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Europe and Its Neighbors

MODERN EUROPEAN IDENTITY IN QUESTION

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EUROPE AND ITS NEIGHBORS

Contents

Editor's Note

How does Europe perceive her neighbors and how are they perceiving her? What is the impact of having Europe as a neighbor? This year's issue has found it most interesting to look at the dynamics of the European neighborhood while it is in the midst of mutation.

EU member states' particular interests and their prejudices about Eastern European countries explain hesitance vis-à-vis enlargement. Despite a mildly eurosceptic tone, Estonian Foreign Minster Toomas Hendrik Ilves finds that the Nice Summit revived the promise that enlargement might still happen in the near future. Radoslava Stefanova reveals the insistent forces in countries such as Bulgaria which press for political and economic unification within the existing European geographical sphere. But Europe faces other regional challenges beyond widening its Union. What would have happened in Kosovo had the United States not intervened under the flag of NATO? One dares not even think about what would happen if the new US administration decides to pull out its forces from the Balkans. In other spheres, as with the self-determination of the Western Sahara and the fight against Islamic fundamentalism in Algeria, Europe finds itself competing with the United States for influence. These examples confirm the growing need for a common foreign policy. They also pose a critical test for Europe.

Other articles in this issue offer insights regarding the relations between Europe and its neighbors through the presentation of different political cultures and national identities. German reunification clearly can be taken as an illustration of how painful enlargement can be at the micro level. The debate on the *Palast Der Republik* is a striking example of the difficulties of consolidating a national identity and creating a sense of commonality. Similarly, is it possible for German *Leitkultur* to continue to serve as a unifying force for the numerous social changes that Germany has endured? These issues are most pressing for a country which continues to demonstrate an influential role in the leadership and consolidation of a dynamic and growing Europe.

Along Europe's eastern border, recent democratization and changes in Russian institutional bodies have not sufficed to provide Russia with a more western-oriented identity, which might serve to draw the country out of its decades of isola-

tion. Clearly, the eastern neighborhood continues to pose many challenges and raise many questions for all of Europe.

In the past, western ideals best reflected in the French slogan of *Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité,* have proven to be an illusion for many black American artists running away from prejudice in the US. Now, a *Black, Blanc, Beur* pride has taken over, as seen in 1998 when France won the World Cup and the fans even asked for Zidane to become president of France. Clearly Europe no longer wants to import its ideals from the USA. The French "dream team" showed that Europe can achieve a successful multiculturalism, but with European *grandeur*.

Cultural gaps definitely have an important impact in defining the game that Europe decides to play with its neighbors. But why were these gaps overlooked, or overcome, in 1957? Why are they now more apparent in a world where globalization is said to have homogenized identities? The European neighborhood is changing but Western Europe cannot move out. The latter holds the key to making this a peaceful neighborhood or to creating a ghetto in the periphery of its neighborhood.

Asmaa Shalabi
Asmaa Shalabi
Editor-in-Chief

e-Estonia and European Integration

Toomas Hendrik Ilves

The European Union recently (and rather belatedly!) launched a program called e-Europe. The name, of course, comes from the field of information technology, and the aim of the project is to help Europe cope more effectively with the modern challenges of the globalized world. Furthermore, the program reflects the realization that the EU is falling behind the US in the realm of technology and must catch up as swiftly as possible or risk losing even more ground.

Notably, there are individual countries that have recognized the importance of technology and have addressed the issue much earlier, even in Europe. It was not by chance that the e-Europe program was launched by a Nordic presidency in the EU, as it is well known that the Nordic countries lead Europe in the field of information technology. It is far less known that Estonia, separated from Finland by only 80 kilometers of the Finnish Gulf, can be regarded as e-Estonia, the latest Nordic start-up. In this respect, Estonia is highly integrated into Europe and indeed into the world. In fact, the candidate countries are well integrated into the European Union in many areas. But is the EU itself willing to recognize this? The aim of this paper is to present a candidate country's view on European integration as it proceeds today and, in doing so, correct some common misperceptions in Europe.

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e-Estonia

According to McConnell International, Estonia is the leading country in the world for promoting technological development. It is ranked highest among 42 states in terms of government use of the Internet, training, and business climate. Currently, 39 percent of Estonians regularly use the Internet. Ninety-five percent of public sector employees use personal computers in their daily work, and 20 percent of the population owns a personal computer. It is most curious that these circumstances exist in what Western Europeans consider a poor, backward East European country. In addition, all Estonian schools are online as, of all candidate countries, Estonia dedicates the highest percentage of its federal budget to education. In addition, more than 80 percent of bank transactions are made electronically, and, last summer, the Wall Street Journal stated that the Estonian Hansabank was among the three most technologically advanced banks of the world.

What do these numbers mean? In the European context, Estonia is in the top five or six countries in both mobile phone and computer use. Estonia may be poorer, but in those areas that currently rank as measures of advancement, Estonia has outpaced two-thirds of the EU member countries and is thus already well integrated into Europe.

"Western Europe" and "Eastern Europe"

The current status of Estonia is an example of a larger issue related to the divides that continue to exist between Western and Eastern Europe. Since the fall of communism, a number of Eastern European countries have pursued highly dynamic reform and transformation policies, very much like the countries of Western Europe underwent in the post-WWII years. The emergence of new technologies and new economies reveals that the old vision of a backward, corrupt Eastern Europe, dismal and gray, should have been buried with the Soviet Union. But "Western Europe" still tends to place "Eastern Europe" in the context of a state that died ten years ago. Misguided preconceptions about Eastern Europe remain, to the detriment of both East and West. Why?

I have long maintained that Eastern and Western Europe operate on different clocks as a result of diametrically different experiences with change and decisive political actions. The post-WWII experience of Western Europe can be characterized by unprecedented political and economic success founded on slow, incremental change. Indeed, it has become almost axiomatic in Europe that through discussion and mutual agreement the unpredictability and chaos of the 1920s, 30s, and 40s can be avoided. A corollary implicit in these Western European approaches to change is that instability and rapid change must be avoided at all costs. This approach has indeed been successful, especially given how, out of the ruins of the Second World War, Western Europe has become the economic and political powerhouse it is today. In the post-Soviet world, however, the experience with time has been the opposite. Slow, incremental change has always been seen as stagnation.

What liberated the Czechs, Hungarians, East Germans, and Estonians were rapid, decisive actions. This in turn, at least in the Estonian case, shaped the approach for the ensuing post-liberation reforms and transition period. Spurred by success in re-establishing independence, Estonia's post-communist governments stepped eyes wide shut into radical and resolute reforms. A case in point

Estonian Parliament building, Talinn, Estonia.
Photo: Cory Reinbold

is currency reform. The International Monetary Fund warned Estonia in 1992: *do not* step out of the ruble zone; *do not* attempt a currency board. Nevertheless, Estonia pursued an independent course of currency reform by establishing a currency board on June 20, 1992. The change was so immediate and complete, and the people were so interested, that by the time I went out to change money in the late afternoon, all the Kroons had been sold for that day, so I was forced to borrow from my friends. No shops would accept any other currency. On that day, the depressing institution dividing communist society into haves and have-nots, the hard-currency shop, died in Estonia, and in its place a vibrant new economy was born. Within half a year, the reform was proven so successful that the IMF was advising other countries to also adopt a currency board. Thus far Latvia, Lithuania, and, most recently, Bulgaria have followed the Estonian example, with considerable success.

Privatization experienced similar successes. Estonia opted for the less popular and far more radical program of straightforward privatization for cash rather than the politically easier voucher privatization. Today, Estonia has one of the few successful privatization histories in the post-communist space. In addition, Estonia eliminated all tariffs and opened itself to trade with the world, constitutionally mandated a balanced budget, established the first flat-rate income tax in Europe, and eliminated the corporate income tax. These measures have contributed to growth rates well beyond the European average. This year, the conservative prognosis for growth is 5.5 percent. Finally, in the transparency and international corruption index, Estonia has consistently ranked as the least corrupt country in Eastern Europe. And, more significantly, Estonia is ranked as a country less corrupt than a number of EU member states. All of this should give pause to West Europeans still living in the decade old, comfortably smug, but misguided notion of Eastern Europeans as barbarians pounding at the gate.

Prejudice and Enlargement

Where, then, does the process designed to overcome the old barriers, including the static vision of the gray and woolly East, actually stand? On the surface, EU enlargement seems to be proceeding according to plan and sufficient political support seems to exist. The EU's Nice Summit in December 2000 made clear that enlargement will take place in the near future. No matter to whom I speak, the rhetoric is always positive: enlargement is a priority, enlargement is inevitable, rapid enlargement is necessary, etc. All of these political statements in support of European expansion are most welcome, but as discussions on serious issues such as transition periods approach, the more often hesitant behavior towards the idea of rapid enlargement becomes apparent.

Technically, the date of accession depends mostly on the candidate countries' ability to implement the existing EU legal and institutional framework in the form of the *acquis communautaire*. Although accession to the EU can be delayed by failure to meet these objective criteria for membership, enlargement can, however, also be delayed through subjective means. It is becoming increasingly apparent that enlargement is not entirely in the hands of the candidate countries alone. The so-called "big bang" approach to enlargement, whereby no country will be admitted to the EU until all or most of the other candidate countries are also prepared to enter, is one of the ways that those who do not support enlargement hope to preserve the status quo for as long as possible by lengthening the time for negotiations. Furthermore, specific countries advance arguments for or against enlargement based largely on their own national interests, rather than on the performance of candidates. Country X demands waiting until candidate Z is ready, while member state Q will not allow enlargement to precede until country Y is admitted. Publicly, enlargement is based on performance; in reality, however, enlargement is a matter of the interests of some EU states.

But if enlargement is held hostage to the national interests of individual member states and is delayed, or standards are artificially lowered for some, or, for purely political reasons, raised for others, the EU will be programming in new problems. In the candidate countries best prepared to join, those governments courageous and bold enough to push through the most dramatic and frequently most unpopular reforms will be penalized for their decisiveness. At the same time, politically motivated rather than performance-based enlargement will reward those governments that have been most recalcitrant in undertaking the understandably difficult measures required for EU membership. I do not believe that the Union will be made better by rewarding slowness and punishing reform. As seen from the Single Market Action Plan, this principle is well understood within the Union; the same principle should apply to the candidate countries.

The existence of even more basic prejudices also poses a threat to enlargement and constitutes perhaps the largest obstacle to overcome. Resolution of these issues is as much in the interest of Western Europe as it is important for candidate coun-

tries. The problem not only hinders the enlargement process, but if Europe does not overcome the kinds of prejudices I have described, citizens of candidate countries will not believe that they are to be treated as equals in the EU and will oppose ascension.

Ultimately, while there seems to be agreement on the necessity of enlargement, candidate countries continue to receive many confused signals about the criteria and conditions necessary for ascension and Europe's willingness to accept new members. Even rapidly developing candidate countries, such as Estonia or its fellow leaders Hungary and Slovenia, which clearly stand at the forefront of innovative change, remain in the eyes of the EU as undeveloped Eastern European countries threatening to drain the EU of its resources.

Arguments Against Enlargement

In addition to these attitudes, enlargement is further endangered by a series of technical arguments against eastward expansion. The most prominent of these arguments include: (1) enlargement will cause an inundation of foreign labor into Western Europe; (2) eastward expansion poses a threat to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP); and (3) enlargement will be very expensive.

The first argument against enlargement is based on the belief that, although Europe is entering a labor-shortage crisis, an influx of cheap foreign labor poses a great threat to Western Europe. Currently, Germany seeks 20,000 technology specialists from Eastern Europe; Denmark wants 4,000 from the Baltic countries. Europe realizes that it cannot compete in the new economy without more trained specialists, and it considers the best way to meet its needs is by having taxpayers in countries like Estonia pay for the education of specialists who can then immigrate to the EU. But, the EU member states remain fearful of the potential for less-skilled foreign workers to enter their countries and seek jobs. The situation, however, is not exactly as Europe envisions it. Last year, Austria was unable to attract enough technology specialists from abroad, and one survey revealed that the Hungarian specialists whom the Austrians had targeted as potential immigrants preferred to stay at home.

The second argument against enlargement maintains that the Common Agricultural Policy must be preserved in its current form to maintain rural life in the Union. However, the EU finds it too expensive to spend the large sums dedicated to the CAP on new members. From this, candidate countries deduce that rural life in the present EU is worth preserving, yet, in the case of Eastern Europe, it is not. The CAP is one of the few remaining issues of the EU internal reform that was not addressed at the Nice Summit. It seems expedient to begin to include the candidate states in discussions as soon as possible, as the controversies over the CAP will not disappear by restricting the discussions to the member states alone.

The argument suggesting that enlargement poses too great an expense to current EU members should be put into a certain perspective. Currently, spending on candidate countries is roughly one percent of the 1.27 of GDP that forms the EU budget. This equals one percent of one percent, or .01 percent, of total EU GDP, a formidable sum. But, in comparison to the amount paid by the US to Europe under the Marshall Plan, which allowed the original members to stabilize and eventually sign the Treaty of Rome, the totals become less impressive. The US opted to send the countries of Western Europe two percent of its GDP and granted open access to US markets for 10 years. These are much more significant contributions than the .01 percent of GDP and restricted access to EU markets offered to the current candidates for EU enlargement. These discrepancies become even more glaring when one considers that European countries clearly were not viewed as candidates for statehood in the US, while Europe is indeed attempting to expand its political and economic union to include many new states.

The US did not contribute so heavily to the improvement of the nearly dead economies of Western Europe out of simple kindness. Rather, it created for itself what stands today as its largest foreign market supported by consumers with a high purchasing power and an appetite for US goods. Clearly, after the purchase of Alaska, the Marshall Plan was one of the best investments the US made. But in Western Europe, a similar self-interested awareness in the trade potential in its own backyard is absent (with certain exceptions such as Finland and Sweden, which have experienced very large growth in exports to countries like Estonia). Altogether, then, enlargement is mistakenly viewed as an expense that Europe cannot afford, rather than an opportunity that it cannot pass up.

The Future

I believe that there are two general directions that the European project can take. The first path demands that Europe be bold and move quickly to bring in those candidate countries that are, by objective evaluation, qualified. This means, *inter alia*, that the goalposts should remain in place and that they should be the same for everyone. By doing this Europe will ensure that enlargement will bring the greatest benefits to all: qualified candidates will be rewarded for their hard work, while those less qualified will see that hard work is indeed recognized, and that there is a light at the end of the tunnel. Candidate countries which have not been able to meet the standards must understand that enlargement will proceed, and that the first phase of enlargement will not be followed by a long pause. To this end, Nice produced a much-needed specific enlargement strategy; the central principles of flexibility and individual treatment of candidates, as well as a realistic timetable, are written into it.

The other option, of course, is to find reasons to postpone enlargement. To quote my dear friend and colleague, the Foreign Minister of Hungary, Janos Martonyi, "Ever since 1995 we have been told we will join the EU in five years." Delaying enlargement will continue to send the message that those who worked

hard to reform were fools and those who delayed the process were on the right track. Certainly this is the message of the "big bang" approach. In this, it is important to remember that the message that effort does not pay will not inspire new members to be eager to play a constructive role in the Union.

