This paper examines Japan's evolving security strategy under Prime Minister Abe's second premiership, situating it within broader structural transformations in East Asia's regional order. Anchored in the hedging school of neorealist thought, the analysis traces how Japan's strategic posture has shifted in response to perceived limitations within the U.S.-led "hub-and-spoke" alliance system—particularly those made more apparent during a period of fluctuating American engagement. Conceptualizing this moment as a critical juncture, the paper argues that Japan's recalibration toward a networked security framework—manifested through the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision and the revitalization of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad)—constitutes a deliberate effort to complement bilateral alliances with inter-spoke and minilateral cooperation. This evolving approach seeks to uphold U.S. regional anchorage while affording Japan and its partners greater agency in shaping the strategic landscape of the Indo-Pacific. By closely analyzing institutional developments and regional responses, the paper contributes to ongoing debates on middle power strategies, strategic hedging, and the layered architecture of regional order. It also illuminates the enduring tension between continuity and innovation in alignment behavior under conditions of contested hegemony and shifting systemic expectations.
Background
The U.S.-led alliance system has long served as the cornerstone of East Asia's postwar security architecture, with Washington occupying what Goh describes as the "superpower overlay"1 —a position of hierarchical predominance in the regional order. Institutionally, this order has been expressed through a bilateral "hub-and-spoke" framework, wherein the United States anchors a series of security relationships with allied states, most notably Japan. From Tokyo's perspective, however, this arrangement has come under mounting strain from two principal vectors: the assertive trajectory of China's rise and evolving patterns of U.S. strategic engagement. Since the late 1990s, China's rapid accumulation of economic and military capabilities has enabled a more confident foreign policy, evidenced by high-profile incidents such as the 2010 collision near the Senkaku Islands and the escalation of maritime patrols in contested waters. At the same time, the United States confronted a set of global demands—marked by prolonged counterterrorism operations and economic contraction following the 2008 financial crisis—that temporarily redirected its strategic focus. These pressures contributed to a perceived reduction in the centrality of East Asia within Washington's security calculus, reflected in altered patterns of military deployment and signalling to regional allies a shift in prioritization.2
Despite China's remarkable ascent—exemplified by its surpassing of Japan as the world's second-largest economy in 2011—Tokyo has maintained a largely consistent strategic approach toward Beijing. This continuity is marked by Japan's enduring participation in regional institutions alongside China and the preservation of substantial economic interdependence, even in the face of deteriorating diplomatic relations—a dynamic often described as "cold politics, hot economy."3 Concurrently, the Obama administration introduced the "Pivot to Asia," a strategic rebalancing intended to reassure regional allies of sustained U.S. commitment. For many in East Asia, this recalibration served to reaffirm the legitimacy of relying on American strategic leadership. Yet Japan's evolving behavior complicates this picture. Increasingly, Tokyo has pursued a more expansive vision of regional order, assuming leadership roles in initiatives such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)—notably in the absence of U.S. participation.
This development raises important analytical questions, which this paper seeks to address, for scholars of East Asia international relations. How should Japan's expanding role in regional security cooperation—alongside actors such as Australia, India, select ASEAN members, and extra-regional partners like the U.K., France, and Italy—be understood? What motivates this strategic recalibration, beyond the simultaneous pressures of China's rise and evolving patterns of U.S. engagement? Does it signal a broader ambition, as suggested by Abe's assertion that "Japan is not now and will never be a tier two power"?4 What empirical evidence, if any, point to a reconfiguration of the traditional "hub-and-spoke" system toward more networked and multilateral security arrangements?
The 2016 U.S. presidential election introduced a period of heightened uncertainty into the strategic foundations of Japan's postwar security architecture. For decades, Tokyo's defense posture had rested on the assumption of a stable and reliable U.S.-Japan alliance, embedded within the broader "hub-and-spoke" system of U.S.-led regional order. The subsequent shift in U.S. foreign policy orientation—marked by a more transactional approach to alliance relations and strategic reassessment in multilateral commitments—generated anxiety among Asian allies regarding Washington's long-term resolve and resource prioritization.5 This moment constituted a structural inflection point that compelled Japanese strategic elites to reconsider the sustainability of existing security arrangements and explore alternative pathways for safeguarding national interests as a secondary power.
