Abstract

This paper examines the rupturing of the long-established ties between Russian and Ukrainian organized crime following Russia's February 2022 invasion. Drawing on emerging research, it focuses on the four main drivers of these changes: disruptions in cross-border operations, emerging wartime illicit economies, rising nationalist tendencies, and intensified state oversight. These shifts reveal how the Ukrainian organized crime's westward realignment and the Russian state's further absorption of criminal groups has established fault lines between a once-borderless network. However, the opportunistic nature of organized crime leaves open the question of whether a brokered peace agreement, and the reconstruction boom likely to follow, could thaw the icy ties, and restore the alliances that existed before the conflict. Whether these shifts will endure hinges on the effectiveness of Western-backed anti-corruption efforts, and the conflicts uncertain outcome.

Introduction

In 2023, special agents from the Department of Homeland Security raided the Brooklyn home of Salimdzhon Nasriddinov, a dual Russian-Tajik citizen who facilitated the trafficking of $10 million worth of sanctioned electronics from the United States to Russia.¹ These electronics, critical for producing missiles and drones used to devastate Ukrainian cities and towns, were purchased by Nasriddinov and his associates through legitimate businesses before being exported abroad. Critical for the production of missiles and drones used to devastate Ukrainian cities and towns, he and his associates purchased hundreds of thousands of dual-use semiconductors through legitimate businesses before exporting them abroad. The smuggling network spanned the globe, with countries like Turkey, India, and Hong Kong serving as key transit points on the way to Russian manufacturing plants. Just a few years ago, even after the Maidan Revolution and the invasion of Crimea, such a sophisticated network would have been largely unnecessary. Criminal partners in the Ukrainian underworld, then seemingly unaffected by the geopolitical tensions between their nations, would have readily supplied these products.² Why then, has this changed in 2023, following the onset of the broader war?

This story, and many like it, exemplifies a growing trend in the severing of ties between the Russian and Ukrainian underworlds. With a shared history that stretches from Soviet-era party corruption, to the "Wild 90s" period of economic liberalization, to the state-linked crime organizations found in the modern era, the two nations' illicit markets have long been interconnected. Human, weapons, and drug trafficking have sustained criminal networks of varying sizes and prominence, even advancing the political careers of leaders such as Viktor Yanukovych and Vladimir Putin.³ However, recent evidence suggests that with the February 2022 invasion, this relationship has largely come to an end, at least in the short term.

This paper seeks to compile available information to address the following question: What factors have led many Ukrainian criminal groups with historical ties to the Russian underworld to distance themselves from those ties after the 2022 invasion, and how sustainable is this shift? While a complete understanding of this phenomenon is impossible due to the secretive and ever-changing nature of the diverse criminal actors in both nations, several trends have emerged.

Drawing on recent research, particularly Mark Galeotti's Times of Troubles report, it is reasonable to hypothesize that Ukrainian criminal groups have distanced themselves from Russian ties due to disruptions in cross-border operations, new war-driven illicit opportunities, the adoption of nationalist rhetoric, and mounting pressure from Ukrainian and Russian state agencies. Since relationships within this cross border illicit ecosystem are based largely on opportunism and economic convenience, it is unclear whether these changes will persist in the long-term, as the war's outcome will shape their dynamics.

This paper will begin by defining the criminal networks in these nations, then highlight the interdependent illicit markets that formed after the collapse of the USSR, and the ecosystem's relative stability because of its connection to corrupt elites. Next, it will address the immediate impact of the February 2022 invasion on the ecosystem, then analyze the shifts recent research and media have identified within the four categories offered above. In conclusion, the paper will assess the likelihood of these changes persisting by examining both the geopolitical uncertainties relating to the conflict and the growing pressure of Ukrainian Westernization.

Addressing this topic is challenging due to the fog of war and the inherently secretive nature of criminal groups. As Mark Galeotti notes, "Greater media censorship and less willingness to acknowledge real problems are already affecting our ability to accurately assess the situation, such that even Russian scholars are beginning to admit that 'there is now no good data'".⁴ This paper, relying on recent online resources and past literature, is a product of this limitation, and seeks to summarize what has been argued thus far.