In conclusion, I hope that I have managed to convey some sense of how dramatically EU candidate countries such as Estonia have changed and that a static or recalcitrant view of Eastern Europe will only harm common European economic prospects and competitiveness. The view of Eastern Europe as a burden only burdens us all. An integrated Europe, whole, free, and prosperous, is within our grasp; it is ours to create. *Carpe Diem*, Europa!

European Integration and EU Eastern Enlargement

A Critical Assessment of a Decade of East-West Relations

Svetlozar A. Andreev

Not long after the sudden collapse of state socialism in Central and Eastern Europe, the enlargement project of the European Union was initiated with the intent to assist the countries of the region with the difficult transformations they were experiencing. The EU also intended to promote peace, democracy, and prosperity in the eastern part of the continent and to advance the European integration process further. Despite the considerable enthusiasm for the successful realization of these goals and the assertion made by some Western politicians and Brussels officials that new member states from Eastern Europe would be admitted in the EU with a minimal delay, the initially optimistic scenario of this initiative has not been realized thus far. A large number of political, social, and economic factors as well as some other permanent constraints of a purely technical character have prevented the EU and its institutions from acting more decisively on enlargement and, as a result, the promotion of the Union's policies in the east has slowed significantly.

Currently, after a decade of intensive EU institution-building and other activities in Eastern Europe, the outcomes of such a well-intentioned initiative do not appear to be particularly obvious or consistent with the original mission of the project. Unfortunately, the bulk of academic research dedicated to studying and conceptualizing normatively the effects and concomitants of the process of European integration in its eastern dimension, has not been able to achieve any major theoretical breakthroughs or produce any practical insight that could explain the nature of

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eastern enlargement to a sufficient extent. Few authors, even those who have written extensively about enlargement, have been able to produce any substantial ideas about the probable agenda and final objectives of the most recent wave of enlargement. Their studies have often been overburdened with the tedious citation of official documents and the enumeration of well-known facts about the procedural aspects of the contractual relations between the EU and its Eastern European partners.[1]

This paper takes a different approach from the predominant trend of treating the subject of the eastern enlargement of the EU descriptively and proposes an alternative perspective towards understanding some key aspects of its development. First, the eastern enlargement of the EU is conceptualized not as a linear process, with clearly defined beginning and end points, but, rather, as a randomly developing and difficult-to-predict venture. Second, it is assumed that a certain set of "initial conditions" was very important during the early period of EU-Eastern European relations immediately after 1989, when there was a general lack of information about the countries on the eastern side of the former Iron Curtain thus making the real intentions and interests of the major actors participating in the process of European integration were very hard to predict. Third, it is hypothesized that the occurrence of several large social and political crises in the broader environment external to the EU, such as the collapse of the communism and the outbreak of major military conflicts on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, had a considerable impact on the evolution of the eastern enlargement process and the pattern of development of European integration, especially as with regard to EU foreign policy. Finally, this paper brings all of the above elements together in order to build a coherent picture of how EU enlargement policies have developed and to determine whether significant changes can be expected in this respect in the future.

Enlargement: Negotiations and Obstacles

Currently there are ten Eastern European countries that are official candidates to become members of the European Union: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.[2] In addition, Cyprus, Malta, and Turkey are also applying as candidates from the South and the Mediterranean Basin. In July 1997, the European Commission presented its opinion on the applications for membership, and in its official communication, *Agenda 2000*, it recommended that negotiations begin with the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia.[3] This position was reconfirmed at the December 1997 European Council in Luxembourg, where it was decided to begin accession negotiations with these five countries and Cyprus. Only two years later, however, the humanitarian and military crisis in the Yugoslavian province of Kosovo occurred. Bearing in mind the possible considerable political and geo-strategic complications that might have resulted both for the EU and its member states directly involved in the region, it gradually became clear that most of the traditional diplomatic interventions and economic measures employed by Western gov-

ernments and international organizations towards the ruling Yugoslav regime, the Balkans, and Eastern Europe would need some kind of readjustment and reformulation. In the context of prevailing instability and threat posed by the conflicts in Southeastern Europe for the entire European security environment, a number of important developments occurred in the realm of EU foreign policy, which suggested that a more comprehensive eastern enlargement with all ten candidate countries participating simultaneously might well take place.[4] Indeed, what had seemed to be a distant possibility several months before that became a real argument at the European Council in Helsinki in December 1999, when the date for beginning negotiations with the remaining five candidate countries: Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovakia, plus Malta, was moved ahead and fixed for the second half of February 2000.[5]

Not surprisingly, some countries that were more "advanced" in their preparations for entry into the EU expressed their concerns about the likelihood that the enlargement process might become "diluted" and that no objective criteria would be applied by the European decision-making bodies as to whether the applicant countries would truly be ready to assume the responsibilities of membership. Since the beginning of 2000, the governments of the first-wave applicant states have also been concerned that the emergence of six new candidate countries and the offer to Turkey of a clearer perspective towards becoming an EU member might lead to a stalemate in the work of the European institutions and provoke the sudden death of the enlargement process in the incipient stages of its evolution. Parallel to that, pressure has been mounting on the individual candidates, regardless of their position in the long list of countries negotiating an accession, following the decision of the EU General Affairs Council on May 31, 1999 to give a number of other Eastern European countries the opportunity, albeit a distant one, to apply for membership in the Union.[6] During the current round of negotiations, however, it became rather obvious that the EU would not be prepared to accept more than a handful of new member states and, most certainly, not even all of the "best-prepared" applicant countries. Moreover, the potential candidates for associate membership, such as Albania, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro, would probably not be able to fulfill a sufficient number of the necessary criteria in the near future, given their present substantial political and economic difficulties.[7]

In the ongoing discussion about the intrinsic characteristics and probable timetable of eastern enlargement, it has been increasingly uncertain whether the EU, in its present format and under its current system of rules, would be able to follow its domestic and foreign policy agendas simultaneously. For instance, much has been said and written about the presumably contradictory nature of the "deepening" and "widening" of the Union, whatever normative values these two terms could have for the proper conceptualization of EU integration, which in itself is an indication of the political confusion and tensions prevailing at the core of the official European institutions regarding this process.[8] Besides the frequent and often just criticism directed at the Eastern European applicant states about various aspects of

their preparedness to join the EU, it has been suggested with equal poignancy by those working for the EU and by some others analyzing the performance of its structures, that the majority of complications with eastern enlargement might actually stem "from the inherent ambiguity of the European Union's integration project itself."[9]

Although it is a well-recognized reality that the goals and identity of the EU have been undergoing constant evolution since its creation as the EEC/ECSC in the mid-1950s, it must also be acknowledged that realization of this "flexible indefiniteness" has created a lot of confusion and general suspicion about the Union's proclaimed objectives, particularly in the field of foreign policy. Moreover, it has been repeatedly stated that a reform of the structural policies and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), as well as a radical revision of the EU budget, are indispensable preconditions for enlargement.[10] Virtually ten years after the signing of the first series of association agreements with the countries of East Central Europe, agriculture is still a major impediment for the accession of new member states in the EU, while no serious discussion of reform of the CAP has been conducted at the level of the European institutions and among the fifteen member states. Hence, it is possible to conclude that eastern enlargement has consistently been held hostage to the internal problems of the current member states and the EU itself, and candidate countries have never managed to influence substantially the integration and transformation processes developing within the Union.

There is a popular misapprehension among Eastern European government officials and various media sources, occupied with monitoring the advancement of enlargement, that the European Commission and representatives of individual member states at the different levels of administration in Brussels play a central role in the organization and promotion of enlargement. It is believed that no progress can be made in any policy area without the necessary commitment and direct involvement of the member states. However, in reality, the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament make the most important decisions regarding enlargement. Yet not all the people working with enlargement issues, least of all those politicians and individuals who defend parallel national, sectoral, and social group interests within the EU, are equally committed to the cause of promoting European integration to the east. The reasons for this attitude are many, but they are basically rooted in a selfish reluctance of the individual member states to release control over certain EU policy areas in which they have a vested controlling interest. This reluctance is also partly the result of the substantial pressure exerted on the Union's institutions by different national and supranational interest groups and social movements during the enlargement negotiations.

Defining Enlargement Policies

This paper attempts to establish the record and make sense out of the often controversial developments in the sphere of the European enlargement policies eastwards. If one assumes that the eastern enlargement project is driven by two

major sets of actors, the EU and its member states on the one hand and the applicant states on the other, then some important points of mutual dependence appear in a number of policy areas.

Primarily, it is asserted that, after the fall of communism and the resumption of EU-Eastern European relations, the historical memories and emerging contacts between the Western states and their Eastern European counterparts have influenced the EU to relate more favorably towards some applicant countries than others on the basis of certain "initial conditions." With the passage of time and the increase in the number of applicant states, however, new challenges have emerged both for the EU and Eastern European countries. These challenges came as a result not only of a strong desire on the part of some former communist countries to be perceived once again as European in cultural and political terms and to join the group of socially prosperous Western European states, but also because of the abrupt dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and the associated violent interethnic conflicts. The initial response of the EU towards these crises taking place in its immediate sphere was sluggish and misleading both for the conflicting parties and for the members of the international community involved in the resolution of those regional problems. Nevertheless, until the mid-1990s, the EU's enlargement initiatives were developing reasonably well in other former Communist Bloc countries, and the EU was also playing a relatively large social and economic role in the region. It was both the biggest capital and know-how investor in Eastern Europe and, following the collapse of the Soviet economic and trading bloc, the CMEA, it was the principal market for the industrial goods and other products from those states.

Hence, the EU seized the historical opportunity to assert its political role at three levels by using enlargement as the most appropriate policy instrument: (1) domestically, by promoting the vision of a united European continent after centuries of authoritarian systems dominating some part of its territory (it might be argued that the re-unification of Germany was presented as the first important act contributing to the realization of this ideal at the national level); (2) in its near-abroad and in Eastern Europe in particular, by providing these countries with the opportunity to eventually join the EU (this meant that the former were forced to open their markets almost overnight and start adopting the *acquis communautaire* as the main legal and administrative basis for the organization of their respective states); and (3) internationally, by relying on the reality that enlargement will inevitably affect the strategic interests of some of its neighbors further east and south as well as those of its transatlantic partners. This vision is given added salience by the EU's intention to extend its borders towards new social and political milieus, and an intriguing parallel could be drawn here between the competing and/or complementary policies of NATO and the EU.

Of course, not everything has gone smoothly for the EU and its member states. Nevertheless, the European institutions have gradually tried to streamline the normative provisions of the Union regarding enlargement and to transform their poli-

cies towards the Eastern European and other candidate states into a far better structured and more predictable process. The various EU initiatives in Eastern Europe have been conditioned by two major factors: the desire of the EU to enlarge itself eastwards and the strong impact of domestic actors. The latter refers not only to the member states but also to a large number of societal and other pressure groups, whose behavior has been conditioned by the perception of the above process more as an opportunity than a danger to the already established economic and political status quo in Europe.

Before beginning an analysis of the events that have shaped EU policies on eastern enlargement and before applying any normative conceptualization, two basic assumptions must be made. The first is that the EU preserves a dominant role and has important leverage vis-à-vis the Eastern European applicant states in most fields of European integration. Secondly, the EU, under its current institutionalized practice of allocating tasks and responsibilities between the Union and its member states, cannot be conceived as having a single decision-making center addressing the problems of eastern enlargement.

As far as the first statement is concerned, almost a decade after the crumbling of the authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe, it is quite certain that the EU has played and continues to play a key role by providing a model and establishing the conditions for membership of the new applicant states from the region.[11] The Union has also extended various forms of assistance to those countries during their painful transition towards modern political democracy and a liberal market economy. From the perspective of Eastern Europeans, the state of their bilateral relations with the Union seems somewhat different, but, nevertheless, the overall perception remains that the EU and its member states have been *the* leading actors during this period of time.

Many reasons have been cited in relation to the growing export of institutions to Eastern European candidate states and the conditionality imposed on them. One possible explanation focuses on the behavior of the various elites in Eastern Europe, who have happened to be mostly "policy-takers" in their multiple interactions with EU actors. The initial phase of the implementation of the eastern enlargement policies has demonstrated that Eastern European leaders have been led in their integration endeavors by a mixture of practical considerations and a dose of political idealism. These motivations have acted as incentives for them to perform certain functions and respond to particular EU policies proposed by different Western experts.[12] One could even speculate that a number of policies have been directly aimed at solving broader systemic problems of those elites' respective states: i.e., completing the modernization of their economies after decades of socialist inefficiency, rendering the political changes in their countries irreversible, building democratic regimes, and asserting their nations' European identity after a prolonged period of foreign communist rule.

The second assumption, relating to the absence of a single EU decision-making center able to manage enlargement, has so far been more difficult to prove empirically because of the obscure nature of the decision-making process in the EU.[13] This has been especially true of those foreign policy decisions in which the competing interests of the individual member states have been at odds both with each other and with those of the Union.[14] Whether a given policy relating to EU foreign and enlargement policy in Eastern Europe obtains the consensus of the various member states or is rejected outright depends on the issue at stake, and on the preferences of individual actors. For example, there have been several critical situations in the immediate European environment, like those in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo, where resolution of these problems could no longer remain solely under the competence of the EU as a supranational organization. They have instead required the collective effort of the majority of EU member states and of the international community as well. A significantly higher level of diplomatic, political, financial, and even military support from a larger number of European countries and even from bodies and organizations external to the EU has been necessary for resolving these types of conflicts. Enlargement is no exception to the above trend, simply because the majority of complications associated with enlargement are perceived mainly as foreign policy rather than internal EU issues. Although they have not evoked such high emotions on the part of Western societies and political class as the military conflicts in former Yugoslavia, issues of immigration, reform of the CAP, and the free movement of labor between eastern and western countries have provoked acrimonious comments and strong debate in the European media and among national politicians.

Finally, it should be noted that an examination of EU enlargement policies in Eastern Europe and a detailed analysis of the factors which have influenced the decisions of the Union and its member states create the impression that the present enlargement consists of random processes difficult to predict . Solutions to different types of problems and criteria for enlargement have not been identical despite the similarities in circumstances. However, through this, both the EU and the Eastern European candidate states have been learning about each other's characteristic features and behavior, and their activities have mostly been *anticipatory* of the expectations and needs of the other side. Consequently, the spread of European integration to the eastern part of the continent should not be depicted as a static, predetermined process, but rather as a dynamic, non-linear one.

Eastern Enlargement: The Point of Departure

Determining the point of departure is an important act in the method of theorizing about eastern enlargement as part of the EU integration process. It fixes the periods before and after a certain initial moment and, parallel to this, permits one to concentrate on the most important information from the beginning phase of such a process. This phase is characterized either by a breakthrough or gradual evolution, and it is presumed that certain events might potentially be repeated in subsequent periods of time.