In response, Japan introduced key policy innovations—most notably the articulation of the "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" (FOIP) vision in 2016 and the revival of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) in 2017. These initiatives have been interpreted by some as signaling the gradual erosion of the Yoshida Doctrine, which had long prioritized economic development under the protective umbrella of U.S. military primacy.6 Others have suggested that these developments reflect a regional trend toward "de-hub-and-spokification," in which the U.S. centrality gives way to more diffuse and pluralistic forms of security cooperation.7 Yet such interpretations often overlook a critical empirical feature: rather than seeking to replace the alliance framework, U.S. partners—including Japan—have pursued deeper inter-spoke and minilateral cooperation in ways that complement existing institutions. In this context, Tokyo's advocacy for a networked security architecture reflects strategic adaptation within, rather than abandonment of, the prevailing order. To situate this shift, the following section revisits the "hedging school" of Japanese security studies, which, grounded in neorealist traditions8, provides a useful framework for understanding this evolving strategic posture.
Theoretical Debate
The Hedging School
Hedging has become the dominant conceptual lens through which scholars interpret Japan's post–Cold War security strategy, capturing Tokyo's dual-track approach of sustained economic and diplomatic engagement with China alongside the reinforcement of its military alignment with the United States.9 Central to this strategy is the maintenance of strategic ambiguity—a calculated posture that affords Japan the flexibility to recalibrate its alignments in response to evolving regional power configurations and strategic uncertainty.10 By resisting the structural imperatives of either pure balancing or bandwagoning, Japan retains manoeuvrability across a fluid geopolitical landscape. Deepening economic interdependence with China may inadvertently enhance Beijing's political leverage, while an overreliance on U.S. military support risks exposure to alliance decoupling or diminishing regional commitment.11 Hedging thus offers a mechanism through which Japan can mitigate these vulnerabilities, enabling it to pursue strategic resilience without committing unequivocally to either pole of the regional power spectrum.
Strategically, Japan's non-aligned posture affords it a broader repertoire of policy responses, enabling calibrated shifts between engagement and deterrence. As Koga observes, Tokyo turns to more overt balancing measures only when avenues for engagement become untenable.12 This flexibility lies at the core of hedging, wherein strategies that blend diplomatic engagement with restrained forms of balancing remain consistent with the conceptual parameters articulated by Goh.13 Goh further elaborates this logic by framing Japan–China relations as a "power bargain"—a condition of managed coexistence in which regional stability is underpinned not by competitive exclusion, but by tacit understandings of influence and restraint.14 Lind adds an important structural dimension to this analysis, identifying two enduring pressures that inform Japan's hedging behavior: the external challenge posed by China's growing material capabilities, and the internal ambiguity regarding the durability of U.S. strategic commitment.15 These insights collectively underscore hedging as a dynamic and adaptive strategy, shaped by shifting regional constraints and the complex interplay of great power relationships.
Among contemporary frameworks, Kuik's typology offers one of the most systematic approaches for analyzing hedging behavior, providing a flexible lens through which to examine how secondary states navigate asymmetrical power relations.16 Within the context of intensifying Chinese capabilities and growing uncertainty regarding U.S. strategic consistency, Japan's hedging strategy may be analytically disaggregated into four dimensions: military hedging (indirect balancing), political hedging (dominance denial), economic hedging (pragmatic diversification), and binding engagement.
Japan's military hedge encompasses both internal and external balancing mechanisms designed to mitigate strategic uncertainty. Domestically, Tokyo has undertaken sustained modernization of its defense capabilities and repositioned the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to enhance operational readiness in the southwestern region—a locus of potential maritime contestation.17 Externally, it has reaffirmed and incrementally deepened the U.S.-Japan alliance, maintaining it as a central pillar of deterrence, even amid periodic concerns over alliance durability. Japan's economic hedge complements this approach by sustaining robust engagement with China while simultaneously pursuing diversification strategies to reduce structural dependence. Expanding trade and investment linkages with Southeast Asia and other regional economies allows Tokyo to hedge against potential economic coercion, thereby preserving strategic autonomy.18 Together, these military and economic hedges reflect a hybrid strategy that marries material preparedness with calibrated integration, enabling Japan to respond adaptively to regional power shifts.
