The collapse of Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria has triggered a significant power shift in the Middle East, disrupting regional stability and altering global geopolitical alignments. This transformation has intensified cooperation among the United States' primary adversaries—Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea—who perceive Assad's downfall as another example of Western interventionism. The event may reinforce their shared interests in regime survival, internal control, and military collaboration, particularly in response to threats of external influence. While Russia, Iran, and North Korea deepen their military and technological cooperation, China remains cautiously engaged, balancing its economic ties with the West against its strategic partnerships with these states. The fall of Syria's government also challenges long-standing alliances, forcing Moscow and Tehran to reassess their positions in the region. Iran faces difficulties in maintaining its regional proxy networks, while Russia seeks to secure its military foothold. As a transitional government emerges in Syria, these shifting dynamics could either solidify or test the growing alignment of anti-Western powers, reshaping the geopolitical landscape in the Middle East and beyond.
Introduction
The geopolitically turbulent year of 2024 in the Middle East has come to an end marked by an extraordinary power shift in Syrian territories caused by the fall of Assad. Events in Syria over the past month have upended the balance of power in the region causing new alliances to form, some old alliances to become brittle, and some to strengthen. This phenomenon represents a complete transformation in the balance of power. The war in Ukraine has often been characterized as a precipitating factor in the growing alignment of the United States' key adversaries—China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. The conflict has incentivized greater cooperation between the members of this quartet. From all the weapon manufacture and exchange between these countries to deployment of foreign soldiers and the battlefront. The fall of the Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria may bring America's four rival antagonists closer together still, at least for now.
The rising alignment between the states of Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea has been driven by a shared perception that the United States and its allies have historically acted to undermine their sovereignty, weaken their influence, and cut off their access to markets. In Moscow, Tehran, Beijing, and Pyongyang, the fall of Assad is likely to be seen through this prism, yet another data point suggesting that the West will do anything to undermine their survival.
Pursuing The Strategic Bond
The overnight collapse of the Syrian regime could heighten fears of domestic upheaval, particularly in Moscow and Tehran. As part of the growing military cooperation among the four countries, Russia has already shared1 advanced surveillance technologies with Iran, and China has subsequently supplied2 Iran with anti-drone and aircraft electronic laser defensive systems. However, the recent events in Syria could incentivize greater cooperation and knowledge sharing on surveillance and internal control mechanisms. Assad's downfall will once again reinforce a key lesson for authoritarian regimes across the globe about the cost of failing to stamp out internal threats to their rule. As a result, other countries may decide to pursue greater alignment with Russia, Iran, China, and North Korea if they view the risk of regime change as greater than the costs of cooperation with U.S. adversaries.
The fall of the Syrian government could also lead to greater military cooperation among Russia, Iran, and North Korea. Failure in Syria could prompt Russia, seeking a win, to double down3 on its war in Ukraine, accepting nothing less than total victory in the conflict. Iran's supply of drones and missiles4, and North Korea's supply of ammunition and troops5, has been crucial in sustaining the Russian war effort in Ukraine thus far, and in the event of an intensification of the conflict, Russia may request increased military support from both Tehran and Pyongyang. In return, Russia could provide Iran with assistance in rebuilding its battered air defenses or expand nuclear cooperation. Likewise, Russia could provide North Korea with the high-end technologies and expertise needed to upgrade its nuclear, space, and missile programs.
Although China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are increasingly viewed as an aligned group, cooperation among them has been almost entirely bilateral so far. This section explains the state of cooperation between each pair, in increasing order of importance. The most significant instances of their cooperation have undeniably been in the context of Russia's war on Ukraine. Whether this cooperation will survive the war is uncertain. The threats from deeper future cooperation among these pairs are greater, but future cooperation is not foreordained and should not be extrapolated from straight line projections based on recent trends in the Middle East. We must also consider that there are also other potential states with similar political views against the West in which can potentially join the bargain against the US in the region and greater areas such as Pakistan, Venezuela, Brazil, and other smaller powers.
The Eastern Front
As tensions between the four states and the West have increased, China has been more willing to play that leadership role. However, it is not clear how much it would sacrifice in its positive economic relations with the United States and its allies in Europe and Asia to organize deeper cooperation among these economically weaker partners. Although the newly implemented tariff policy by Trump's Administration could potentially boost this shifting policy in favor of security rather than deterrent economics. China is deeply integrated into the world economically and politically in ways that the other three countries are not. China benefits from the existing world order far more than the other three and prefers different end states from them when it comes to international rules of the road, for example.
While China seeks to reform the world order, Russia, Iran, and North Korea aim for what more closely resembles an outright revolution. Moreover, Russia now sees its relationship with Europe as almost entirely adversarial whereas China seeks to sustain a positive economic and political relationship with the wealthy European nations. In other words, China is somehow playing the two-level game on an international level whereas on one side they are the strategic security and economic partner of the anti-West wagon and on the other side the deceptive yet strategic economic partner of the West. This two-level game6 can be seen by the US as both exploitational and provisional. However, the newly implemented tariff policy by the US targeting China could possibly discourage China's economic relations with the west and straitening their military strategies with the other side.
The Caspian Neighbors
When it comes to Russia and Iran, the roots7 of this deepening alignment were apparent long before February 2022. Over a decade of propping up the regime of Assad, the two countries became increasingly enmeshed, even as their security interests8 often diverged. The fall of the Syrian regime could mark a turning point in the Russia-Iran relationship, and it may also have broader implications for the growing alignment9 of the United States' key adversaries. Over a decade of civil war in Syria, the Assad regime could count on the steadfast support of two countries—Russia and Iran. In the early years of the civil war, Iran deployed10 Quds Force personnel to the country, ultimately allowing the Syrian regime to regain key territory from rebel control. The Russian intervention11 in September 2015—reportedly12 initiated after Iranian Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani appealed to Russian President Vladimir Putin during a visit to Moscow—provided decisive air control13 to Syrian government forces. Without the support of Russia and Iran, the Assad regime likely would likely have collapsed much earlier.
Conclusion
For both countries Iran and Russia, Syria was a linchpin for their geopolitical ambitions. For Iran, Syria served as a critical land bridge14 that allowed it to funnel weapons and supplies to Hezbollah. With the future of that supply route in question, and Hezbollah's ranks and infrastructure decimated15 by conflict with Israel, Iran now faces the considerable challenge of rebuilding its once formidable proxy network. With a reduced ability to resupply16 Hezbollah, Iran may lean more heavily on its network of Shia militia groups in Iraq or on the Houthis. Russia, for its part, is trying to negotiate17 continued access to its bases in Syria with HTS; in the meantime, it has begun withdrawing18 troops and materiel from 'Hmeimim' Air Base and moved some naval assets from Syria to Libya. "The recent events in Syria challenge the idea…that Russia, Iran, China, and North Korea are working together not just to achieve military or economic objectives, but rather because they seek to supplant the Western-led international order."19 Moving forward, as a transitional government20 takes power in Syria, the anti-liberal axis will have to renegotiate their respective approaches in the Middle East—and their relationships with one another. This test could ultimately bring them closer together than ever and introduce a new order in the Middle East.
About the Author
Arash M. Akbari is a MAIA graduate from Johns Hopkins University SAIS with an international law and international relations background from Curtin University in Australia. He is currently working at the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a political analyst and a security advisor to the Minister. Previously worked as a research assistant at the German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA), Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), the Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA); also was an Officer of External Relation and Strategic Partnerships at the International Anti-Corruption Academy at United Nations Office in Vienna.
Footnotes
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