	Roman Catholic / Protestant religion	Previous experience with democracy	Previously organized anti-communist resistance	Political reforms before 1989-91	Economic reforms before 1989-91
Bulgaria	-	-	-	-	-
Czech Republic	+	+	+	-	-
Estonia	+	+	-	-	-
Hungary	+	-	+	+	+
Latvia	+	+	-	-	-
Lithuania	+	+	-	-	-
Poland	+	-	+	+	-
Romania	-	-	-	-	-
Slovakia	+	-	-	-	-
Slovenia	+	-	-	-	+

Table 1: Initial Conditions in Eastern Europe (1989-93)
Results: Group I: Hungary - 9/10, Czech Republic - 8/10, Poland - 8/10

It is very complex to determine precisely what consists of a point of departure for the eastern enlargement process. Is it the moment of the collapse of state socialism in the different countries of the region? Is it the decision of the EU member states to conclude a new generation of Europe Agreements with the applicant countries? Is it the outcome of the 1994 European Council at Essen after which a clearer perspective was offered to a number of Eastern European states to become members of the EU? Or is it the Commission's June 1997 proposal to name the countries that can begin pre-accession negotiations for joining the Union in its own official document (*Agenda 2000*)? The problem here is to provide a specific date after which the policies of the EU regarding its enlargement eastwards were firmly established and became virtually irreversible. In other words, the point of departure is the moment when the EU, its member states, and the Eastern European countries established contractual relations and when it became very difficult for any one of the parties to retreat from the leading negotiations for enlargement.

	Anti-communist political opposition movement	Visible opposition leaders during former regime	Negotiated transition (Round table talks)	Free and fair elections	Emergence of non-communist politicians in first elections
Bulgaria	-	+	+	+	-
Czech Republic	+	+	+	+	+
Estonia	-	+	-	+	+
Hungary	+	+	+	+	+
Latvia	-	+	-	+	+
Lithuania	-	+	-	+	+
Poland	+	+	+	+	+
Romania	-	-	-	+	-
Slovakia	+	+	+	+	+
Slovenia	-	+	-	+	+

Group II: Slovakia - 6/10, Estonia - 5/10, Latvia - 5/10, Lithuania - 5/10
Group III: Slovenia - 5/10, Bulgaria - 3/10, Romania - 1/10

Undoubtedly, one of the most crucial events since the establishment of bilateral relations between the EU and the Eastern European candidate states has been the disclosure of the criteria for a future enlargement of the Union by the Copenhagen European Council in June 1993. The essential requirements for membership laid down in the so-called Copenhagen criteria represent the main legal framework and, even, an initial version of a written "constitution" of the European enlargement process. They have been evoked on various occasions since being made explicit and have also been used as the most important argument in the hands of the EU official representatives to allow or deny the beginning of accession negotiations with a given country. Most recently, in the case of the renewed Turkish application for joining the Union, the overall political and economic situation of the country was scrutinized to ascertain whether it conformed to the Copenhagen criteria. These criteria have served as the main basis for evaluation of individual applicant states from Eastern Europe in the annual Progress Reports produced by the Commission. Furthermore, in the last half-decade, the Copenhagen criteria have been used increasingly as a set of relevant provisos invented by the EU for comparison both among

the new associate countries and between the EU as a regional initiative and other countries and regions in the world where the model of European integration has been analyzed and occasionally replicated.

Ultimately, if there is a normative consensus that in the case of Eastern Enlargement of the EU, the defining of the Copenhagen criteria represents the point of departure for this process, then indeed, one might be able to describe the factors and establish analytically the record of the EU enlargement policies in Eastern Europe during the period between the collapse of communism in the region (1989-91) and the recent war in Kosovo (1998-99). This historical period consists of ten years, and the introduction of the Copenhagen criteria in June 1993 stands out as an approximate mid-point of this time span.

## Eastern Enlargement: The Point of Arrival

The point of arrival should ideally indicate the moment at which the negotiations for membership are finalized and the enlargement of the Union is sanctioned by the European Council and the European Parliament as well as by the national governments and parliaments of the member states. The eastern enlargement negotiations have shown that the EU officials, unlike some Western politicians defending concrete national interests, have been extremely reluctant to fix precise deadlines for admitting a particular country or group of countries so far. The temporal dimension of the enlargement process has thus remained largely unspecified, and this has become one of the main reasons why eastern enlargement has not been able to transform itself from a mere "project" of the European elites into a reality that would benefit the majority of people living on both sides of the former Cold War divide. One can even speculate that until the first Eastern European countries enter the EU, eastern enlargement might represent anything one would like it to be, i.e., a political concept, historical ideal, or social notion, but still *not* a hard fact that would confirm the completion of an important stage of the European integration process. Therefore, the point of arrival of the EU eastward enlargement has not yet been reached.

The Importance of the Initial Conditions

The "initial conditions" play a central role in the development of any social process without a predetermined end. A correct understanding of these conditions may provide a prime explanation for the occurrence and sequence of certain events after the beginning of this process. In the case of the EU-Eastern European relations before the summer of 1993, such interactions could have been of a historical, economic, political, social, ethno-cultural, or other nature. It is very difficult to establish which set of factors has contributed most to the decision-making regarding enlargement after the adoption of the Copenhagen criteria. Bearing in mind that in the first few years after the collapse of the communist system, some of the most urgent priorities of the political elites in Eastern Europe were connected with abol-

ishing the former authoritarian regime
structures, completing successful tran-
sitions to democracy, and rebuilding
their respective economies, the EU and
its member states kept track of these
changes and became almost immedi-
ately and decisively involved in all of
these domains of activity. Certainly, the
precise list of priorities of the West
European decision-makers in Eastern
Europe cannot be re-established with
100 percent confidence, but the official
discourse and concrete actions of these
people have prompted the majority of
researchers to look at the combination
of broadly-defined objectives shown in
Table 1.[15]

The Hungarian Parliament building. Budapest,
Hungary
Photo: Cory Reinbold

Table 1 presents a set of ten factors, described as "initial conditions," which
may provide a possible explanation for the attitude of the major EU actors towards
the Eastern European applicant states according to the presence or absence of some
of these factors in a given country or group of countries. The overall ranking of the
Eastern European states is made by summing these factor variables. The variables
are intended to coincide with the above-mentioned three basic areas of EU inter-
vention in Eastern Europe, namely, abolishing the remnants of the communist ide-
ology and conducting political and economic transformation. The results from this
survey clearly demonstrate that Catholic/Protestant countries, countries with some
previous experience with democratization, countries which had initiate political
and economic reforms earliest, and countries in which people who had not been
officially connected with the former communist regime arrived to power after elec-
tions in the period 1989-91 have been viewed much more favorably by both the EU
decision-makers and Western public opinion as a whole. The Eastern European
countries are tentatively divided into three groups according to their level of overall
performance, as indicated by the aggregate sum of positive answers obtained in
each of the above ten categories. The polities from Group I and some from Group II
have been those which have received the largest share of EU and member states'
attention and assistance with regard to enlargement initiatives and different bilat-
eral and multilateral types of contacts. The states from Group III and some from
Group II have been mostly disregarded in one or more of these respects and, as a
consequence, have been considered unlikely candidates for early membership.

As a rival hypothesis, it could also be proposed that some regions and groups
of countries amass historical chance simply because of a more favorable geographi-
cal superiority. The possession of close and special relations with a neighboring
country, which may happen to be a key player in the EU "bargaining game," may
give one reason to believe that certain countries are in a better position to integrate

	Trade and Cooperation Agreement signed	Europe Agreement signed	Europe Agreement comes into force	Extension of the PHARE program	Visa-free travel to at least one EU / EFTA member state
Bulgaria	May 1990	March 1993	Feb. 1995	1990	No
Czech Republic	May 1990†	Dec. 1991† (Oct. 1993)	Feb. 1995	1990† (1993)	1991
Estonia	May 1992	June 1995	pending‡	1992	1995
Hungary	Sept. 1988	Dec. 1991	Feb. 1994	1989	1991
Latvia	May 1992	June 1995	pending‡	1992	1991
Lithuania	May 1992	June 1995	pending‡	1992	1991
Poland	Sept. 1989	Dec. 1991	Feb. 1994	1989	1991
Romania	Oct. 1990	Feb. 1993	Feb. 1995	1991	No
Slovakia	May 1990†	Dec. 1991† (Oct. 1993)	Feb. 1995	1990† (1993)	1991
Slovenia	April 1993	June 1996	Feb. 1999	1992	before 1989

Table 2: EU Reaction to Eastern European Transformation and European Integration Efforts (1989-99)

† A Trade and Cooperation Agreement, a Europe Agreement, and an agreement on the PHARE program were signed with the then-existing Czechoslovakia.

‡ In late 1999, the Europe Agreements with the Baltic States had not yet been ratified by all the EU member states.

themselves in the EU than others, which cannot enjoy such a proximity to the European core where some of the most important decisions about the future of the continent are being taken. This statement may well hold true for certain situations, but it cannot explain everything and enter deep enough into all the aspects of the eastern enlargement policies of the EU. A geographical closeness to the main centers of European integration and, conversely, a greater distance from the centers of the previous authoritarian system has benefited one group of countries during the initial period of transition from communism. It has helped those countries which had formerly been part of major Western and Central European empires to sustain their claim of a historically based "European identity" more easily. However, proximity has also led to unresolved territorial problems between states and increased criticism in case of non-fulfillment of the previously highly set expectations for a quick enlargement. Even more importantly, the conceptual method of explaining

	EU member states' financial assitance* (billion ECU)	EU overall assistance* (billion ECU)	G-24 grants* (billion ECU)	Inflow of FDI** (million USD)	Share of EU imports from Eastern Europe*** (percent)
Bulgaria	0.7	1.8	2.6	157	4.2
Czech Republic	3.0	4.15	5.2	2,735	18.8
Estonia	0.3	0.5	0.7	248	1.0
Hungary	4.2	6.6	8.7	5,291	15.6
Latvia	0.3	0.5	0.7	34	2.1
Lithuania	0.4	0.7	0.9	22	2.1
Poland	13.7	16.1	23.3	2,784	26.6
Romania	2.6	4.3	5.2	211	7.8
Slovakia	2.1	2.75	3.8	1,531	6.3
Slovenia	0.4	0.6	0.7	223	9.1

* Source: G-24 Scoreboard of Assistance Commitments to the CEEC (1990-95), 1996.
** Source: UN World Investment Report, 1989-93, 1994.
*** Source: Eurostat, 1996.

facts solely in terms of one's geographical position overlooks the influence of individual actors. For example, dissidents and immigrants from the East, as well as a large number of political actors in the West, have contributed significantly both by hastening the collapse of communist rule and by helping establish an entire set of official and unofficial contacts between the EU and the governments of Eastern Europe, thereby assisting the enlargement process and European integration.

EU Responses in Eastern Europe

Table 2 presents some basic facts from the field of politics, economics, and finance, as well as the responses that the EU and its member states have given to the Eastern European countries in view of their aspirations to join the EU and

become further integrated into its structures. When one analyzes the above data, two major trends can be discerned in connection with the reaction of the major West European actors to the attempts of the Eastern European countries to become part of a more general process of integration. The first refers to the institutionalized reaction of the EU as a supranational regional organization, while the second relates to the answers provided by the individual member states of the Union to the same issues.

The signing of Trade and Cooperation Agreements between the EU and the former Communist Bloc countries was initiated relatively early and was completed in April 1993, with the participation of Slovenia. Meanwhile, the Europe Agreements, which were created with a view of integrating Eastern European candidate states, began to be implemented by the Commission on schedule. However, the EU member states have been relatively slow and inefficient in the sanctioning process and, as a consequence, the official ratification of the Europe Agreements with Slovenia and the three Baltic States has been considerably delayed, and a number of the Agreements remain unsigned.

As a whole, the official institutions and administrators within the EU have treated the Eastern European applicants on an equal basis. After Poland and Hungary, the PHARE program was quickly extended to the other Eastern European states, while the financial assistance provided by the EU through its various funds has benefited the associate countries in accordance with the approximate size of their population and level of economic development. With regard to the financial help given to the Eastern Europeans by the EU member states' governments directly or through alternative channels, such as the G-24, it becomes clear that the reaction here was less unbiased and selfless towards each country of the region. Conversely, certain preferences have been evident in those actors' relations with particular Eastern European and Baltic states. The omission of Bulgaria and Romania from the group of countries benefiting from the laws permitting the free movement of persons on the territory of EU/EFTA member states suggests that the criteria from Table 1, which divide Eastern European countries according to their historical, social, cultural, and political backgrounds, has not yet been completely overcome either at the level of the EU institutions or at the level of the member states.

The flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) into and the import of goods from the Eastern European countries into the Union presents a more balanced relationship, especially when one considers that both of these processes require active participation and creation of the necessary political, economic, and legal conditions by the authorities of the formerly communist states themselves. Nevertheless, the role of the EU and the direct intervention of individual member states on behalf of their Eastern European partners should not be underestimated. All of the above-mentioned factors tend to contribute to a generally more stable social and political environment for a few select Eastern European countries. They also provide foreign investors with some important indicators of how the economies of those countries

should develop in the future and/or whether the EU would "open" itself earlier in order to accelerate some countries' full integration into the European institutions and structures.

The Influence of Major Political Events

Looking back at the history of EU-Eastern European relations, over the last ten years, one can see that there are two major international political events which have substantially changed the attitude and behavior of EU actors towards the region and the current enlargement in particular. The first is the downfall of communism in Central and Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia. The second is the recent war in Kosovo. While the former represents the beginning of EU-Eastern European bilateral relations, the latter is a major military and humanitarian crisis, in which a number of EU member states as well as almost all of the associate states from Eastern Europe have been directly involved. During no other period, including during the conflict in Bosnia, have similar situations such as the collapse of communism and the Kosovo crisis been perceived as truly European and become the preoccupation of both Western and Eastern European governments to the extent that they would be ready to resolve them in unison and intervene with military force. On these two occasions, a consensus was reached both at the Union level and at the member state level that it was necessary to act and provide an adequate response to the challenges that arose.

The objectives of the policies proposed on each occasion coincided with and served the interests of both the EU and the majority of its member states. For the applicant countries, the downfall of communism and the pacification of Southeastern Europe have been of critical importance. Those were issues of strategic importance for the governments of the region, and Eastern European public opinion was generally in favor of the cooperation with and intervention of Western European countries and the EU in particular in their countries' internal affairs. Another important factor, which is certainly related to the current discussion, is that the EU elites and those of its member states have realized that ultimately enlargement and, to an extent, the promise of enlargement can serve as important foreign policy instruments. Thus, member states are able to force the prospective applicant countries to resolve their internal and regional problems peacefully and in a less-costly way for the EU.

Conclusions

In this paper, it has been demonstrated that the policies of the eastern enlargement project have unraveled rather unevenly and not always in unison with the integration endeavors of the majority of European states. Although the reasons for this are multiple, certain factors can be clustered together into two relatively concentrated periods of time, both between the late 1980s and the beginning of the twenty-first century.