The political dimensions of Japan's hedge strategy are expressed through binding engagement and political hedging. Binding engagement aims to embed China within multilateral frameworks that promote norm adherence and institutional constraint, while political hedging emphasizes the importance of inclusive institutional arrangements—particularly those involving continued U.S. participation—to maintain a favorable balance of influence. These approaches are often operationalized simultaneously. Through platforms such as ASEAN+3, the East Asia Summit, and APEC, Japan has worked to integrate China into rule-based regional processes while reinforcing institutional norms through broader coalitions of like-minded states.19 These efforts exemplify Japan's dual objective: shaping regional order by fostering cooperative inclusion while constraining the potential for unilateral dominance.
The reorientation of U.S. foreign policy following the 2016 election introduced unprecedented challenges for Japan's strategic calculus. A more transactional approach to alliance management—marked by public critiques of burden-sharing and a greater emphasis on unilateral cost-benefit assessments—cast renewed light on the conditional nature of U.S. security commitments. This shift underscored the inherent fragility within the "hub-and-spoke" system, particularly for regional spokes such as Japan, which faced heightened strategic exposure amid growing concerns over alliance dependability. Against the backdrop of intensifying great power rivalry and China's expanding regional presence, perceived ambiguities in U.S. strategic resolve emerged as a critical driver of Japan's evolving security posture. In response, Tokyo advanced key strategic initiatives—notably the articulation of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision and the revitalization of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue—as part of a broader effort to reinforce regional alignment structures and hedge against volatility in traditional alliance frameworks.
The Argument
Cha distinguishes the U.S. "hub-and-spoke" alliance system from NATO by highlighting its dual function20 : as a deterrent framework against external threats and as an instrument for maintaining bilateral control, including monitoring domestic political developments and constraining unilateral military initiatives by allied states. Situated within the broader U.S.-led liberal international order, this architecture was long assumed to possess institutional durability beyond the Cold War. However, during a period of recalibrated U.S. foreign policy priorities, both the perceived material capacity and political willingness of Washington to uphold its traditional regional commitments appeared increasingly uncertain. For Japan, this ambiguity introduced new strategic anxieties—raising difficult questions about the extent to which even institutionalized bilateral alliances could ensure U.S. support in the event of a contingency involving China. These concerns are encapsulated in the concept of the abandonment dilemma21 , which highlights the risks of dependence on a single great power's consistent engagement. The U.S. decision to withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) further signaled a more cautious approach to regional economic integration. For many Asian states—particularly those outside formal alliance frameworks—the lack of robust multilateral mechanisms for addressing coercive pressures and capability asymmetries has become an enduring strategic concern.22 At its core, the vertically structured "hub-and-spoke" model, centered on U.S. authority, offers limited institutional avenues for horizontal coordination among allies. The broader moment of regional flux revealed by this episode has thus prompted recalibrations in security strategies, especially among middle powers such as Japan, whose strategic orientation remains deeply embedded in the alliance system.
In response to these limitations, Japan has adopted a dual-track approach to security. On one hand, Tokyo remains strongly committed to the U.S.-Japan alliance, continuing to prioritize American engagement as the foundational element of its strategic posture. On the other, it has pursued a more proactive role in cultivating alignments with like-minded partners—many of them existing U.S. allies or strategic associates—through a series of multilateral and minilateral initiatives.23 This shift reflects a movement from reactive alliance reliance to more deliberate shaping of regional security architecture. Under Abe's second administration, this posture became notably more assertive. The 2014 reinterpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution, allowing for limited collective self-defense, marked a significant institutional step toward greater alignment with U.S.-led operations. While the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) continue to function within a complementary role, Tokyo has made concerted efforts to signal its reliability as a strategic partner—both to reinforce the alliance's credibility and to underscore that sustained U.S. engagement remains a core pillar of regional order.
Among Japan's recent strategic initiatives, the advancement of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision and the revitalization of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) stand as pivotal markers of its evolving security posture. Both frameworks—energized through sustained leadership by Tokyo—signify a deliberate recalibration from the more tentative strategic orientation of Abe's first administration (2006–2007). These initiatives represent a departure from a strictly bilateral alliance model, articulating instead an inter-spoke logic of regional engagement. By "connecting the dots" among like-minded partners, Japan seeks to institutionalize a networked regional architecture through a combination of minilateral and multilateral mechanisms—explicitly designed not to supplant the U.S. alliance system, but to reinforce it through complementary alignments that address shared strategic concerns.24 This approach marks a conceptual evolution beyond conventional hedging, which typically pivots between reassurance of a dominant power and deterrence of a rising one. Nor is it limited to economic diversification. Rather, the FOIP and Quad frameworks aim to engage a broader set of regional security issues—spanning both traditional and non-traditional domains, from maritime governance to contingencies on the Korean Peninsula.