Nonetheless, the topic is significant since Ukraine's heroic struggle to exist as a stable democracy has consistently been grossly affected by its ties to Russian criminal groups and their ability to corrupt its officials, institutions, and livelihoods on a large scale. Identifying and highlighting changes due to the war provide national law enforcement and politicians with invaluable information on potential backsliding in these relationships post-conflict and how to combat them. Furthermore, the European Union will also face the consequences of this shifting criminal alignment, as both regional ecosystems seek to harbor new illicit incomes in safe havens away from the front lines. An organized crime migration to the West could lead to the integration of illicit expertise by local criminal actors, further straining the resources needed to address the rise of organized crime in some EU member states.

Defining Organized Crime

Organized crime groups from Ukraine (UOC) and Russia (ROC), are composed of individuals from diverse economic backgrounds and ethnicities. Their ranks include both private individuals and corrupt state actors, and these groups vary widely in sophistication and resources. Unlike Latin American drug cartels or Italian mafias, these groups are highly decentralized yet broadly interconnected.⁵ This structure allows actors to access resources, capital, and criminal specialists with relative ease. As Finckenauer and Waring note, "they may not be directly connected to a large number of others, but they are indirectly connected to many".⁶ This makes both UOC and ROC difficult to categorize in many instances, as their structures, associations, and member compositions evolve rapidly in response to opportunities. Despite these unique characterizations, Tamara Makarenko's work offers categorizations based on size and association, which are useful for analyzing criminal groupings within both the ROC and UOC regardless of their fluid nature. This paper will use these categories to contrast relationships and specific situations. They are as follows:

1. Criminal Groups (CG) - "Mostly small gangs that are predominantly involved in extortion, theft, and narcotics dealing. These make up the majority of organized crime."
2. Criminal Organizations (CO) - "Relatively large formations that have known connections to state authorities at a regional level …"
3. Criminal Networks (CN) - the third group, "... is considered the highest level of organized crime in Ukraine. The influence of this group extends throughout many regions within the country and often includes international ties and the means to launder large volumes of money. The membership base CN consists of a "combination of former communist party elites, members of law enforcement and other security apparati, and organized criminals".⁷

Interconnected Illicit Markets Pre-2022

Ukraine and Russia's shared political past, trauma, and the poverty that followed are largely the factors that contributed to its famously close-knit underground connections. After the USSR's collapse, these connections grew and evolved similarly, forming a single transnational ecosystem.⁸ After the fall of the USSR, they would grow and evolve in similar fashion, ultimately forming a single transnational ecosystem. Organizationally, crime generally followed a trajectory from small criminal groups that supplemented larger organizations, to networks with direct ties to state agencies and actors, or oligarchs connected to them. Since the 2000s, Russian organized crime (ROC) has primarily facilitated illicit dealings, with their Ukrainian counterparts (UOC) serving as transit partners. Although largely interconnected, most participants behaved as opportunistic and fluid partners, without top-down, hierarchical systems as seen in the Wild 90s' characterized by the heavily tattooed vory elite.⁹ As opportunities arose, an organization may have cut ties with a long-time partner, without the need for overt violence or feuds.

Nonetheless, the state in both nations holds decision-making power for those connected to organized crime and is the accepted kingmaker. In The Vory: Russia's Super Mafia, this relationship is described: "The state is undoubtedly the dominant force, able to set the boundaries of 'acceptable criminality' and, increasingly, to go further and encourage certain behaviors and activities… Corruption and complicity ensure that there are connections and ponyatiya (understandings) at every level, from the Kremlin down to local administrations".¹⁰

Both before and after 2022, the security services, customs agencies, and economic committees of both nations have been among the most influential corrupt government bodies, greenlighting the largest illicit schemes that state-connected criminal networks engage in. Naturally, members of the parliaments, the duma in Russia and verhovna rada in Ukraine, are often connected to criminal networks, using these ties to promote their political campaigns and maintain power. Former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych's connection to the Donetsk Clan, and further Moscow's Solntsevskaya crime syndicate, is an unfortunate example of this.¹¹ In Russia on the other hand, with the absence of legitimate elections, power and acceptable corruption have consistently flowed from Vladimir Putin since his rise to power in the early 2000s.¹²