Until the adoption of the Copenhagen criteria in June 1993, a limited set of "initial conditions" influenced the EU, and especially EU member states, to establish closer relations with and assist certain Eastern European countries more than others. Gradually, official institutions of the EU and the European Commission have responded to most of the individual and collective problems of the applicant states with greater professionalism and in a more balanced manner from a local and regional point of view. Neverthless, other policy areas such as the free movement of persons and labor have remained at the discretion of member states' national authorities. These policy fields have been characteristic of the growing structural and political inequalities between the various regions, sub-regions, and states not only within the EU itself, but also among the Eastern European applicants.

Finally, it has been hypothesized that European integration and enlargement have been strongly influenced by two important exogenous factors: the end of communist rule in Eastern Europe and the recent Kosovo crisis. These landmark events managed to consolidate European public opinion in favor of the Western governments' more decisive involvement in the problems of Eastern Europe, and they gave a strong impetus to the ongoing integration process on the continent as well. The collapse of communism created an opportunity for the start of the eastern enlargement process. In fact, the war in the former Yugoslavia demonstrated some of the "defects" of the initial plan (or absence of a plan) of the EU to manage the emerging problems linked with enlargement in the post-authoritarian environment of Eastern Europe. Of course, comparable events of major international political and social significance may not be ruled out completely from occurring in the future. However, present experience with enlargement policies in the region has shown that the more the EU and the Eastern European countries have learned about each other, the more "institutionalized" that process has become, and the more the European integration has been advanced qualitatively and quantitatively among the EU member states, the smaller the probability of failure becomes for such an important project.

Notes

[1] P. Van den Bempt and G. Theelen, *From European Agreements to Accession: The Integration of the Central and Eastern European Countries into the European Union* (Brussels: European Interuniversity Press, 1996); C. Preston, *Enlargement and Integration in the European Union* (London: Routledge Publishers, 1997) pp. 195-209; A. Mayhew, *Recreating Europe: The European Union's Policy Towards Central and Eastern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); and G. Avery and F. Cameron, *The Enlargement of the European Union* (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998).

[2] The Essen Summit in December 1994 selected those Eastern European countries that might be considered as candidates for membership in the EU. All of them had previously concluded Europe Agreements with the EU/EC. One year later, however, the group of official applicants increased after the three Baltic States and Slovenia joined. Thus, the number of candidate countries reached thirteen, including not only Eastern European countries but also the candidates from the Mediterranean wave of enlargement: Cyprus, Malta, and most recently, Turkey.

[3] EU Commission, *Agenda 2000, 15 July 1997, Supplement to the Bulletin of the European Union 5/97* (1997).

[4] In October 1999, the European Commission released its annual Progress Reports on the current state of affairs of the individual applicant states, where it praised the developments in several countries

from the so called "second wave" of enlargement, including Bulgaria and Romania, which had supported the military operation of NATO in Kosovo earlier that same year. EU Commission, *Regular Report From The Commission on Progress Towards Accession By Each of The Candidate Countries*, IP/99/751, 13 October 1999.

[5] It should be recognized, however, that Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, and Slovakia had already achieved substantial economic and political progress, which would probably have permitted them to join the first-wave applicants' group; the problem obviously remained only for Bulgaria and Romania, which were threatened with relegation to the second wave. The possibility of starting immediate negotiations for enlargement with Turkey was less certain, so it was given a longer period of time to comply with some of the basic membership requirements of the EU, namely the political and economic ones.

[6] In its official communication COM (99) 235 of 26 May 1999 to the Council and Parliament, the Commission proposed the start of a Stabilization and Association Process to the countries of Southeastern Europe. The General Affairs Council (GAC) of 31 May 1999 concluded on 4 June that the EU reaffirms "the readiness of the European Union to draw the countries of [Southeastern Europe] closer to the prospect of full integration into its structures."

[7] The 1993 European Council in Copenhagen decided that the Eastern European applicants should meet three essential criteria for membership: (1) stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, rule of law, human rights, and the protection of minorities, (2) the existence of a functional market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the Union, and (3) the ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic, and monetary union. European Council in Copenhagen, *Conclusions of the Presidency*, SN 180/93, 21-22 June 1993 p. 13.

[8] See, for example, *Agenda 2000*.

[9] J. Zielonka, "Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy. Policies Without Strategy: The EU Record in Eastern Europe," *European University Institute Working Paper*, RSC No. 97/72 (1997) p. 8. In a relatively recent article in the *Financial Times*, French foreign minister Hubert Vedrine argues about a successful completion of the December 2000 Nice Summit and a speedy enlargement eastwards and southwards. Parallel to this, however, he shares the concerns of the Enlargement Commissioner Günther Verheugen about the slow and painful reforms that the EU has to conduct internally. "EU's Challenge," *Financial Times* 6 September 2000.

[10] See R. Baldwin, *Towards an Integrated Europe* (London: CEPR, 1994) pp. 161-79; A. Hyde-Price, *The International Politics of Eastern Europe* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996) p. 203; and F. Schimmelfennig, "The Eastern Enlargement of the European Union: A Case for Sociological Institutionalism," in Lars-Erik Cederman, ed., *Constructing Europe's Identity: Issues and Tradeoffs* (1999) pp. 10-12.

[11] H.G. Krenzler, "The EU and Central East Europe: The Implication of Enlargement in Stages," *European University Institute Policy Paper*, RSC No. 97/2 (1997) p. 3; and H. Grabbe and K. Hughes, *Eastward Enlargement of the European Union* (The Royal Institute of International Affairs, February 1997) pp. 14-23.

[12] P. Balász, "The EU's Collective Regional Approach to its Eastern Enlargement: Consequences and Risks," *CORE Working Paper* No. 1/1997 (Copenhagen: Copenhagen Research Project on European Integration, 1997) pp. 2-9.

[13] J. Zielonka, *Explaining the Euro-Paralysis: Why Europe is Unable to Act in International Politics* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998) chs. 5-6.

[14] A.M. Sbragia, *Euro-Politics: Institutions and Policymaking in the "New" European Community* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1992) pp. 1-22; F.W. Scharpf, "Democratic Policy in Europe," *European Law Journal* 2, no. 2 (July 1996): pp. 136-55.

[15] G. Ekiert, "Do Legacies Matter? Patterns of Post-Communist Transitions in Eastern Europe," *Occasional Paper No. 53*, Woodrow Wilson Center: East European Studies Program (1999) pp. 11-24; and D. Stark and L. Bruszt, *Post-Socialist Pathways: Transforming Politics and Property in East-Central Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) ch. 1.

Bulgarian Foreign Policy

Regional Cooperation and EU/NATO Relations

Radoslava Stefanova

The topic of regional cooperation in Bulgaria has always maintained a high profile in the country's regional policy making, but it has gained particular popularity with the current government in place since 1997. There are several reasons for the primacy of this topic, which differ in both structure and substance. These are worth exploring both because of the ascending importance of the topic of regional cooperation in South Eastern Europe in general and because of Bulgaria's growing credibility in the larger context of international efforts aimed at the stabilization of the region.

First, it is worth noting that prior to the coming to power of the pro-Western government headed by Prime Minister Ivan Kostov, Bulgaria professed an interest in Balkan regional cooperation for two basic reasons. On the one hand, the previous governments, and in particular the last one headed by Jean Videnov, had a very low credibility in the West. Thus, exalting Bulgaria's participation in the regional cooperation initiatives was one of the few available tools to the politicians of that period to conduct foreign policy activities without disturbing the sensitivity of Russia. On the other hand, patterns of trade and communication remaining from the Cold War, particularly with Romania, revealed to some extent the need to trade on new and much more competitive markets, even if it did not prevent a severe economic crisis at the end of 1996. Furthermore, hiding behind regional cooperation at the time was also a convenient propaganda tool for politicians of the *ancien régime* to deliver promises devoid of substance related to the reformist pretences of govern-

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ments unable and unwilling to change. As a result, it could be claimed that until mid-1997 Bulgaria's policy of regional cooperation was partly the result of a lack of choice, and partly the result of a certain inertia, due to the semi-isolation in the post-Cold War political and economic vacuum, in which Bulgaria had placed itself.

Secondly, with the qualitative change of the regime in Bulgaria in April 1997, regional cooperation continued to be one of the top items of the foreign policy agenda of the country, but for different reasons. While the Kostov government managed to quickly restore Western interest and trust in Bulgaria both as a "prime stability factor in the region,"[1] and as an eventual member in the EU and NATO, Bulgaria's retarded economic development (despite significant progress made since 1997) still imposes regional cooperation as one of the most important economic trade and exchange realities. Furthermore, in view of Bulgaria's new and more articulated foreign policy priorities, namely, rapid integration with the Euro-Atlantic institutions, it is becoming increasingly clear that regional cooperation, understood primarily as integration in terms of export and import priorities, infrastructure, communications, and labor mobility, is a fundamental prerequisite for the consolidation of the country's competitiveness in view of obtaining its wider foreign policy objectives.

Finally, and most importantly, it has been a policy of the current Bulgarian government to adopt with very little criticism foreign policy choices recommended by the West, in an attempt, perhaps, to reinforce the climate of trust and respect for a country without strong lobbies in the EU and NATO decision making forums. While it is not the purpose of this research to either qualify the usefulness of this policy choice in terms of effectiveness, or measure it in view of the realistic attainment of Bulgaria's proposed EU and NATO membership, it should be that in this context, especially in the aftermath of the Kosovo war, that the promotion of regional cooperation in the Balkans has emerged lately as a major Western policy prescription for stability and prosperity in the region. As a result, Bulgaria is confronted with a necessity to follow a policy of regional integration in the hope of reaping major foreign policy dividends in its bid for EU and NATO membership. This tendency was well articulated by Bulgaria's Foreign Minister, Nadejda Mihajlova, as early as 1997:

> Bulgaria tries through its regional policy to promote European patterns of behavior
> among the countries of the area so as to accelerate incorporation of our area into the
> EU and NATO . . .Bulgaria tries to coordinate all its activities in the area with the
> foreign and security policy of the EU and with the terms and positions agreed upon
> within the context of NATO . . .[2]

The Foreign Minister also recently reaffirmed this policy by noting that regional cooperation stands together with EU and NATO membership as the top priority for the Bulgarian government, while specifying that she sees these three different processes as intrinsically interlinked.[3] Similar statements are also repeatedly reiterated by the Bulgarian President, Petar Stoyanov, whose speech of February 23, 2001 at the prestigious regional forum of the South Eastern Europe Cooperation Process was unequivocal; Stoyanov stated that Bulgaria's engagement in "regional

cooperation should develop in the light of each Balkan state's European prospects, and not as a substitute for their independent path towards EU integration."[4] Premier Ivan Kostov has been even more explicit in his frustration over the necessity for Bulgaria to adopt regional cooperation in order to improve its prospects for joining the EU. On January 16, 2001 Kostov said in an interview with *Financial Times Deutschland* that Bulgaria's recent progress in meeting the criteria for EU membership "has not been fully recognized" blaming the Union for assessing candidates' performance by "patching them up into groups" and not in line with their respective achievements or failures.[5]

Bulgarian Participation in South Eastern European Cooperation Initiatives

As is evident from the above discussion, Bulgaria has, therefore, tended to reinforce its participation in current and new initiatives of regional cooperation and integration. However, it is worth noting that the emphasis the government has tended to give to different initiatives has been dependent on the importance of the EU and the US accorded programs. As a result, if Bulgaria's participation and support for the various regional cooperation initiatives is to be ranked, the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe launched in 1999 would undoubtedly loom more important than other regional initiatives, such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), which was criticized in the press for being too bureaucratic and inefficient.[6] Moreover, in the past the Bulgarian government has attempted to launch major regional cooperation initiatives, such as the Sofia Process, an annual meeting of the Balkan defense ministers, independently. Such efforts demonstrate Bulgaria's search for the foreign policy and economic dividends that would bring about among its Western allies. Many Bulgarian global policy aspirations can, therefore, be found in its ostensibly quite superficial and straightforward regional cooperation policy. It is for this reason that it is important to examine briefly Bulgarian attitudes towards the major regional cooperation organizations and agreements.

The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe

As already mentioned, the most important regional cooperation initiative for Bulgaria is undoubtedly the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe adopted on June 10, 1999 in Cologne. There are two basic reasons for which the full adherence to the Stability Pact has become Bulgaria's top foreign policy priority. On the one hand, it is clear that the Pact represents an important *démarche* on the part of the European Union, which Bulgarian politicians undoubtedly interpret as a *sine qua non* stage to EU membership. In fact, the Stabilization and Association Process under the Stability Pact is a continuation and expansion of the Union's 1996 Regional Concept developed initially for the countries of the former Yugoslavia and Albania. The EU's Regional Concept's centerpiece was a political and economic conditionality aimed at the overall stabilization of the Western Balkans. Bulgaria considers this particularly important for its EU and NATO integration.[7] An active

involvement in and support of the Stability Pact, is therefore, seen as a way to promot Euro-Atlantic regional priorities, and consequently, as a gateway to membership based on a reliable partner's behavior.

Secondly, supporting the Stability Pact has important economic implications for Bulgaria not only at a regional level (even if regional trade considerations certainly go in the same direction), but even more so at the level of trade and commercial relations with the EU, which remains Bulgaria's main trade exchange partner.[8] In fact, Bulgaria's exports to and imports from the EU amount to 49.7 percent and 45.0 percent respectively, while exports to and imports from the countries in the region are 9.3 percent and 4.0 percent, respectively, excluding Greece, where the export-import relationship is 8.8 percent to 5.9 percent and Turkey, where the figure is 7.9 percent to 2.6 percent.[9] As evident from the statistics, the EU dominates Bulgarian regional trade activities.

Perhaps even more important in this context is the significant financial assistance in the form of grants and foreign direct investment (FDI) projects, generated in the framework of the three tables of the Stability Pact at the donors' conference in Brussels last March. Bulgaria was the only recipient country, which coined an elaborate lobbying strategy aimed at swiftly approaching the most likely donors taking part in the Brussels conference. Bulgaria now believes that it has benefited considerably by the fund-raising effort of the Stability Pact.[10]

It is worth noting, however, that after initially enthusiastic support for the Stability Pact, Bulgaria retreated significantly, attempting even to use its support for the Pact as leverage to achieve other very important goals, such as lifting the restrictions on the travel of Bulgarians abroad. Such attitudes clearly demonstrate that the country's policy makers do not believe in significant benefits stemming from adhesion to the Pact, other than as a means to display a good and reliable EU candidate's attitude. The visa lifting issue, however, emerged as the most important pre-electoral promise of the government, the realization of which was considered to be the only tool available to raise the ruling coalition's falling popularity domestically.[11] As a result, having conducted an intense visa-lifting campaign in virtually all European capitals, Bulgarian officials estimated that they needed an even stronger tool to use. On November 10, 200 Kostov declared that "Bulgaria must defend its national interest by preparing for an active and strong foreign policy response in case the visa restrictions are not lifted."[12] The same day the Chairman of the Parliamentary Foreign Policy Committee, Assen Agov, declared that Bulgaria would leave the Stability Pact if visas were not waived,[13] thus making explicit Bulgaria's consideration of the practical benefits it sees in participating in the Stability Pact. Namely that Bulgaria considers the Pact a short-term foreign policy tool aimed at advancing its relations with the EU, an agreement that will eventually deliver long-term regional cooperation benefits. Kostov himself soon took up this explicit line of what could even be called an EU blackmailing, when he declared in

Brussels that "it remains to be seen if in the future Bulgaria will be able to devote as much effort as in the past to regional initiatives and European integration."[14] This statement was a clear warning to the EU, referring not only to the possible discrediting of the organization if an exemplary and core member like Bulgaria left it, but also to the difficulties the EU would have of the visa issue contributed to the ousting of the ruling coalition from power. Such an event would be a highly undesirable eventuality for the EU, as the remaining party formations in Bulgaria are all much less Europe-oriented than the Kostov coalition.