This emerging networked approach constitutes a carefully calibrated response to the perceived institutional limitations of the "hub-and-spoke" system, as revealed during a period of shifting U.S. strategic priorities. While this evolution signals a more proactive and assertive Japanese posture relative to earlier phases of strategic ambiguity, it does not represent a wholesale departure from the Yoshida Doctrine. The U.S.-Japan alliance remains the central pillar of Tokyo's security architecture, a position reaffirmed in the Kishida administration's 2022 National Security Strategy, which underscores the enduring value of bilateral cooperation. Similarly, claims of "de-hub-and-spokification" remain analytically premature. Empirically, the structural foundations of the existing order remain intact. Japan's strategy, therefore, is best understood as an effort to supplement, rather than replace, alliance-centered regional order through the construction of flexible, overlapping security partnerships.
To conceptualize Japan's evolving security strategy, it is analytically useful to frame the U.S. evolving commitment to the alliance system as a structural independent variable—an exogeneity that recalibrated expectations surrounding alliance reliability and regional order. Japan's response, in this context, constitutes the dependent variable: a strategic adaptation manifest in a shift toward inter-spoke and minilateral cooperation. Importantly, this recalibration does not amount to a repudiation of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Rather, it reflects a reconfiguration of Japan's strategic orientation, wherein inter-spoke connectivity and institutional diversification are pursued in parallel with the maintenance of bilateral ties. This layered approach suggests a broader pattern of middle power adjustment under conditions of strategic ambiguity within a U.S.-anchored order.
Hypothesis: Perceived volatility in the U.S.-centered alliance system encourages regional middle powers to pursue networked security alignments as a hedge against uncertainty.
Empirical Analysis
In the aftermath of the Cold War, Japan confronted a strategic and discursive inflection point. With the Soviet threat receding, a key question emerged: to what extent would China's ascent reconfigure the regional balance of power, and what posture should Tokyo adopt in anticipation of such a shift?25 Realist scholars such as Waltz anticipated that Japan would become increasingly concerned about its strategic position, reinforcing an analytical consensus that Japan's post–Cold War security strategy has been largely defined by the rise of China.26 At the same time, Japan's continued engagement with the United States has been viewed as necessary to sustain a hierarchical regional order, with Washington at its apex.27 As the postwar alliance framework began to show signs of strain—amid broader trends of American retrenchment from liberal internationalism—some analysts suggested that Japan might begin assuming a more proactive role, stepping into areas where U.S. leadership appeared more ambivalent.28 This interpretation aligns with the expectation that Tokyo could serve as a regional convenor, cultivating alignments among like-minded states and, in doing so, exercising greater strategic agency—albeit still within a U.S.-anchored order.29
Reflecting this evolution, Japan began broadening both the conceptual and geographic scope of its strategic imagination by the late 2000s. Abe's "Confluence of the Two Seas" address to the Indian Parliament and his early promotion of a Quadrilateral Security Dialogue signaled an effort to recalibrate Japan's regional role in light of growing Chinese maritime assertiveness. These initiatives laid the groundwork for key elements of Japan's rearticulated security strategy—most notably, the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision and the revival of the Quad. Together, these frameworks seek to institutionalize minilateral cooperation and reinforce shared norms, while preserving the structural foundations of the U.S.-centered alliance system. Rather than a rupture, they represent an attempt to extend and adapt Japan's strategic reach within a still-hierarchical, but increasingly pluralized, regional security architecture.
Japan's articulation of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision and its sustained promotion of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) have gained considerable resonance among both the United States and key regional stakeholders. The U.S. 2019 Indo-Pacific Strategy Report echoes many of the strategic principles embedded in Japan's FOIP framework, signalling alignment in both narrative and intent. Similarly, Washington's endorsement of the Quad's elevation to the leaders' level reflects broader recognition of the grouping's utility in addressing shared regional challenges. These developments illustrate Tokyo's growing strategic efficacy—not only in identifying institutional gaps within the traditional "hub-and-spoke" system, but also in offering a normative and operational framework for inter-spoke and multilateral cooperation. The following sections examine the FOIP and Quad initiatives as comparative case studies, through which Japan's recalibrated security strategy—consistent with Lind's twofold framework30 —can be interpreted as an effort to institutionalize a more networked regional architecture. This strategy reflects a pragmatic response to structural uncertainty, enabling Japan to navigate a period of intensified great power competition while reinforcing the broader order in which it remains embedded.