The web of cooperation within this transnational ecosystem prior to the February 2022 invasion relied on a handful of illicit industries. Smuggling, particularly of drugs, humans and weapons, along with international money laundering, were the most profitable activities. These operations were managed by criminal networks and organizations (CO) with access to corrupt state officials.¹³ Embezzlement of state funds has also been highly profitable since the fall of the USSR, though these actions generally do not consist of actors from both nations. Known internationally for its expertise as a "facilitator of underworld transactions, (ROC) … provides existing gangs with access to expertise, services and criminal products to which normally they could never aspire".¹⁴ Ukrainian (OC) would greatly benefit from this, as its ports on the Black Sea would become the most important smuggling transit point in eastern Europe. Inland, Ukraine would act as a "contraband superhighway" between Russia and western Europe, while also producing illicit products for export in the various cities around the country.¹⁵ These routes for ROC proved invaluable, and over time, due to shared interests, a largely stable criminal ecosystem developed, with actors from many backgrounds participating relatively peacefully under the oversight of corrupt officials.¹⁶

In 2014, the Maidan revolution would begin the process of unraveling this relationship. While the main developments on the ground, such as Russia's takeover of Crimea and establishment of quasi-separatist regions in the east of Ukraine, would not immediately affect participation between ROC and UOC, it would mark the beginning of the split to come.¹⁷ The loss of Sevastopol introduced a rival smuggling port to Odesa, conveniently manned by the Russian military, and the local underworld profits would suffer accordingly.¹⁸ Nationwide outrage over the loss of Crimea would quickly align anti-Russian sentiment, potentially laying the groundwork for the patriotic shift that would later be seen in UOC.¹⁹ The election of Volodymyr Zelensky cemented the country's Western pivot, as the Russian military began finalizing the catalytic invasion it had planned. Both nations' OC groups were wholly unaware of what was to come, and the drastic changes it would bring after the intertwined cooperation that defined the years following the fall of the Soviet Union.

Factors Contributing to the Division since the February 2022 Invasion

Disruptions in cross-border operations

The most significant disruption between ROC and UOC has been a physical decoupling. Since the February 2022 invasion, a nearly 2,100-mile-long militarized frontline has emerged, fortified with personnel, trenches, landmines and deadly drones. In the Black Sea, the global smuggling hub of Odesa, along with Sevastopol, are under frequent missile and UAV bombardment, reducing shipping traffic to a trickle.²⁰ These developments have disabled the "contraband superhighway" to Western Europe, which long enriched OC in both nations, and disrupted Russia's role as a dominant underworld facilitator.²¹ Three main changes have characterized this disruption. First, sanctions have severed ROC's access to much of the global banking system, ending its ability to launder money on a significant scale. Second, the conflict has effectively eliminated ROC presence in key Ukrainian smuggling ports such as Odesa, dismantling many of the illicit operations it relied on. Finally, the militarized frontline has forced OC groups to abandon long-standing trade routes, radically altering long established smuggling patterns.²²

On March 1st, 2022, seven of Russia's largest banks were removed from the SWIFT payment system, a global network used to facilitate secure international financial transactions. For years, ROC exploited SWIFT and the large banks affiliated with it to launder illicit earnings from international criminal activities.²³ Whistleblower exposés like the Panama Papers revealed how illicit funds were funneled through Eastern countries, including Ukraine, into Western financial systems to obscure their origins before being deposited in tax havens like the British Virgin Islands and the Bahamas. In one stark example, it was uncovered in 2015 that a small town near Kyiv served as a critical link in the "Russian Laundromat," a money-laundering operation that washed over $20 billion, an amount sizably larger than the region's annual budget.²⁴ In another example, former Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko, was linked to a comparable network.²⁵

The SWIFT cutoff has created significant challenges for the Russian state and ROC, requiring riskier decisions to access money than those seen in the previously mentioned schemes.²⁶ With the sanctions affecting "nearly 80 percent of all banking assets in Russia", hard currency has been difficult to acquire and the Kremlin's security agencies have been forced to oversee OC activities to fund themselves.²⁷ This suggests further absorption of ROC by the state, significantly curtailing the autonomy of these groups.²⁸ This change will likely be monitored by Western intelligence services, and further deepen divisions between ROC and UOC. Along Ukraine's southern maritime coast, the physical decoupling is evident in several key examples. In the first months of the invasion, maritime traffic was stopped in Odesa and Mykolaiv, disrupting the operations of all sizes for both ROC and UOC. This stoppage cut off illicit imports that local groups relied on for their distribution networks, largely dependent on tourism which had vanished, while simultaneously stopping transnational smuggling operations.²⁹