It should be noted that Kostov's policy pressures were successful, displaying that he had correctly understood the mechanics of the EU decision-making process and its application to regional cooperation agreements in the Balkans. On December 1, 2000 the EU Justice and Home Affairs Council announced that visa restrictions will be removed, and on March 1, 2001 the European Parliament approved the Council's report on the unconditional waiver of visas for Bulgarian citizens traveling abroad. Bulgaria has since reconfirmed its commitment to the Stability Pact by signing an agreement to promote freer trade among the members in January.[15] On February 23, 2001 the Pact's Coordinator, Bodo Hombach, noted that he was impressed with the Bulgarian government's achievements and pledged his personal assistance for the country.[16] As a result, it is apparent that the Stability Pact has proven to be an important foreign policy tool for Bulgaria, and in the future Bulgarian politicians will undoubtedly continue to consider it an important policy tool for applying pressure on the EU.

The Black Sea Economic Cooperation

In contrast, however, Bulgaria's participation in the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) is not as active as with the Stability Pact. Based on the above analysis of Bulgarian foreign policy making, it could be claimed that the relatively low cooperative enthusiasm for this particular initiative was due to the fact that the BSEC has been relatively unimportant at the level of the EU and NATO. Indeed, only after the EU officially supported the BSEC's reformed structure and objectives at the BSEC's Parliamentary Assembly in Athens in June 1997, did Bulgaria show more vigor in its involvement. However, there are some important regional factors that contribute to Bulgaria's continued presence in the BSCE, such as the prospect for joint projects with considerable economic potential with Turkey and Russia. One example is the pipeline politics and preferential trade in and exchange of natural gas, oil, and petroleum, which emerged under the aegis of the EU-sponsored "Synergy" program. Bulgaria, furthermore, volunteered to be the permanent host of the organization's Energy Center.

The Central European Initiative

Bulgaria's main reason for applying to and joining the Central European Initiative (CEI) is again related to advancing its position in the EU integration pro-

cess. In addition to the fact that joining that club has meant having preferential access (and possible lobbying ground) to two EU members, Italy and Austria, the other candidate states are all in a much more privileged position regarding the date of their EU entry. As a result, through participation in the CEI, Bulgarian foreign policy is also projected towards the future EU members, all of which will be expected to support Bulgaria's bid for EU membership. Another point in favor of Bulgarian membership in the CEI in this respect relates to the particular importance given to the improvement of regional infrastructure. Particularly relevant for Bulgaria in this respect is the completion of Transport Corridor Eight, for the concrete realization of which the CEI members signed a memorandum at their annual meeting in 1997, which would greatly improve the country's trade relations with the EU, which were considerably crippled by the embargo placed upon the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).

South Eastern European Cooperation Initiative

Similar considerations condition Bulgaria's participation in the South Eastern European Cooperation Initiative (SECI), where the country's foreign policy makers are influenced strongly by the US support of the initiative. An additional element in the whole-hearted embrace of the Initiative was an initial objection on the part of Russia in 1997 to what it considered to be the imposition of US unilateral interests in the Balkans. At the time, the recently elected Kostov government considered it particularly important to demonstrate support for the Initiative in order to show the US its level of sensibility towards Russian objections in contrast to that of its predecessors, as well as to improve its credibility as an aspirant NATO member.[17] In addition, there are some strong economic considerations underlying Bulgarian support for the SECI; namely, the US is the third largest investor in Bulgaria after Belgium and Germany, while Russia comes only twelfth.[18] Moreover, in 1997 under its sponsorship of the SECI the US granted Bulgaria $ 8 billion over a period of four years for the construction of Transport Corridor Eight.

Balkans Defense Ministerial (Sofia Process)

In yet another effort to reinforce its bid for NATO membership, the Bulgarian government launched a regional cooperation initiative of its own, that of the Balkans Defense Ministerial, which became known as the Sofia Process. The initiative gained immediate support from the US, which joined the initiative as a NATO member, and from the EU, from which Italy and Greece joined.[19] The purpose of the Ministerial is to create efficient Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM), which could contribute to creating a lasting climate of stability in the region. Some unease was created when participation was refused to Russia, after an explicit request on the part of the Russian government. The Kostov government justified the denial by the fact that Russia was neither part of the Balkans, nor a NATO member, nor an EU member, conditions cited as indispensable for participation. However, it was clear that such exclusion went much beyond the security cooperation

interests of the organizers—it was another way of reaffirming Bulgaria's credibility as an ally in order to lay the ground for its future NATO membership. This sentiment is similarly reflected in Foreign Minister Mihajlova' statement that

> regional cooperation should not lead to the creation of 'regional clubs,' but rather reinforce the broadening and deepening of the Partnership [for Peace] itself. Nor should this cooperation be seen as an alternative to early membership in NATO for qualified countries, but rather as an instrument to better engage their efforts to the benefit of regional security.[20]

Balkans Foreign Ministerial

Consistent with these approaches has been Bulgaria's attitude towards the Balkan Foreign Ministerial launched in 1996, the focus of which has been the promotion of stability in a broader sense, including aspects of cooperation in the fight against trans-regional organized crime and corruption, as well as discussion on social security, immigration, and human rights. While Bulgaria has always been represented at the highest level at the meetings, it demonstrated some criticism of the excessive bureaucratization of the regional cooperation initiatives, together with fear of duplication of initiatives. Premier Kostov thus pointed out that

> Bulgaria supports the intensification of cooperation between the countries from South Eastern Europe, but it should not be too easy-going when the creation of new regional administrative structures is being proposed. In order to support a new institution, Bulgaria must be sure that it is going to be efficient and capable of delivering economically.[21]

Clearly, this attitude of an increased demand for efficiency is fundamental to Bulgaria's approach to all initiatives and organizations. However, it should be noted that Kostov voiced no similar fears or criticisms at the launching of the Balkan Defense Ministerial only a year after the Foreign Ministerial, which essentially repeated the format and the basic objectives. The explanation of this behavior is to be found in the fact that while the Defense Ministerial was strongly supported by the US, NATO, and the EU, the Foreign Ministerial remained limited to the region and failed to receive substantial support and attention on the part of the Euro-Atlantic structures.

What emerges from this discussion is that Bulgaria's strong support for South Eastern European regional cooperation initiatives is at all times conditioned by foreign policy priorities judged to be more important, namely those of EU and NATO membership. From a more careful analysis it becomes clear that Bulgaria is interested only in cooperation initiatives that in one way or another reinforce its position at the level of Euro-Atlantic policy-making. It is thus clear that regional cooperation is not seen as a goal in itself (trade exchange figures are, in fact quite eloquent in this respect), but as a policy course towards objectives that go beyond the region. While such an attitude towards regional integration is not necessarily constructive, it does imply some positive co-lateral effects, produced by the strong EU and NATO conditionality policy.

Regional Cooperation At Bilateral and Trilateral Levels

Both the EU and NATO, as well as their individual members, have stressed in all major documents the primacy of human rights observance and the conduct of good neighborly relations. While Greece, as an EU and NATO member, and Turkey as a NATO member are not necessarily a good example of security and stability maintenance, human rights observance, or good neighborly relations at a regional level, the other Balkan countries are required and expected to fully comply with the strict conditionality policy of both the EU and NATO by fully addressing all points of friction with their neighbors and resident minorities. Failure to comply with these conditions immediately results in ever more elusive prospects for membership, fewer preferential trade agreements, and decreasing financial assistance packages.

Bulgaria, like most of the other countries of the region, has thus been forced to try to solve disagreements, overcome a history of hostility with some of its neighbors, and straighten its human and minority rights policy. This section will be concerned with the former process, while the latter must be the subject of a different piece of research.

Crudely put, on its way to regional cooperation Bulgaria has had to overcome minority and human rights disputes with Macedonia and Turkey, while relations with Greece and Romania have been less conditioned by patterns of ethnic discord. Relations with the FRY have been subject above all to the international embargo against the Milosevic regime, which has practically impeded the development of an independent policy course there, even if Bulgarian minority in the FRY has been officially recognized. Compared to the rest of the countries in the region, the Kostov government has had an impressive record of mending relations with neighbors, a political ability which was fortunately coupled with good will on the part of new and reform-minded governments in the neighboring countries in question, a process which is now extending also to the rump of Yugoslavia.

Turkey

Turkey was probably the first country with which Bulgaria re-established good neighborly relations after a history of repression of Bulgaria's 9.4 million ethnic Turks by the communist regime in the mid 1980s. Over 360,000 ethnic Turks were expelled from the country after refusing to change their Islamic names into Slavic ones. Premier Kostov called this unfortunate episode in Bulgarian minority policy "ethnic cleansing par excellence" and "ethnic genocide against the Bulgarian Turks."[22]

After the fall of communism, an important ethnic Turkish political party, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms asserted itself among the ethnic Turkish electorate. They soon became a "force to be reckoned with"[23] for the Bulgarian governments, because of the attention Turkey manifested in this party.[24] As a result, both major parties in Bulgaria essentially accepted the new party and tried to meet its demands of improving and guaranteeing ethnic Turkish minority rights, by bring-

ing them to a truly European level.[25] Indeed, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms has managed quite freely under all Bulgarian governments, despite the wide historical and ideological divide between various parties leading the Movement to vote for one party or the other quite circumstantially.[26]

As a result, relations with Turkey improved dramatically and many cooperative agreements were signed. For example, as early as 1991 Bulgaria and Turkey signed an important agreement, whereby they agreed to advise each other on military matters and not to conduct military exercises using large military units within 15 km of their common border. In 1992 a classic regional cooperation agreement on "Friendship, Good Neighborliness, Cooperation and Security" followed, which paved the way for a deeper cooperation commitment, and even better relations. In 1999 a free trade agreement between Bulgaria and Turkey was signed, which will be fully effective in 2002. For Bulgaria this is a big step forward, because it constitutes an indirect preferential access to the EU market, given that Turkey has had an effective customs union with the EU since 1996. Trade patterns between Bulgaria and Turkey are thus intensifying and consolidating, a fact which also positively influences other aspects of regional cooperation. Thanks to a Bulgarian governmental decree from 1999, Bulgarian ethnic Turks residing in Turkey will receive their Bulgarian pensions. Furthermore, a common family reunification program was adopted to help the movement of ethnic Turkish across both sides of the border. These facts have made the Turkish government one of Bulgaria's staunchest supporters for NATO membership and have certainly contributed to the climate of good neighborliness in the Balkans.

Greece

With Greece the situation has been more ambiguous, even if quite positive overall. Immediately after the fall of communism, it seemed that Bulgaria was willing to privilege Greece over Turkey in its regional policy making, mainly due to a certain solidarity with the Greek point of view on the non-existence of a Macedonian nation.[27] However, strong Greek suspicion over Bulgarian intentions after Bulgaria recognized the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as an independent nation in 1991, coupled with a particularly nationalist rhetoric on the part of the Papandreu government regarding presumed Bulgarian aspirations for Macedonian territory, tended to favor Bulgarian rapprochement with Turkey rather than with Greece. As a result, the current policy of Bulgaria towards Greece and Turkey can be described as one of "positive energy,"[28] clearly reflecting the Bulgarian government's realization that the two most important players of the region could be successfully played against each other.[29] Greece still remains a very important regional partner for Bulgaria as a EU member, especially after the post-Papandreu governments reduced nationalist rhetoric.

The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

The question with Macedonia is more complicated for both historical and contemporary domestic political reasons. Macedonian history, as described by native scholars, tends to coincide with major nation-building myths of the Bulgarian state.[30] Moreover, delicate and strongly politicized issues, such as the long-lasting language controversy, or the existence or not of minorities, were for a long time hard to resolve because of the nationalist-minded populism of governments on both sides.

While Bulgaria was the first country to recognize the Republic of Macedonia in 1991 under its new constitutional name (a fact which upset Greece), Bulgarian policy has long been one of refusal to recognize both the Macedonian nation and language as separate from Bulgarian. Lingering on old nationalist myths was a favorite policy of the ex-communist governments preceding the Kostov government, which made matters even more complex. As a result of the language controversy over thirty bilateral cooperation agreements with Macedonia were blocked for eight years, the result of which was both countries suffering economically and politically at the level of the EU and NATO.

The question of the existence of each country's minorities on both sides of the border is even more complicated than that of language and nationality. Officially both Bulgaria and Macedonia deny the existence of the other country's minority on their territory. Even discussing the existence of a Bulgarian minority in Macedonia is problematic for Bulgaria, as it would imply the recognition of two different nations. Another reason for Bulgarian passivity on the question of the minority debate with Macedonia is the imperative to show tolerance and open-mindedness towards its neighbors as part of the country's bid for EU and NATO membership. In that respect, it is clear that even if Bulgaria demanded discussion on the question of protecting citizens in Macedonia, who profess a Bulgarian ethnic identity, it would not be taken as a positive signal on the part of the EU and NATO, which are much more interested in the maintenance of stability in the region.

Kostov's coming to power in Bulgaria, followed by the more tolerant Democratic Party for National Unity (VMRO) government in Macedonia, finally paved the way to a compromise on the language issue in February 1999 (while leaving the other controversies unresolved), which provided for the signature of all fundamental cooperation agreements, even if some degree of suspicion still remains between the two neighbors. Here it should be noted, that EU and NATO conditionality contributed significantly to the easing of tensions and the signing of the accord, as both countries' priorities were anchored in closer links to NATO and the EU. Even if questions of national history myths and claimed or disclaimed minorities on both sides of the border still remain unresolved, both Kostov and Macedonian Prime Minister Ljubcho Georgievski signed a declaration in which they pledged that their countries "shall not undertake, incite, or support unfriendly activities against each other."[31] On the day of the declaration's signature Bulgaria donated 150 tanks and 150 howitzers to Macedonia, as a gesture of good will.[32]

A certain complication in bilateral relations between Bulgaria and Macedonia is related to the volatile situation in the ex-Yugoslavia. It could be claimed that chronic instability due to the Yugoslav wars has increased the strategic importance of Macedonia, a fact especially evident in the aftermath of the Kosovo conflict. Because of the Macedonia's geopolitical situation, which makes the country central to all international involvement in all of the former Yugoslavia, even the new Macedonian policy makers seem to have become less prone to regional cooperation and more interested in cultivating direct relations with the US (due to American military presence on Macedonian territory within the framework of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)) and the EU, with which Macedonia negotiated a Stabilization and Association Agreement in January 2000.[33]

In fact, after a certain "warming of Macedonian-Bulgarian relations"[34] in the immediate aftermath of the Macedonian general elections won by the VMRO government of Georgievski, recently there have been some signs of "cooling down."[35] However, Bulgarian Foreign Minster Mihajlova stated that "some political circles are trying to provoke this cooling down." She then indicated that relations with Macedonia would improve even further as the latter intensifies its ties to the EU.[36] In fact, a high level visit by Macedonian President Boris Trajkovski is scheduled for May 2001,[37] during which two important bi-lateral documents are expected to be signed: a Declaration of Friendship, and a Readmission Agreement.[38] Yet ultimately it becomes evident that Bulgaria's bilateral cooperation with its neighbors passes through Brussels.