The "free and open Indo-Pacific" (FOIP) Vision
The conceptual lineage of the "Indo-Pacific" can be traced to Abe's 2007 articulation of a "broader Asia," which tentatively envisioned greater integration between East and South Asia.31 Since then, the concept has undergone substantial refinement in both geographic scope and strategic purpose. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs formally introduced the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) in its 2017 Diplomatic Bluebook, referencing Abe's 2016 remarks that extended the region's connective logic to include Asia and Africa. Later iterations expanded the spatial horizon further to encompass the Americas, while shifting the label from "strategy" to "vision"—a discursive adjustment intended to mitigate regional anxieties about exclusion and alignment pressures.32 This evolution reflects Tokyo's broader effort to construct a networked security framework in response to the perceived constraints of a U.S.-centered order increasingly marked by strategic volatility.33 FOIP has since emerged as a flagship initiative through which Japan has sought to expand its regional responsibilities and partnership roles.34
Wilkins identifies three core elements underpinning this approach: strategic diplomacy, domestic resource mobilization, and the cultivation of external partnerships.35 Through FOIP, Tokyo has undertaken legislative and institutional reforms to enhance the operational flexibility of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), thereby overcoming some of the constitutional constraints that previously limited Japan's security contributions. Critically, FOIP represents Japan's attempt to operationalize inter-spoke and regional alignments while preserving the U.S.-Japan alliance as the structural foundation of its security strategy. As Koga succinctly summarizes, FOIP reflects a vision of "U.S. in, China down, Australia/India/ASEAN up"—a layered formula that encapsulates Japan's effort to strengthen regional order from within the existing alliance framework rather than through structural disengagement or replacement.36
Within the FOIP framework, the defense of freedom of navigation has emerged as a central pillar of Japan's strategic posture. Since 2015, the Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF) have undertaken a series of port visits, humanitarian operations, and rotational deployments—most notably the 2017 dispatch of destroyers and the 2019 "Indo-Pacific Deployment," which featured the Izumo and Murasame—to bolster interoperability with regional partners including the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam.37 These efforts have been complemented by the participation of Japan's Ground and Air Self-Defense Forces in joint exercises, further reinforcing Tokyo's profile as a reliable security provider committed to shared maritime and regional interests.38
FOIP has also provided renewed impetus to Japan's engagement with ASEAN. Historically shaped by Japan's "flying geese" economic model39, this relationship has gradually adapted to address the strategic implications of China's post–Cold War economic rise and maritime assertiveness. Episodes such as the 2010 boat collision and the 2012 Senkaku/Diaoyu nationalization catalyzed Tokyo's re-engagement with traditional security concerns, prompting constitutional reinterpretations regarding SDF operations and a strategic reframing of its regional outlook—from the "Asia-Pacific" to the more expansive "Indo-Pacific."40 Abe's diplomatic outreach to all ASEAN states in 2013, shortly after reassuming office, underscored Japan's renewed regional attentiveness. While FOIP has not yielded a singular regional identity, it has enabled Japan to reassert normative leadership, particularly by cultivating shared concerns over the erosion of the regional status quo in the face of intensifying strategic competition.41
The trajectory set by FOIP was reaffirmed in Japan's 2022 National Security Strategy (NSS), which situates the current international environment as one marked by mounting instability and identifies China as "an unprecedented and the greatest strategic challenge."42 The NSS underscores Tokyo's intent to harness its comprehensive national power and deepen alignment with both U.S. allies and like-minded regional partners.43 Consistent with FOIP's logic, the document affirms Japan's commitment to fostering a networked security architecture anchored in the U.S.-Japan alliance. In doing so, Japan positions itself not only as a stabilizing actor, but also as a strategic convenor, actively shaping the evolving Indo-Pacific order.