Coupled with the outright ousting of pro-Russian OC at the onset of the invasion at the directive of the SBU, these areas' criminal economies effectively collapsed for a short period after the invasion.³⁰ In short time they would recover, although characteristically anti-Russian. After the bombing of central Odesa and her seaport, even the formerly pro-Russian mayor was quoted saying" a message for Russians.. if only you knew how much Odesa hates you'.³¹ These sentiments will only intensify as the war drags on, and combined with growing domestic drug production supported by Western European OC, it is unlikely that these links will be repaired in short order.³²

The broader war's effect on land-based trade routes has been proven to have a fracturing effect as well, disrupting the trade of drugs, weapons, and human trafficking. Drug and weapons smuggling routes have shifted to the peripheries of Ukraine, with regional groups in Belarus and Turkey emerging as beneficiaries.³³ This has hurt some of Russia's most powerful OC groups such Moscow's Solntsevo and St Petersburg's Tambovskaya, due to their dependency on routes that are no longer accessible.³⁴

While human trafficking thrives in both countries, it is no longer interconnected and largely involves supporting domestic residents interested in leaving their respective countries, while migrants have chosen new paths. Sex trafficking, another market of former OC cooperation, has met the same fate as curfews and traveling restrictions have forced these markets to operate independently of each other.³⁵ Given the likely permanence of these militarized zones in these nations, it is unlikely that these illicit markets will be capable of reintegrating in the near future.

Rise of new war-driven illicit opportunities

The post-2022 war period has divided ROC and UOC due to the new illicit opportunities it has produced. While many have been documented, this section will cover three that stand out:

1. Increased illicit drug and tobacco production in Ukraine
2. Use of OC by the military infrastructure of both nations
3. Aid embezzlement within Ukraine

Prior to the broader conflict, drug manufacturing in Ukraine was primarily focused on synthetics such as mephedrone and methadone.³⁶ Precursor chemicals were routed through the southern ports to cities such as Kryvyi Rih & Kharkiv, where factories would produce them for both the ROC and UOC. Tobacco followed a similar process, with illegal cigarettes becoming a profitable, low-profile market generating billions in revenue.³⁷ Originally marketed to the lower income consumers in both nations, these products are now targeted towards both the Western European market, and soldiers at the front line. In 2020, "Ukraine overtook China to become Europe's largest source of illegal tobacco", with illegal cigarettes making up one-quarter of Ukraine's market, hitting tax revenues in the budget-stricken nation.³⁸ Synthetics, on the other hand, have benefitted UOC through new markets in Central and Eastern Europe, driven by similar economic conditions and spending habits.³⁹ ROC has suffered as a result, as the closed land routes in Finland and through the rest of Europe have led to supply deficits, with few timely replacements available.⁴⁰ These examples highlight how the conflict has transformed UOC from transit region to producer and facilitator.

Another new opportunity that has arisen is the increased use of OC for military interests in both countries. In the months following the larger invasion, cooperation between the SBU and OC in cities like Kyiv and Odesa led to the outright expulsion of Russian interests, as well a period of patrolling in some of the communities that welcomed them. UOC has also been used to root out Russian spies and provide information on occupied territories.⁴¹ While this relationship may be one of necessity, especially due to recent laws giving agencies like the SBU wartime powers and control over ports and entry points, UOC has with little doubt benefited. This is likely in the form of arrangements where security services will turn a blind eye to their illicit business or promises of wider benefits in the future post-conflict.⁴² ROC has also benefited from similar arrangements, though this relationship has a much longer and more complex history. Their actions generally involve smuggling dual-use components for Russia military industries and replenishing the shrinking budgets of its intelligence agencies.⁴³ Nonetheless, some experts express that this may lead to absorption of OC by state agencies in both countries, to their institutions' detriment. Aid embezzlement, both in humanitarian and military goods, has also become a profitable new industry. As donated materials such as vehicles, medical supplies, and clothing reach Ukraine from the West, a portion of it disappears in small opportunistic schemes as well as in those that are more sophisticated. In a recent example, the head of a local charity was arrested for selling over 230 donated vehicles that were intended for the armed forces.⁴⁴ Similar schemes exist in Russia, forcing many troops, including conscripts, to purchase their own weapons and supplies.⁴⁵ While this process hasn't directly severed previous ROC and UOC ties, it has motivated new alliances and interests that will likely last. Moreover, reconstruction aid for Ukraine, which has been predicted to total in the hundreds of billions, will be coveted by UOC, which has little interest in sharing with their previous counterparts.⁴⁶ As construction embezzlement has been a deep-rooted problem across Ukraine for decades, these groups will likely manage to divert a percentage of these proceeds and further cement their standing apart from ROC and other groups.