Romania

A good example of bilateral cooperation is to be found in Bulgaria's relations with Romania. As already mentioned, there are practically no tensions with Romania based on ethnic disaccord. As of 1992, the Bulgarian minority in Romania is officially recognized, has its own media, language schools, and parliamentary representation. Furthermore, both Bulgaria and Romania are in very similar political and economic positions regarding the status of their preparation for membership in the EU and NATO; both started structural reforms relatively late and encountered similar problems of implementation and imperfect efficiency. As a result, cooperation agreements between Bulgaria and Romania have been numerous and relatively easy to reach (with exception, perhaps, of the agreement for the building of a second bridge over the Danube, a problem which was solved at the Stability Pact donor conference in Brussels last March).

It was therefore natural for Bulgaria and Romania to join forces in making the most of regional cooperation both in terms of reinforcing their bids for EU and NATO membership, and by looking for strategic allies in the region to lobby for them at the Euro-Atlantic decision making forums. It is in this light that two important trilateral initiatives were born, where Bulgaria and Romania constituted the core and Greece and Turkey were approached and involved separately. On October 3, 1997 the Presidents of Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey gathered in Varna to sign

a series of important regional cooperation agreements on trilateral cooperation against organized crime, illegal immigration, and corruption. Later that same month, on October 27, 1997, the Foreign Ministers of Romania, Bulgaria, and Greece signed practically the same series of agreements. On February 16, 2001 the three countries' presidents met again to discuss issues related to the curbing of organized crime in the region. On this occasion President Stoyanov noted: "the idea that our three countries cannot do without the EU, whereas the EU can do without us, is absolutely wrong in respect to the struggle against organized crime."[39] At the same meeting Bulgaria and Romania also pressured Turkey to pledge its support for their NATO membership. Ultimately, it could be concluded that Bulgarian regional cooperation works best with Romania because the two share not only common foreign policy objectives, but also a common starting point and common problems in the course of reform implementation.

Conclusions

Clearly, this analysis reveals that Bulgaria's propensity for regional cooperation is undoubtedly one of the country's top foreign policy priorities. However, regional cooperation is not promoted by Bulgarian foreign policy makers for the sake of stabilizing and improving the economic performance of the region *per se*, but rather as a vehicle towards EU and NATO membership. Good neighborly relations, minority and human rights observance, and regional integration and consolidation are all priorities that the Euro-Atlantic policy makers have classified as fundamental to policy-making strategies to be conducted in the Balkans. As a result, espousing this extrinsically prescribed policy course has become the precondition for membership for the individual countries from the region. Bulgaria's foreign policy has thus turned towards the region, even if trade, historical and cultural patterns have seldom provided for intensive and effective cooperation in the past.

Bulgaria has greatly improved its relations with practically all of its neighbors, and is on the way to solving even such extremely difficult and emotionally charged controversies as that of Macedonian language and nationality. It must be recognized that much of the credit for the successful internalization of the EU's Copenhagen criteria must go to the present government of Premier Kostov, which put EU and NATO membership on the top of the Bulgarian foreign policy agenda. Bulgaria's relations with both Turkey and Greece are now excellent, the partial basis of which is Bulgaria's very progressive policies towards the Turkish minority. Furthermore, Romania's foreign policy priorities, namely integration with the EU and NATO, coincide with these of Bulgaria, a fact that has paved the way for a harmonious and fruitful regional cooperation track record between the two. Similarly, relations with the FRY now proceed in a calm and stable manner.

It can therefore be concluded that despite the drive for regional cooperation in the Balkans is external, rather than intrinsic to the traditional patterns of regional relations, it has effectively produced more stability and prosperity for the countries which have espoused it, relieving ethnic, historical, and economic tensions. The EU

and NATO should therefore continue to conduct a measured conditionality policy, which combines credible membership perspectives for the South Eastern European countries with carefully targeted incentives and assistance on the basis of which the West could continue to maintain its leverage on the local policy makers of the region.

Notes

[1] Ivan Kostov, *Press Conference*, Sofia, 3 May 2000.

[2] Nadejda Mihajlova, "Priorities in Bulgarian Foreign Policy," *Thesis* 1, no. 3 (Autumn 1997): p. 17.

[3] Kostov, 3 May 2000.

[4] Petar Stoyanov as quoted by the Bulgarian Telegraph Agency, 23 February 2001.

[5] As quoted in *RFE/RL Newsline*, 18 January 2001.

[6] *24 Chasa*, 15 July 1997.

[7] Nadejda Mihajlova, "Stability in South-East Europe and Bulgaria's Policy of NATO Integration," *NATO Review* 46, no. 1 (Spring 1998): pp. 6-8.

[8] Deputy Trade Minister of Bulgaria Hristo Mihajlovski, as quoted in *RFE/RL Newsline*, 26 April 2000.

[9] Loukas Tsoukalis, "Economic Aspects of European and Balkan Regional Integration," *The International Spectator* 4, no. 34 (December 1999): p. 44.

[10] Deputy Foreign Minister of Bulgaria Vassilij Takev, *Press Conference*, Sofia, 3 May 2000.

[11] Margarita Assenova, "The Schengen List Impacts on Bulgaria's Elections," *RFE/RL Newsline*, 22 November 2000.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid.

[14] *RFE/RL Newsline*, 22 November 2000.

[15] *RFE/RL Newsline*, 19 January 2001.

[16] Bulgarian Telegraph Agency, 23 February 2001.

[17] It should be noted that for the same reason as soon as the Kostov government emerged victorious on the visa issue for Bulgarians in Europe, it declared that it would introduce visa requirements for Russians visiting Bulgaria.

[18] Agency for Foreign Investment, Sofia, 1997.

[19] At a major conference on Balkan regional cooperation held in Rome in October 1999, organized by the *Istituto Affari Internazionali*, participants form the region, the EU, and the US all agreed that Bulgaria deserves much credit for successfully generating support for the Initiative at a very high political level, thus contributing significantly to the reinforcement of confidence building measures in the region. *Report of the Conference on Regional Cooperation and Reconstruction in Southeast Europe.* Documenti IAI, IAI9934, p. 7.

[20] Mihajlova, 1998, p. 7.

[21] Ivan Kostov, *Democrazja* 4 November 1997.

[22] As quoted in Joe Cook, "Bulgaria Proves Rare Model of Ethnic Tolerance in the Balkans," *Financial Times* 13 July 1999.

[23] Ekavi Athanassopoulou, "Turkey and the Balkans: The View from Athens," *The International Spectator* 29, no. 4 (October-December 1994): pp. 55-64.

[24] The Turkish Premier in 1991, Mesut Ylmaz, stated: "The behavior of the Bulgarian government towards the Turkish minority would be a guarantee for Turkish-Bulgarian relations," *Democrazja* 5 September 1991.

[25] Cook.

[26] For example, on May 8, 2000 the Turkish party's leader, Ahmed Dogan, attended meeting of the opposition, the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), at which the party re-elected its leader, and declared that he would be willing to support the opposition, or even form a coalition with it. *RFE/RL Newsline*, 9 May 2000. On May 10, Dogan supported the government in a no-confidence motion initiated by the BSP. *RFE/RL Newsline*, 12 May 2000. Getting closer to the elections, however, Dogan revamped his political importance by supporting the opposition against the government in a no-confidence vote on 16 February 2001. *RFE/RL Newsline*, 16 February 2001.

[27] Radoslava Stefanova, "La Turchia e l'Europa Sud-Orientale," in Roberto Aliboni, ed., *Geopolitica della Turchia* (Milano: Franco Angeli, 1999) p. 135.

[28] "Challenges and Choices for the New Government," *International Crisis Group Report*, 6 April 1999.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Interview with a Macedonian historian, Institute of National History, Skopje, 17 October 1997.

[31] *International Crisis Group Report*, 6 April 1999.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Radoslava Stefanova in Luciano Bozzo and Carlo Belli, eds., *Macedonia: La Nazione che Non C'è* (Milano: Franco Angeli, 2000).

[34] *International Crisis Group Report*, 6 April 1999.

[35] On April 22, 2000, in the background of the growing flurry over the EU visa waiver in Bulgaria, the Macedonian President Boris Trajkovski told the Macedonian daily *Utrinski Vestnik* that "criminals, smugglers and drug traders penetrate Macedonia from Bulgaria" and urged the EU not to grant the visa waiver to Bulgaria. The Bulgarian Foreign Ministry spokesman reacted on April 28, claiming that Bulgaria hoped the Macedonian President had been "misinterpreted" by the press, because "it would be alarming if the opposite were true," pointing out that "transferring one's own problems to one's neighbors has never been a useful thing to do." *RFE/RL Newsline*, 2 May 2000.

[36] Nadejda Mihajlova, *Press Conference*, Sofia, 3 May 2000.

[37] *RFE/RL Newsline*, 23 February 2001.

[38] Petar Stoyanov's Press Secretary Neri Terzieva as quoted by the Bulgarian Telegraph Agency, 23 February 2001.

[39] *RFE/RL Newsline*, 16 February 2001.

Never Again
Historical Analogy in the Kosovo Crisis

Joy L. Frey

1389—Version I

Prince Lazar had come to be the most powerful regional lord in Kosovo and Metohija. It was he who led the troops to battle on that fateful morn of St. Vitus, June 15, 1389. The night before the battle, Prince Lazar hosted a feast for his noble friends and proposed a now-legendary toast conveying doubt in the loyalty of Serbian knight Milos Obilic. The battle occurred on a plain in Kosovo Polje near Priština. It was here that the troops of Prince Lazar confronted the Turkish army led by Emir Murad I and assisted by Albanians from the region. During the battle, the knight Milos proved his allegiance to Prince Lazar by killing the Turkish emir in his tent. Despite these heroics, the Turks overwhelmed the Serbs and, after killing Prince Lazar, brought the Serbian army to its knees. The battle marked the beginning of Turkish dominance in the region, acquired in the holiest place of Orthodox Serbia.

1389—Version II

On June 15, 1389 Prince Lazar of Serbia led a coalition army of Serbs, Hungarians, Romanians, Albanians and others against a vastly superior Ottoman army in a battle fought on a plain in Fushë Kosova near Prishtina. During the battle, a brave Albanian by the name of Milosh Kopiliq infiltrated the tent of Sultan Murad I and killed him. Nevertheless, the Ottoman army was too powerful for the coalition troops, and the Turks brought a bloody conclusion to the battle, and thereby establishing their rule over the territory.

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The Influence of History

The Battle of Kosovo in 1389 was an unknown event outside of the Balkans until 1999. Now, almost any well-informed European or American knows the significance of this 600 year old battle which was the foundation for the massive, systematic ethnic cleansing campaign waged against the Albanian population of Kosovo by the Serbian government and military. The Serbian and Albanian versions of the same story are irreconcilable. The Serbs believe that Albanians helped to bring about the most devastating loss the Serbian people have ever suffered, whereas the Albanians argue that Serbs and Albanians fought together against a common enemy, for land that was first sacred to Albanian ancestors, the ancient Illyrians, before it became a holy place for the Serbs.

As this story became known to the Western public, an atmosphere of incredulity ensued. It is unthinkable that a historical event from so long ago could have such devastating consequences at the end of the twentieth century. It was perhaps less evident to the public that the Western response to the Kosovo crisis was also informed and shaped by historical events, albeit ones from the not so distant past. But is historical analogy a reliable tool if the "truth" of history is as elusive as suggested by the conflicting accounts of 1389?

Prior to the commencement of the NATO bombing against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), some of the main initiators of the campaign, US President Clinton, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, and British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook, as well as the media, promoted analogies likening the situation in Kosovo to the atrocities committed during World War II by the Nazis. These analogies and the suggestion that the world could not let another Hitler act with impunity against a vulnerable race of people helped reinforce public support for NATO's campaign against FRY.

The West—especially the Anglo-Saxon powers—has made a concerted effort for the past 50 years to avoid repeating the mistakes of "appeasement" whereby the soon-to-be allied powers granted large concessions to Hitler with hopes of avoiding another European war. In particular, the Munich Pact of 1938 reflected the Western leaders' fear and paralysis in the face of Hitler's threats; the Western leaders acquiesced to the Nazi dictator's demands by agreeing to the incorporation of the largely German *Sudetenland* of Czechoslovakia into the Third Reich. British Prime Minister Chamberlain's single objective at Munich was to keep Great Britain out of war because of domestic pressure from a war-weary British population and thus settled the "quarrel in a faraway country between people of whom we know nothing" by sacrificing Czechoslovakia.[1] Soon after Chamberlain was lauded in Great Britain for preserving "peace for our time" at Munich, the Wehrmacht marched into Prague and occupied the rest of Czechoslovakia before invading Poland.

In this, the Western policy of appeasement contributed significantly to the start of the Second World War. The Munich Pact came to be a symbol of the dangers

of appeasement and remains to this day a specter in the minds and memories of Western foreign policy makers. Appeasement has become especially taboo for Great Britain (which shouldered most of the blame for appeasing Hitler) and for the United States (whose staunch isolationism prevented it from containing Hitler before it was too late.) The fundamental lesson the powers learned from Munich was unmistakable:

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"Appeasement of aggression only invites more aggression, and can be stopped only by an early collective defense. Totalitarian states, be they fascist or communist, are insatiably aggressive, and their imperial ambitions must be thwarted early, and by war if necessary."[2] This issue of appeasement was a constant theme in the rhetoric of the US and UK leaders during the NATO bombing of FRY—and it was hammered home by the media. President Milosevic assumed the role of Hitler: "We have learnt by bitter experience not to appease dictators. We tried it 60 years ago. It didn't work then and it shouldn't be tried now. Milosevic's actions in Kosovo have given rise to scenes of suffering and cruelty people thought were banished from Europe forever."[3] And NATO was the one force, which could stop the savage dictator:

> We know we are up against a dictator who has shown time and again that he would rather rule over rubble than not rule at all . . . We have seen this kind of evil conduct before in this century, but rarely has the world stood up to it as rapidly, and with such unity and resolve as we see today with NATO's coalition of 19 democracies, each with its own domestic pressures and procedures, but all united in our outrage, and in our determination to see this mission through.[4]

The Munich and Auschwitz analogies, which resonated in almost every speech given by Clinton, Blair, and Cook, served a dual purpose. First, they addressed the legitimate concern over the potentially disastrous consequences for the ethnic Albanian population of appeasing Milosevic and the desire to put an end to the ethnic cleansing operation. Second, the analogies would naturally spark a moral reaction from the public and hopefully garner the necessary domestic support to implement a military campaign against FRY. The eloquent triumvirate perfected a lexicon aimed at resurrecting visions of horrific past atrocities: "innocent men, women and children taken from their homes to a gully, forced to kneel in the dirt, sprayed with gunfire,"[5] "concentration camps," "mass graves," " . . . separated the

men from the women," "final solution."[6] The initial surge of support in the early stages of the NATO campaign by the public at large and the corresponding empha-sis by the media confirmed that the strategy was successful.