The Quad Grouping
The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) constitutes one of Japan's most concrete efforts to institutionalize a networked regional security framework under the broader vision of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP).44 Initially proposed during Abe's first premiership in 2007—alongside his "Confluence of the Two Seas" speech delivered in India—the Quad sought to align four maritime democracies (Japan, the United States, Australia, and India) around shared principles such as the rule of law, freedom of navigation, and the maintenance of a stable regional order.45 Despite the normative appeal of this framework, early momentum was constrained by leadership transitions, divergent strategic priorities among partners, Chinese opposition, and reservations within ASEAN, as well as hesitancy from Canberra and New Delhi.
Abe's return to power in 2012 marked a more assertive rearticulation of the Quad's rationale, particularly amid growing concerns over maritime tensions and Beijing's rejection of the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling on the South China Sea. These developments prompted a renewed emphasis on institutionalizing cooperation among states that share not only strategic interests but also normative commitments to a rules-based regional order.46 The Quad was formally revived in 2017, culminating in its first leaders' summit in 2021. For Japan, the grouping functions as a critical complement to the bilateral U.S.-centered "hub-and-spoke" alliance system. By fostering minilateral, inter-spoke alignments—particularly with Australia and India—the Quad reinforces Japan's dual objective of enhancing regional security cooperation and reaffirming continued U.S. engagement in the Indo-Pacific.
Since its reconstitution, the Quad has gradually developed institutional substance through recurring diplomatic dialogues, working groups, and joint initiatives. While early summits concentrated on non-traditional security issues—such as pandemic response, vaccine access, and emerging technologies—the May 2022 leaders' summit in Tokyo expanded this agenda with the launch of the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness. This initiative directly reflects Japan's enduring emphasis on maritime security and freedom of navigation as critical elements of regional stability.47 Together, these activities demonstrate how the Quad has come to serve both hard and soft security functions in a regional environment increasingly shaped by strategic competition and contested norms.
Nonetheless, the Quad remains an evolving initiative, with institutional consolidation still underway.48 To date, its members have not formalized mechanisms for expansion nor articulated a fully coherent strategic vision for the Indo-Pacific, leaving open questions about the group's long-term durability and direction.49 Japan has consistently emphasized that its support for the Quad does not come at the expense of ASEAN centrality—an important reassurance in a region where perceptions of exclusion carry significant diplomatic weight. For Tokyo, cooperation with Australia and India is a necessary foundation, but not sufficient for broader regional order-building. Its strategic ambition extends to engaging a wider set of non-allied actors who share converging interests in preserving stability, particularly amid growing geopolitical uncertainty. Despite ongoing divergences in priorities and structural ambiguity, the Quad's institutional footprint signals Japan's commitment to cultivating a flexible and inclusive security architecture that complements, rather than competes with, existing alliance arrangements.
Ultimately, the Quad constitutes both a symbolic and operational augmentation of Japan's regional strategy. Building upon earlier trilateral dialogues, it encapsulates Tokyo's effort to forge functional linkages among regional actors and create a more resilient, inter-spoke security configuration. While its institutional trajectory remains a subject of ongoing observation, the Quad already serves as tangible evidence of Japan's strategic adaptation to shifting regional dynamics. In advancing this initiative, Japan contributes to the construction of a synergistic Indo-Pacific order—anchored in normative convergence and designed to foster pragmatic cooperation across a range of security domains.
Discussion
Regional Security Dynamics
The U.S.–Japan–China strategic triangle has long constituted a foundational structure of East Asian security dynamics, with Japan situated as both a critical U.S. ally and a proximate regional actor vis-à-vis China.50 However, this triangular equilibrium has become increasingly unstable amid intensifying U.S.–China strategic rivalry and the steady deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations. While Japan's embeddedness within the U.S.-led liberal order has provided security guarantees, it has also complicated Tokyo's postwar reconciliation with neighboring states and reinforced a perception of regional detachment.51 Japan's recent efforts to institutionalize inter-spoke alignments through mechanisms such as FOIP and the Quad reflect an ambition to assume a more proactive role in regional security governance. Yet from Beijing's perspective, such initiatives risk being interpreted as exclusionary or confrontational. Chinese critiques have portrayed FOIP as an extension of a containment logic, underscoring the fraught perceptional politics that accompany Japan's evolving strategic engagement.52
Tensions within the Sino-Japanese relationship have become increasingly multi-dimensional. Strategic competition over semiconductor supply chains, normative divergences on governance and human rights, and Japan's calibrated engagement with Taiwan all underscore the breadth of bilateral friction. Tokyo's endorsement of the 2022 G7 statement following the then-Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives' visit to Taiwan elicited a strong diplomatic response from Beijing, including the summoning of the Japanese ambassador. While Prime Minister Kishida has expressed a willingness to improve relations, substantive rapprochement has remained elusive. Recent developments—such as China's seafood import ban following the release of treated water from the Fukushima nuclear plant—illustrate how political tensions are beginning to undercut the economic interdependence that has historically served as a stabilizing force in bilateral ties.