In conclusion, these changes will likely ensure long term participation in new OC crime regions as the conflict makes historic partnerships obsolete. UOC will likely turn westward to the EU, as ROC turns east to Asian counterparts. The groups that moved abroad during this period will produce an even larger headache for these regions, as their potential return may build new transnational networks.⁴⁷ If UOC reaches this threshold, it is likely they will pose direct competition to ROC, unleashing further complications in managing crime in both nations.

Adoption of nationalist rhetoric

Newfound patriotism, though difficult to definitively characterize, has emerged within both UOC and ROC. While largely apolitical prior to 2022, even with the Russian takeover of Crimea, these groups quickly adopted nationalist sentiments, especially in the case of Ukraine. Collaborating with Russians is now viewed as a betrayal, with Mark Galeotti describing the sentiment as, "It is one thing to be called a criminal; quite another to be thought of as a traitor,".⁴⁸ Several factors contribute to this mentality. First, in both nations, many OC associates have been sent to the frontlines. These individuals, whether drafted or sent from prison, experience comradery and shared trauma that fosters patriotism. Russia has famously been emptying its prisons to support PMCs such as Wagner with manpower. Those who survive the violence will likely share this sentiment with other criminals. Second, Ukrainian criminals have argued that life under Russia would be worse for them, citing prison conditions, OC competition, and general living standards. This alone could instill a sense of patriotism, however self-serving.⁴⁹ Lastly, organized crime may have realized that it "may come to benefit from patriotic fervor in a more indirect way: through the recruitment of demobilized soldiers into organized crime groups".⁵⁰ This potential has become a grave concern to authorities in Europe and Russia alike. As traumatized soldiers come home in the hundreds of thousands, the violence they witness may open them to irregular lifestyles in economic distress, such as that found in OC.

While information on this topic is limited and difficult to substantiate, increasing reports suggest that this phenomenon is occurring on a significant scale. Time will tell whether this is simple opportunism or a genuine adoption of nationalist ideology. However, if it takes root, it may prove to be the most divisive factor splitting this regional relationship. If UOC views their Russian counterparts with the same disdain as the public has in recent polls, this may indeed be the case.

Rising pressure from Ukrainian & Russian state services

The final factor contributing to the fragmentation of relations is the significant increase in pressure that state services have levied on these groups. This is exemplified by several characteristics, two of which stand out. First, in Ukraine, changes to the criminal code granted the SBU wartime powers, further consolidating UOC's dependency on them. Second, in Russia, intelligence agencies' use of ROC to recoup budgets lost to sanctions has further eroded the latter's independence, blurring the lines between state agencies and criminal organizations even further. When the broader war began in Ukraine, immediate changes were implemented to Articles 109, 110, and 111 of the Criminal Code, aiming to simplify the fight against Russian threats. The text primarily focuses on "'actions aimed at forcefully changing or overthrowing the constitutional order or taking over government... prohibiting 'trespassing against territorial integrity' and protecting the 'inviolability of Ukraine' and actions of high treason," all of which can be broadly applied during wartime.⁵¹ This gave the SBU sweeping powers. In Odesa, for example, they "emerged as the sole authority in the city, superseding even the police, with all criminal matters seen through the lens of national security".⁵² This upended previous arrangement between UOC groups and agencies such as the customs service, as the SBU now had the legal authority to punish or restructure these arrangements, with kickbacks or other illicit deals. This relationship has led to a crisis of public trust, especially as SBU's Directorate K, the group meant to combat organized crime, has been accused of collaborating with it.⁵³ The growing dependency between the agency and UOC will likely widen the split with ROC.

A similar situation exists that flows from the Kremlin, where ROC management has essentially been absorbed by agencies such as the GRU and FSB. The "pay to play" arrangement that has previously characterized their relationship has been taken to new heights, with criminal networks connected to oligarchs and other influential figures expected to supplement the war effort with illicit revenue.⁵⁴ Those who refuse may quickly find themselves sent to the frontlines, if not killed. Recent examples of these arrangements, such as complex cryptocurrency scams, the smuggling of Italian handbags, and illicit cigarette factories scattered around eastern Europe, racking up millions in revenue, have shown the opportunistic state-criminal fusion that has occurred.⁵⁵ As one journalist remarked, "Putin's Russia was once a hybrid government-mafia, post Ukraine and sanctions, it's transforming into a state controlled mafia".⁵⁶ These changes on one hand highlight the lengths that Russia will go to conduct hybrid war, and on the other the hold it has over ROC. This fusion will make law enforcement efforts all the more difficult in the coming decades, both within Russia and globally.