The moral appeal was perhaps especially necessary in the United States to gain the American population's support of a war that endangered American lives for the sake of "a quarrel in a far away country between people of whom we know nothing." The average American had never heard the word "Kosovo" before the conflict there exploded. President Clinton pointed out the danger of letting igno-rance of the culture breed indifference to the conflict: "At the time, [in Bosnia] many people believed nothing could be done to end the bloodshed. They said, 'Well, that's just the way those people in the Balkans are.'" He continued, "We learned that in the Balkans, inaction in the face of brutality simply invites more brutality. But firmness can stop armies and save lives. We must apply that lesson in Kosovo before what happened in Bosnia happens there, too."[7] But for the benefit of those who were still unmoved, Clinton often emphasized the danger of the violence in this little region spilling over into other parts of Europe, including the territory of US allies:

> Ending this tragedy is a moral imperative. It is also important to America's national interest. Take a look at this map. Kosovo is a small place, but it sits on a major fault line between Europe, Asia and the Middle East . . .To the south are our allies, Greece and Turkey; to the north, our new democratic allies in Central Europe. And all around Kosovo there are other small countries, struggling with their own economic and political challenges—countries that could be overwhelmed by a large, new wave of refugees from Kosovo. All the ingredients for a major war are there: ancient grievances, struggling democracies, and in the center of it all a dictator in Serbia who has done nothing since the Cold War ended but start new wars and pour gaso-line on the flames of ethnic and religious division.[8]

He also suggested that a firm and final resolution to the conflict in this Balkan hotspot might negate the possibility of American soldiers having to fight a war on European soil ever again: "The challenge of ending instability in the Balkans so that these bitter ethnic problems in Europe are resolved [by] the force of argument, not the force of arms; so that future generations of Americans do not have to cross the Atlantic to fight another terrible war."[9]

In the UK, apparently Blair and Cook saw Kosovo as a means to exorcise the ghost of Munich that has haunted Great Britain's legacy since World War II. They squeezed every last drop out of the Munich and Holocaust analogies with a zeal that made Clinton's rhetoric seem subtle by comparison. Given the strong emo-tional dimension of Cook's new brand of ethical foreign policy, it is no wonder that Britain was the nation most in favor of ground troops. Cook maintained that Kosovo was a struggle between past and present, and thus it was a moral imperative to fight for the Albanians so that the progress made in the last 60 years will long endure:

> There are now two Europes competing for the soul of our continent. One still follows the race ideology that blighted our continent under the fascists. The other emerged

fifty years ago out from behind the shadow of the Second World War. The conflict between the international community and Yugoslavia is the struggle between these two Europes. Which side prevails will determine what sort of continent we live in. That is why we must win.

If an individual were to base his knowledge of the Kosovo situation entirely on the speeches of Robin Cook, he could easily be led to believe that Hitler and his regime had been reincarnated and relocated to the Balkans:

> The first is the Europe Milosevic clings to. It is a Europe whose expression is found in the burning villages of Kosovo, in the forced deportations and in the mass graves. It is founded upon the same standards of racial purity and ethnic intolerance that the fascists used to define their ideology. It is a Europe where the law is merely the dictator's tool, where truth is a means of control, and where rights can be taken away and freedoms extinguished. It is a Europe in which individuals are forced out of their homes, raped and even killed, purely on account of the ethnic group they belong to.[10]

Moreover, this time he would not be appeased:

> The other Europe is the Modern Europe. It was founded fifty years ago, in the rubble that was left after the Second World War. We surveyed what was left of our continent. We saw the extermination camps, the piled bodies of the victims and the pathetic masses of survivors. And we made a promise. We vowed Never Again. It was on that pledge that we built the Modern Europe.[11]

Never again. This simple phrase has become ubiquitous in all literature and speeches regarding the Holocaust. In a speech he gave at the White House during the Kosovo campaign, Elie Wiesel asked rhetorically, "Is today's justified intervention in Kosovo a lasting warning that *never again* will the deportation, the terrorization of children and their parents be allowed anywhere in the world?"[12] Likewise, in an article entitled "Kosovo, Holocaust and Differences," Mark Nataupsky, president of the Holocaust Education Foundation, concludes his analysis with the assertion that "we need to study the relationship of Kosovo and the Holocaust. We need to examine the similarities and differences to help assure we do not have another Holocaust. Not to any people. *Never again.* Nowhere."[13] Cook's usage of the term goes beyond a simple analogy; he seems to have no doubt that he is stating a truism—Kosovo does not merely bear certain similarities to the Holocaust; it is an extension of it. There could not possibly be a more potent way to evoke the sympathy of the public and enlist its support.

While the method does seem extreme, in retrospect, Clinton, Blair, and Cook were well justified in their anticipation of the fickleness of public opinion and media coverage. Tony Blair accurately predicted the syndrome to which the viewing public (one full month before the end of the bombing) would fall prey: "Refugee fatigue. In other words, once you've reported one mass rape, the next one's not so newsworthy. See one mass grave, you've seen the lot. This is a dangerous path, and it is one that benefits the Serbs."[14]

As the campaign wore on, reports of atrocities became commonplace and the media thus sought out new headlines. NATO indeed was able to provide some banner—and infamous—headlines after its accidental bombing of a convoy of Albanian refugees and the absolute fiasco caused by the inadvertent bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. These events caused a media circus and suddenly the public's support of the NATO campaign waned dramatically, despite the atrocities still being committed by Serb military and paramilitary forces within Kosovo against the Albanians. Eventually, victim interviews about the conditions and reality within the Kosovo borders were not enough to hold the interest of the public without tangible visual evidence to rejuvenate the horror of the crimes perpetrated inside Kosovo. Blair acknowledged the growing indifference toward the plight of the Kosovar people and attempted to again remind the public—and to subtly chastise it as well—not to succumb until the goal has been achieved:

> . . . I believe the fact that there are no pictures is part of the story. These are real places, real people. Real stories of burnt villages, devastated families, lootings, robberies, beatings, mass executions. These people are the reason we are engaged and the fact that we cannot see them makes us more determined to get in there and give them the help they need. This is more than a map. It is a montage of murder . . . [T]hese people are the victims of the most appalling acts of barbarism and cruelty Europe has seen since World War II. We teach our children never to forget that war. We must not allow ourselves to become sensitized to accept what is happening in Kosovo today.[15]

Yet another reason that the Anglo-Saxon leaders relied so heavily on the Munich and Auschwitz analogies was the recent experience that had shown that, with respect to Milosevic, the comparison is not empty. Bosnia had left its own legacy. While the US and Western Europe declared victory when the Dayton Accords were signed, Bosnia had also thoroughly humiliated the Western nations and NATO. The world sat back, watched, and waited while the Omarska concentration camp functioned, while Bosnian women were raped, and while the men of Srebrenica were slaughtered in the worst genocidal massacre since World War II. For four years the West appeased Milosevic and the Bosnian Serbs. The realization of this and the knowledge of the consequences of their inaction was a key factor in urging an offensive NATO intervention in the Kosovo conflict. Clinton acknowledged the impact that Bosnia had and the lessons it taught:

> We learned some of the same lessons in Bosnia just a few years ago. The world did not act early enough to stop that war, either. And let's not forget what happened . . . a quarter of a million people killed, not because of anything they have done, but because of who they were. Two million Bosnians became refugees. This was genocide in the heart of Europe—not in 1945, but in 1995. Not in some grainy newsreel from our parents' and grandparents' time, but in our own time, testing our humanity and our resolve. [16]

Bosnia had been yet another catastrophic incidence of appeasement in the twentieth century. The US and NATO had no desire to end the century with one more.

There is a natural predilection for human beings to let history be their guide into the future. The same penchant obviously pertains to governments as well so

long as humans remain the driving force behind policy. It is also human nature to want to correct one's mistakes. The Kosovo conflict offered vast opportunities to pay penance for the past. Britain desperately wanted to provide "peace for our time" in order to compensate for lost opportunities and for the role it arguably played in the initiation of World War II. Through policies of appeasement, the United States and NATO failed the Bosnian people for four tragic years. To let the same cruel dictator humiliate the West further in Kosovo by turning a deaf ear to those suffering under Milosevic's savage rule was an utter impossibility. Although the means were questionable, the cause was admirable. Vaclav Havel gave the following assessment of the Kosovo intervention: "The enlightened efforts of generations of democrats, the terrible experience of two world wars, . . . and the evolution of civilization have finally brought humanity to the recognition that human beings are more important than the state."[17]

Thus, maybe history has made us wiser. Maybe not. Maybe a Hungarian assassinated Emir Murad I.

Notes

[1] Telford Taylor, *Munich: The Price of Peace* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1979), p. 884.

[2] Jeffrey Record, "Perils of Reasoning by Historical Analogy: Munich, Vietnam, and American Use of Force Since 1945," *Occasional Paper No. 4* (Maxwell Air Force Base: Center for Strategy and Technology) p. 6.

[3] Tony Blair, "We Are Fighting for A New Internationalism," *Newsweek International* 19 April 1999 UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 8 January 2001 <http://www.fco.gov.uk/news/newstext.asp?2243>.

[4] William Clinton, *Statement from the Roosevelt Room,* 5 April 1999 The White House Office of the Press Secretary, 10 January 2001 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/New/html/19990405-10246.html>.

[5] William Clinton, *Press Conference*, 19 March 1999, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, 10 January 2001 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/New/html/19990319-6715.html>.

[6] Robin Cook, *Press Conference*, 20 April 1999, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 8 January 2001 <http://www.fco.gov.uk/news/newstext.asp?2287>.

[7] William Clinton, *Statement by the President to the Nation*, 24 March 1999, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, 10 January 2001 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/New/html/19990324-2872.html>.

[8] Ibid.

[9] William Clinton, 24 March 1999.

[10] Robin Cook, "Ours is the Modern Europe of the Human Rights Convention," *The Guardian* 5 May 1999, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 8 January 2001 <http://www.fco.gov.uk/news/newstext.asp?2369>.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Elie Wiesel, *The Perils of Indifference,* Millennium Evening at the White House, Washington, D.C., April 12, 1999, 12 January 2001 <www.historyplace.com/speeches/wiesel.htm>.

[13] Mark Nataupsky, "Kosovo, Holocaust and Differences," *Daily Press* 29 July 1999.

[14] Tony Blair, *Speech to the Newspaper Society Annual Lunch*, 10 May 1999, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 8 January 2001 <http://www.fco.gov.uk/news/speechtext.asp?2403>.

[15] Tony Blair, 10 May 1999.

[16] William Clinton, 24 March 1999.

[17] Vaclav Havel, as quoted in Noam Chomsky, *The New Military Humanism* (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 1999).

New Directions in European-North African Relations

Roberto Aliboni

From the European geopolitical perspective, North Africa presents a rather confused picture. European politics tend to focus on the Maghreb, the Arab Occident, which traditionally includes Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. Egypt, although geographically part of North Africa, belongs geopolitically to another framework, the Mashreq, the Arab Orient. Libya, while strongly attracted towards the Mashreq and the Arab-Israeli framework because of its Nasserite nationalism, has largely failed to find a clear identity among the Arab front-line countries. Despite its attempts to integrate itself, it has remained, in many respects, excluded from both the Mashreq and the Maghreb. At the end of the 1980s, it joined the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), thus accepting a less eastward political orientation. Thus, in European policies and perceptions, Libya is regarded as part of the Maghreb, yet the country continues to remain in between the Arab Occident and Orient.

The AMU includes the Western Saharan state of Mauritania, as well. Traditionally, Europe has considered Mauritania to be a sub-Saharan, rather than a North African country. While the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue includes Mauritania, the current EU Mediterranean policy, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) does not, instead placing it within the framework of the Lomé Convention. However, were a new EU policy to emerge as distinct from present all-Mediterranean EMP, it seems reasonable for the EU to include Mauritania in a new EU-Maghreb group-to-group framework.

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Thus, this article concentrates on EU-Maghreb relations, considering a wider or narrower notion of the Maghreb depending on the particular circumstances. Europe faces a number of challenges and issues in this part of the world, which affect its security in a narrower as well as broader sense. This article considers five central challenges of EU-Maghreb relations: Libya as a "rogue" state; Algeria and political Islam; migration; the Western Sahara; and the American presence in the Maghreb. To be sure, the US presence in the Maghreb does not directly impact European security. However, the mediation carried out by former US Secretary of State James Baker between the parties to the Western Sahara crisis; the weight of the American policy in shaping out Western and European attitudes towards Algeria and Islamism; and, more recently, the Eizenstat initiative of economic cooperation with the Maghreb states, are many signals of a significant American role in a region where Europe perceives itself, and is broadly perceived by others, as a primary actor. This trend, while not a security issue, is nevertheless a political question mark in the European role in the Maghreb and in the Southern Mediterranean more generally.

European Relations with Libya

Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi's Libya has never ceased to pose many problems internationally. In many respects, the regime is characterized by strong heterodoxy and activism and, for various reasons, it often acts as a troublemaker on the world stage. Rightly or wrongly, the regime has been suspected of using terrorism to attain its political ends. Such suspicions brought about the US bombing of Tripoli in 1986. Since then, two opposing kinds of strategies, inclusion and coercion, have been pursued in relations with Libya. One school of thought considers inclusion to be the best approach, as it prevents the al-Qaddafi regime from feeling frustrated or isolated and thus moderates Libya's radicalism and unpredictability. On the other hand, coercion and retribution are often considered to be the most forceful and effective ways to moderate Libya.

At the end of 1980s, Algeria's President, Shazli Benjedid, following a clearly inclusive policy line, convinced Qaddafi to enter the AMU. It must not be forgotten that the AMU was not created to foster economic and inter-state cooperation. Rather, it was designed as a framework for fostering cooperation among incumbent regimes to strengthen their domestic stability and security. In this sense, Libya, with its record of subversion and activism in the region, was seen better in than out, as follows from Machiavelli's notion that, if one has an enemy, he must be either co-opted or killed. On the other hand, at that time domestic pressure and opposition from both tribal and religious quarters was beginning to increase in Libya, as well as in other Maghreb and Arab countries, so that the support provided by the AMU was welcomed by Tripoli. This inclusive policy was coupled by the addition of Libya to the framework of the Five-plus-Five Western Mediterranean agreement, established in 1989 by the AMU countries, on one side, and France, Italy, Malta, Portugal, and Spain, on the other. This cooperation, however, was subsumed by the 1990-91 Gulf War.[1]

In subsequent years, coercion became the dominant policy line. The UN placed sanctions on Libya because it refused to surrender the two citizens suspected of carrying out the terrorist attack against a Pan Am civilian aircraft over Lockerbie, Scotland on December 12, 1988.[2] Meanwhile, France suspected Libya in the bombing of a UTA aircraft in 1989, and Great Britain maintained no diplomatic relations with Libya because of both the Lockerbie incident and the murder of a London policewoman, Yvonne Fletcher, in 1986.