ASEAN's reception of Japan's FOIP initiative further highlights the complexities of regional order-building in a pluralist environment. The issuance of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific in 2018, partly in response to Japan's FOIP, reaffirmed the principle of "ASEAN centrality" while also revealing divergent preferences among member states.53 These variations reflect underlying asymmetries in bilateral relations with China, consensus-based institutional norms, and differing levels of national capacity.54 As a result, ASEAN states remain ambivalent about whether FOIP enhances or constrains their agency within emerging regional security architectures.55 Japan's engagement with ASEAN, while normatively framed around inclusivity, must therefore navigate the region's institutional sensitivities and strategic heterogeneity.
The sustainability of Japan's networked security approach remains closely tied to the continued presence of the United States as a strategic anchor in the Indo-Pacific. As Wilkins notes, Washington has begun to recalibrate its alliance framework, moving from a traditional bilateral "hub-and-spoke" architecture toward a more adaptive model that facilitates inter-spoke cooperation among allies and partners.56 While this transition reflects broader efforts to enhance regional resilience and flexibility, it also introduces systemic uncertainties. Variations in U.S. foreign policy posture over the past decade have raised questions about the consistency of strategic commitments to the region. For Japan, such uncertainties carry significant implications: any diminution in U.S. engagement—whether perceived or actual—could erode the credibility and operational effectiveness of the interlinked alignments that Tokyo has sought to cultivate. In this context, Japan's networked strategy remains embedded within the broader U.S.-anchored regional order, and its success is contingent on the coherence and continuity of that external framework.
A second area of uncertainty concerns the substantive trajectory of the Indo-Pacific strategy itself. While the United States has formally adopted the language of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific—illustrated by the 2018 renaming of U.S. Pacific Command—the underlying objectives and strategic orientation of this approach continue to invite scrutiny. It remains unclear whether the initiative reflects a genuinely collective vision for regional order or if it is more narrowly oriented toward advancing specific U.S. strategic interests. These ambiguities have important implications for regional perceptions, particularly with respect to the evolving role of the Quad. Concerns persist among some stakeholders that deeper institutionalization could signal a shift toward a more militarized or exclusive security configuration, raising questions about whether such developments would alleviate or exacerbate existing regional tensions. These dynamics highlight the need for continued examination of how Indo-Pacific strategies are understood and operationalized across different actors within the region.
As Evelyn Goh warns, an East Asian security order achieved at the expense of Japan's alienation would repeat the very historical failures that contemporary regional order-building seeks to overcome.57 Japan's strategic challenge, then, lies in balancing its proactive leadership in shaping regional security with the delicate management of its relations with both great powers—all within an Indo-Pacific order experiencing profound reconfiguration.
Japan's Domestic Politics
As a consolidated democracy, Japan's domestic political institutions play a pivotal role in shaping the strategic preferences and autonomy of its ruling elites. Electoral reforms and shifting political norms have significantly reconfigured the landscape in which security policy is formulated. Reed et al. identify a critical inflection point in the 2005 lower house election, where party affiliation overtook interpersonal networks as the dominant determinant of electoral outcomes.58 This transformation compelled political parties to project coherent institutional identities, thereby elevating the strategic salience of party leadership.59 The Liberal Democratic Party's (LDP) return to power under Abe in late 2012—following a brief period of opposition—reinstated a stable parliamentary majority, which, coupled with a party-centered electoral environment, empowered Abe to centralize decision-making authority.
This institutional consolidation was formalized through the establishment of Japan's National Security Council (NSC) in 2013, modeled after its U.S. counterpart. Unlike the Security Council created in 1986, which served primarily as a site for bureaucratic coordination and diluted executive control60, the NSC provided the Prime Minister with a platform for strategic oversight and direct policy intervention.61 While Abe's assassination in 2022 marked the end of his personal leadership, his successors have relied on this internal support base. As such, the legacy of Abe's institutional reforms is likely to persist, shaping Japan's strategic trajectory through both structural entrenchment and factional continuity.
