift in France's strategic priority, not in France's post-war behavior
The consideration of Russia as a threat pushed France to get closer to Central and Eastern European states. Since the End of World War II, France has been seeking to restore its rank, strengthening the actorness of the EU and favor the emergence of a stable and equilibrated international order. After the End of the Cold War, relations between France and CEE states had been limited, due to divergence in foreign policy doctrines and in strategic priorities.
After decades of mistrust and lack of interest in Central and Eastern Europe, France is now looking to forge closer ties. French policymakers have recognized the failure of their attempt to integrate Russia in the European security environment. While France had not been considering Russia as a security threat since the end of the Cold War, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has changed this perception. Russia is now approached as a security threat. This leads to a partial reorientation of French foreign policy towards the East. Russia becoming a threat again, France now sees the value of Central and Eastern Europe. In an apologetic exercise, President Macron recognized France's lack of interest in the region, and announced his desire to deepen ties with it. At the same time, he acknowledged the central role of the Atlantic Alliance in the defense of Europe, an institution he had previously treated with distance and skepticism. More concretely, France is scaling down its defense investment in Africa and in the Middle East to reallocate them on the Eastern Flank and in the preparation of a high intensity war.
Yet, this apparent shift is only partial. France has reoriented its strategic priority but has not abandoned its post-war foreign policy behavior. This commitment is consubstantial with the promotion by France of a greater European strategic autonomy. The Russian threat and the American partial withdrawal are actually perceived by French policymakers as a confirmation of their preferences. To achieve this long-standing foreign policy objective, France is now aware that the Russian threat must be taken into account. Likewise, French policymakers realized the need to involve the eastern half of Europe and to involve NATO, realizing that a more integrated European defense system cannot ignore the Alliance. Thus while France is keen to forge closer ties with CEE states (having difference policy preference), it still pursues its traditional foreign policy objective. The objective is an ambitious one, since these countries are traditionally skeptical of anything resembling competition with the Atlantic Alliance, the central pillar of their security.
President Macron is proposing a multiple framework for developing France's relations with Central and Eastern Europe: NATO, the EU and the European Political Community. Macron's policy aims at conciliating French objective. At the same time, he intends to deepen bilateral ties. The framework appears complex, with the risk of competition between institutions. France is not sufficiently precise about the division of competences it promotes between these different institutions.
The French shift has been well received by its partners in Central and Eastern Europe. Yet, concrete achievements remain very limited. France has increased its involvement in the defense of the Eastern flank of the Atlantic Alliance. It has not yet concluded aby single cooperation treaty with the region, nor has it integrated any CEE states into its armament's projects.
However, positive trends are currently underway, in some cases validating French proposals. Thus, by avoiding duplication of institutions, a rapprochement with the CEE states following the objective of greater European autonomy is possible. To achieve this, France will have to give concrete form to its proposals and adopt a clear strategy defining the modalities of cooperation with these states. Industrial cooperation appears to be the most feasible. Not only is there an opening on the CEE side, but this would not call into question cooperation within NATO. France should strengthen the presence of its industries in the region, and involve CEE countries in its projects.
France must put an end to its practice of diplomacy decided in a highly centralized manner by the Presidency of the Republic, and make the effort to define a long-term strategy. To gain credibility, France needs to provide security guarantees that come close to those offered by the USA. Two avenues can be explored. The first would be to implement the proposal to deploy troops in Ukraine. It now seems likely that a ceasefire (of varying length) will be adopted, with the establishment of a demarcation zone similar to the "demilitarized" zone between the two Koreas. The deployment of American forces would most likely be excluded by the agreement signed. In this scenario, France could take command of a European reassurance force deployed on the Ukrainian side. On the other hand, France could establish a system for sharing its atomic weapons. It could set up a double-key system similar to that used by the United States within NATO.
In any case, the willingness of the CEE states to endorse French positions on European strategic autonomy will depend on the evolution of American support for Europe. Indeed, every step taken by the CEE states towards greater European strategic autonomy has been preceded by a threat from the USA to reduce its support for Europe. For the time being, the CEE states seem to support European defense only as an alternative to American support.
About the Author
Louis Bazelle is a Master in International Affairs student at Johns Hopkins University SAIS, from Nantes, France. Louis has dedicated his studies and work to the field of defense and European policies. He obtained his Bachelor of Arts from Sciences Po Lille and Münster University, with a focus on public governance. His research has focused on Franco-German arms cooperation and the European Union's involvement in the Indo-Pacific. Prior to SAIS, Louis worked at the Egmont Institute, the French Permanent Representation to NATO and Spiegel TV
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