Sustainability of the Shift & Conclusion

The February 2022 invasion of Ukraine has undeniably created a seismic rift between the historically interconnected criminal networks between Russia and Ukraine. As outlined in this paper, while not exhaustive, the conflict has disrupted cross-border operations, redirected attention to emerging illicit opportunities, fostered nationalist tendencies within UOC, and fostered unprecedented state intervention into UOC, that have distanced it from its Russian counterparts. Never in the history of post-Soviet nationhood have these networks been forced to operate in such isolation and newfound opposition. With no definitive resolution to the conflict in sight, the fluid and largely opportunistic shifts observed may solidify over time. This could have far-reaching consequences for crime within both nations and the broader global community.

Given the geopolitical stakes between Ukraine and Russia, it is unlikely, barring the capitulation of the Ukraine state, that the long-standing ties will be restored. The pro-Russian syndicates forced out of Odesa and other regions are unlikely to be welcomed back into the illicit. Even with a ceasefire brokered by the Trump administration, militarized borders, sanctions, and the wrath of a war-weary Ukrainian public will likely sustain the icy relationship for decades to come. Further, Ukraine's anti-corruption drive, supported by the West, may fundamentally change how UOC operates over time. Reconstruction funds will face hawkish oversight, exposing elite embezzlement more than ever before. As of January 2025, Ukraine's Customs Service Head is under investigation for failing to disclose over $100,000 in assets, exemplifying the nation's likely trajectory in fighting embedded corruption.⁵⁷ While organized crime will undoubtedly persist regardless of the conflict's outcome, a reformed Ukrainian state could transform it into a more manageable challenge.

However, some experts argue that a revival of cross-border ties remains possible. A full Russian victory would guarantee this, though unlikely, but even in the case of a cold conflict, certain factors could foster unity. First, the urgency to recover lost revenues might prompt cooperation, particularly if Odesa and other profitable seaport smuggling hubs reopen. As seen after the Chechen conflict, profit can at times overshadow deep regional grievances in organized crime. Second, as Russian and Ukrainian groups establish themselves abroad due to displacement during the war, they may reconnect out of opportunism and later bring this collaboration back home. Finally, with Russia's recent successes in election interference and influence campaigns, it is conceivable that over time, acceptance of warming ties could reintroduce regionally specific corrupt state actors, enabling ROC operations once again.

Although the outcome of this relationship rests largely on which side emerges victorious in the geopolitical conflict that has devastated much of eastern Ukraine, other realities exist that will likely prove difficult for Europe and the United States to tackle in the future. As the war has displaced many UOC and ROC networks throughout the West, it is likely that these, once domestic actors, will stay put, passing along criminal know-how to local groups. Without preemptive measures by law enforcement, this could lead to a surge in crime within their own borders while simultaneously threatening public support for Ukraine. Furthermore, interactions between local OC groups and these newcomers could transform domestic crime issues into transnational ones, creating a cascade of broader concerns.

Ultimately, the opportunistic nature of organized crime makes it difficult to predict whether the divide will persist, but observable phenomena suggest it will only deepen over time. The heroic resistance of the Ukrainians, coupled with the nation's determined appetite for corruption reform, has placed organized crime on the backfoot, potentially paving the way to reduce its influence to manageable levels. The outlook in Russia is less optimistic, but its people may eventually find their footing to force change in their country as well. It is up to each nation, and the broader international community, to determine whether they will capitalize on these criminal groups' newfound isolation and continue to allocate the needed resources to combat them. Eastern Europe will be wholly a more stable and secure region if they succeed.

About the Author

Ian Petrus Landy is currently a master's student within the International Public Policy program at SAIS Europe in Bologna. He received a bachelor's degree in political science from The John Jay College of Criminal Justice, CUNY, New York City. He completed an internship at the Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management in Albany, NY. During the COVID-19 pandemic Ian was active as Community Infrastructure Coordinator as well as a Testing Center Emergency Relief Associate. His current interests include European studies, labor markets, and emergency management. Hobbies include furniture making and high-fidelity audio design.

Footnotes

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