Debates surrounding the future trajectory of Japan's security strategy have increasingly permeated the political mainstream, emerging as a salient issue that even opposition parties can scarcely avoid. Within Japan's competitive parliamentary system, electoral cycles compel candidates across the ideological spectrum to articulate positions on national security, often translating abstract policy preferences into manifestos that resonate with a broader electorate. This electoral dynamic not only structures elite discourse but also reshapes the contours of public opinion, fostering iterative feedback between political leadership and societal expectations. As security issues gain prominence in electoral contestation, they acquire normative weight, potentially redefining both elite consensus and mass preferences in ways that influence the long-term direction of foreign and defense policy. In this sense, Japan's strategic posture is increasingly mediated by the interplay between institutionalized democratic processes and evolving threat perceptions within a fluid regional order.
Conclusion
This paper has examined the drivers and implications of Japan's increasingly assertive security strategy during Prime Minister Abe's second premiership. Grounded in the hedging school of neorealist thought, the analysis has traced how gradual erosion in the perceived reliability of the U.S.-led "hub-and-spoke" alliance system—amplified by broader structural shifts—has informed Japan's recalibration toward a more networked security framework. While some may view this period as an anomalous deviation from longstanding alliance norms, its effects have proven durable. Notably, subsequent efforts by the United States to reaffirm its regional engagement—such as the launch of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework in 2022—suggest a recognition of the need to restore strategic credibility and reengage partners within a multilayered regional order. In this respect, the earlier episode of uncertainty can be interpreted as a critical juncture that catalyzed a broader evolution in Japan's strategic posture, one that now integrates bilateral continuity with diversified regional alignment.
Through a systemic analysis of Japan's FOIP vision and its leadership in the revival of the Quad, this paper contributes to emerging scholarship on Indo-Pacific security dynamics by foregrounding patterns of inter-spoke and regional alignment through the lens of a middle power. This perspective is particularly instructive in light of Japan's dual identity: as a long-standing U.S. ally embedded within a hierarchical alliance structure, and as an increasingly proactive actor shaping regional order. As Lipscy notes, Japan's evolving strategic trajectory provides important insight into how secondary powers may respond to the reconfiguration of great power competition and the proliferation of overlapping institutional frameworks in the Indo-Pacific.62 While some analysts have characterized recent developments as indicative of a broader "de-hub-and-spokification"63, Japan's case stands out as one of the earliest and most deliberate articulations of a networked strategy. Its experience therefore warrants closer analytical attention as a potential model—or at least a reference point—for other states navigating similar strategic landscapes.
Despite Abe's departure from office in 2020, subsequent administrations have continued to uphold the FOIP framework as the cornerstone of Japan's regional strategy, attesting to its institutional entrenchment beyond the tenure of any single leader.64 Nonetheless, the extent to which Japan's evolving strategic vision will shape the broader regional security architecture remains contingent on longer-term geopolitical developments and the responses of regional stakeholders. Future research should examine how FOIP and related initiatives, such as the Quad, are being interpreted and operationalized by ASEAN member states—particularly in relation to the principle of ASEAN centrality—and how other actors, such as New Zealand, are positioning themselves within the expanding Indo-Pacific discourse. The rise of alternative frameworks, including the China-backed Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), adds a further layer of complexity to regional strategic calculations. As Wada suggests, the coexistence of multiple regional visions is likely to persist, raising important questions about institutional design, normative convergence, and the management of political contestation.65 In this context, Tokyo may be required to advance new institutional arrangements to address emergent security concerns that existing frameworks may not adequately cover.66 The effectiveness of such initiatives will hinge on the strategic acuity and diplomatic capacity of future Japanese leadership in navigating an increasingly complex regional order.
About the Author
Zihan Zhu is a PhD student in Government and Politics at the University of Maryland, College Park with a primary field in International Relations and a secondary field in Comparative Politics. He currently studies the interaction between domestic political institutions & actors and foreign policy decision-making (particularly regarding international trade) with a country-specific focus on Japan. He also takes some interest in electoral politics (specifically political dynasties), and the emerging trend of global authoritarianism.
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