However, the Libyan leadership's decision of April 5, 1999 to hand over the two suspects in the Lockerbie affair has brought about the suspension of sanctions and the implementation by the European states and the EU of normalization policies in a renewed inclusive perspective.[3] Even before this, Italy acted as a forerunner in the fostering of normal diplomatic relations. In 1996 the Italian Foreign Minister received his Libyan colleague, Omar al-Muntasser, in Rome. This meeting paved the way towards a joint declaration of the two governments in Tripoli on July 9, 1998. By this declaration, Italy has recognized its colonial responsibilities, and in particular its duty to search and care for Libyan victims of the Italian colonial administration and their families as well as to help Libyan authorities to clear Second World War Italian land mines. In the same declaration, the two governments agreed to set up an Italian-Libyan joint stock company, with a mandate to undertake joint development projects in Libya and transfer part of the income to a fund for the support of operations related to colonial victims and de-mining. After the surrender of the two Lockerbie suspects, Italian-Libyan relations were rapidly upgraded. The Italian Foreign Minister, Lamberto Dini, visited Libya on April 6, 1999, the day immediately after the sanctions were suspended, and again in August of the same year. The joint stock company was established on May 30, 1999. And, the Italian Prime Minister, Massimo D'Alema, visited Tripoli in December 1999. Altogether, bilateral relations between Italy and Libya are flourishing.

In a March 1996 letter to the French President, Jacques Chirac, Colonel al-Qaddafi promised to accept the French verdict on the UTA incident if it were handed down *in absentia* and to collaborate with the French authorities to enforce it. The ad hoc French court established to judge on the UTA case handed down a sentence on March 10, 1999, which convicted six Libyan citizens *in absentia*. According to a communiqué by the Quai d'Orsay, by mid-July 1999 a fund to compensate the relatives of the UTA victims had been transferred from Libya to France. French authorities have issued international arrest warrants for the convicted Libyans. Whether Libya will collaborate to enforce them remains uncertain. Altogether, however, France considered bilateral differences with Libya publicly closed. Similarly, in the UK, after 15 years of silence, diplomatic relations resumed on July 7, 1999. At the same moment, the two governments issued a joint declaration whereby Libya recognized its responsibility in the killing of Yvonne Fletcher and its readiness to compensate her relatives as well as to cooperate with the British police inquiry into the case.

Also within the realm of this political normalization is Libya's initiative for a multibillion-dollar economic development plan to which most European countries contribute. Italy, Germany, the UK, and France remain Libya's most important partners. In 1997, these countries contributed the largest percentage of Libya's world imports: 19.4 percent from Italy; 10.5 percent from Germany; 8.5 percent from the UK; and 6.5 percent from France (about 8 percent in the two previous years). This trend continues today.

Bilateral normalization was extended further, when in April 1999 the EMP invited Libya to the its Ministerial Conference in Stuttgart as an observer with a view to become a member. In subsequent developments, the EMP partners and Libya failed to agree on membership, but Tripoli was invited again as an observer to the EMP Conference in Marseilles in November 2000. While there are many positive signs for increasingly normalized relations between Libya and Europe, the international court's conviction of one of the two Libyans indicted for the Lockerbie incident may put in question these efforts to moderate the regime by including the country in some international cooperative systems.

Algeria and Political Islam

The Europeans' interest in supporting Libya's stability largely stems from fears that Libya is easily destabilized by religious forces and such destabilization has the potential to spill over into its Arab and Sahelian neighbors. The latter are very concerned with this danger as well. In fact, the founding of the AMU was, among other things, a tentative response to this common danger. North African diplomacy, especially on the Egyptian side, has been very active in supporting Libya against Islamists so as to prevent transnational contacts and alliances between religious groups in the region. Because of its pre-eminent interest in Southern Mediterranean stability, Europe also has been very sensitive, both in bilateral and regional relations, to this concern. The invitation for Libya to become member of the EMP derives partly from this very concern and reflects one of the few north-south security understandings working across the Mediterranean.

Even more central to concerns about destabilization in the Maghreb and North Africa is the violent conflict unleashed by Islamism in Algeria. Europe expresses concerns over Algerian spillovers into Europe as well. The European and Western debate on Algeria in the 1990s took place as part of wider Western perceptions with respect to Islamism.[4] In this debate, two main positions can be discerned. On one hand, after the Gulf War, European and Western perceptions of Islamism and its impact became most acute as a result of the domestic reactions to the war in most Arab countries and in particular in Egypt, occupied Palestine, and Algeria. Here, Western perceptions of Islamist expansion combined with emerging ideas about the enhanced role of cultural and identity factors in post-Cold War international relations and the clashes these factors could bring about. In this framework, Islamism is a risk or even a threat with respect to Europe, the West, and their regional allies, which necessitates an adequate response through defense or coercion.

On the other hand, the rise of political Islam has been regarded in many European quarters as evidence of the need to introduce political reform and pluralism in Maghreb and Arab polities. The argument runs that, provided that Islamist parties and groupings renounce violence and accept the rules of the democratic game, they should be considered legitimate opposition and should be integrated into national political processes through democratic reforms. The inherent systemic character of Islamist opposition groups to the kind of national and secular states that gradually developed in the Arab region after the French Revolution was broadly trivialized by stressing the unacceptability of "culturalist" interpretations.[5]

This point of view has been supported by European non-governmental organizations (e.g. the St. Egidio Community in Italy) and academic circles and has strongly influenced European and Western official policies in general. Developments in Algeria have been for Europe a most important test of such progressive views and policies. Islamist leaders, considered to be terrorists by the Algerian and other Maghreb governments, were given political asylum in European countries and in the United States. In general, the mistrust of the illegitimate and authoritarian Algerian military regime outweighed concerns over Islamist threats. The use of violence by the Algerian state was regarded as state-terrorism, to the extent that it was exercised by a poorly legitimated incumbent power, so that at times Islamist violence was regarded as legitimate resistance. This state of affairs continued into the mid-1990s.

However, the expulsion of a number of Algerian leaders from Europe and the United States coincided with a change in European and Western governmental policies towards offering more support to the Algerian government. European as well as American governmental circles now give credit to the institutional reforms set in motion by President Laimine Zéroual. Western non-governmental organizations do not lend the same credit to them and tend to believe that the Algerian government continues to be masterminded by the military and affected by their internecine struggles for power. The election of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, hailed in Europe as an opportunity to emancipate the state from military control, has proved disappointing. In any case, while the international economic organizations have never failed to support Algeria, what has changed today is that the EU, after a long suspension of relations, has started negotiations for a new association agreement with Algeria within the framework of the EMP, and NATO has provided a green light for Algeria's membership in its Mediterranean Dialogue.

European and Western perceptions of political Islam have changed in the second part of the 1990s. Islamism is no longer regarded as a direct risk or threat to Europe or the West. Instead, it is conceived as a risk or a threat to regimes and countries in the region whose destabilization would be detrimental to European and Western interests in the region and in their own countries. In this sense, the European policy, in line with that of the United States, is today more supportive of regional regimes and less selective about their political natures, whether with respect to Algeria, Libya, or Egypt.

Migration

Europeans are afraid of terrorism as a spillover effect of political unrest and Islamism. But, in addition to the few cases of "new" terrorism, Europe is also involved in the region for political and logistical reasons. Political interactions also emerge as a result of perceived remnants of colonial relations in the region. For example, Algerian attacks in France in 1994-1996 were founded Algerian Islamists' belief of a link between the Algerian incumbent power and France. In the case of logistics, geographical proximity and the presence of expatriated communities in European countries are factors which also objectively involve Europe. There is no doubt that there is an important correlation between the presence of expatriated communities, sometimes fairly large, such as the Maghreb community in France and the Turkish/Kurdish presence in Germany, and transnational trends like terrorism and organized crime.

This correlation contributes to negative European attitudes towards migration, though the perceived threats of Islamism, terrorism, and crime are not the only factors in anti-immigration positions. Immigration, legal or illegal, is regarded as a spillover in itself. The Maghreb is an important contributor to the new immigration center that Europe constitutes today. European responses to this situation, although not always directly addressing the Maghreb or North Africa, are in any case relevant to the latter and sometimes, especially in bilateral relations, have a direct impact on them.

Today, immigration to Europe, and in particular into the countries of the EU, as well as related issues, such as asylum, citizenship, etc. is essentially regulated by national policies. For the Maghreb countries, the relevant national policies are those of Italy, France, and Spain as the main countries of immigration and, more and more, countries of residence. The orientation of immigration regulations oscillates. In general, despite pressure from the left-wing parties for the adoption of liberal policies, even towards illegally immigrated people, the substantive European and Southern European trend, with few exceptions, is towards policies of more or less controlled access, regardless of the left or right orientation of the governments involved.

The integration of the European space to provide people the possibility of moving freely in the EU/Schengen territory would require that the EU place the development of common immigration policies as a higher priority than it does currently. By raising many questions related to immigration to the level of EU policy-making, the Treaty of Amsterdam constitutes progress.[6] Still, the process of developing a coordinated EU response and policy towards immigration is proceeding slowly, particularly in terms of common action and resources. This situation has thus far prevented the EMP from addressing migration and setting out cooperation in a field, which, ultimately, is the only real north-south security issue in trans-Mediterranean relations. In sum, the EU has offered a very weak response to a very important challenge.

The Western Sahara and the US Presence in the Maghreb

The Western Sahara crisis is considered to be over, in the sense that it will hardly return to an armed and internationalized conflict.[7] Still, the conflict remains unresolved and, if a political solution is not finalized, it could trigger new tensions such that regional relations would be prevented from improving and bringing about the cooperation the Maghreb needs for its political stabilization and economic development.

At the beginning of the 1990s, the violent confrontation between the Western Sahara separatist movement, the Polisario Front, and Morocco ended after Algeria's support ceased under President Ben Jedid. In 1992 the UN Secretary General, on the basis of a "settlement plan" agreed upon by the parties involved, established the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO). After many years of unsuccessful talks with the parties to implement the settlement plan, in 1997 the Secretary General asked former US Secretary of State James Baker, to mediate between the Polisario Front and the Moroccan government so as to come to an agreement as to how the referendum should be regulated. Mr. Baker held talks in Houston which succeeded in bringing about an agreement on the procedure to set up a list of eligible voters.

This procedure, however, has not managed to establish the necessary voters list. The Moroccan government has submitted numerous candidates for eligibility, but the MINURSO has approved only a small number of them. These outcomes have triggered opposition and discontent on the part of the Moroccan government and stalemated the procedure. After another unsuccessful round of talks led by James Baker, in May 2000 the UN Secretary General issued a report asking the Security Council to provide a new mandate whereby resolution options other than a referendum were made possible, which the Security Council approved.

According to a recent analysis, the possibility that the parties will compromise on a solution different from a "winner-take-all" referendum, such as a form of Western Sahara autonomy within the Kingdom of Morocco, is not to be dismissed.[8] The Polisario seems unwilling to revert to urban terrorism and unable to practice military options any more. It is also aware of the fact that if Morocco looses the referendum, it will hardly willingly evacuate the territory. Furthermore, Algeria seems more interested in settling its long-standing dispute with Morocco than supporting the Polisario. As of today, the situation remains stalled.

The Western Sahara issue is interesting not because it affects European security, since it does not, but because of the conspicuous absence of European diplomatic participation in the issue, with the exception of some French international involvement and the fact that the Western Sahara issue is constantly on the Spanish domestic opposition's agenda. The involvement of former Secretary of State Baker in the negotiation process obviously has a personal character. Still, the UN General Secretary's the choice of an American rather than a European figure is evidence of

the fact that there is an American influence in the Maghreb which competes well with Europe's. There is also an American policy towards this region that is far from neutral with respect to the region and European policies. This has been very clear in the change in Western policy towards Algeria. Although this change was not an American initiative only, the US definitely stated its decision more clearly and loudly than Europe (which acted without much official noise) and strongly influenced the overall change in European policies.

The presence of the United States in the Maghreb has been felt most recently with the Eizenstat initiative,[9] which intends to involve the Maghreb countries (including Mauritania and Libya) in closer trade and investment cooperation with a view to linking these countries to globalization trends more firmly. While the countries concerned did not prove very responsive, the initiative is nevertheless further evidence of an active American presence in the Maghreb.

Conclusions and Prospects

The conventional view suggests that, while the United States has a primary role in the Middle East, in the Maghreb this role is played by Europe. The issues considered in this article suggest, that, on the contrary, Europe's role in the Maghreb is not particularly decisive or assertive. Some European countries have played an important diplomatic role in trying to put an end to the long-standing tensions with Libya. Europe as a whole, however, played no role in the management of the Western Sahara crisis and has even failed to govern regional socio-economic challenges like migration. In some respects, it managed the Algerian crisis and the Islamist challenge more effectively. Yet, the foreign policy of the Algerian regime in the 1990s seems to have been affected less by the European than American role.

In the course of the 1990s, Algeria's leadership was driven by two principal perceptions in shaping its foreign policy: the European and French role with respect to the ongoing domestic crisis, and the development of NATO crisis management capabilities to intervene in regional crises. To counterbalance the risks of Europe's interference in the regime's policy, the Algerian government made its best political and diplomatic efforts to move closer to the United States. To this end, Algeria signed and ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1994 and signed a comprehensive safeguard agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, which took effect in January 1997. In addition, Algeria made the decision to enter the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue and downgraded the EMP's political and security relevance to their foreign and security policy. Thus, Algeria's policy reflects a growing role of the United States in the Maghreb. Still, it reflects less the impact of an increasing American presence in the Maghreb than that of European weakness. The American presence in the Maghreb aims at governing stability in this region as seen in the Eizenstat initiative and former Secretary of State Baker's mediation. In these endeavors, the United States undoubtedly pursues its national interest, yet to a large extent it also compensates for Europe's absence or weakness.

In this turn towards the US and away from Europe, Libya seems to be an exception. Here, Europe has shown to be effective in managing crises and might now help to normalize the country and encourage the restoration of Libya-US relations. However, after the Camp Zeist verdict and the conviction of one of the two suspects in the Lockerbie trial, diplomatic relations may again go back to square one. Unlike in the central Maghreb, where transatlantic relations are shaped by a mixture of competition and cooperation, which in the end brings about positive results for all the parties involved, in the case of Libya the emergence of a renewed transatlantic opposition could prove mutually detrimental rather than helpful.

Contrary to conventional wisdom, the EU's Maghreb policy is indeed affected by transatlantic relations no less than its Middle East policy. Still, it remains true that Europe could have a more prominent role if it wanted to, and that in principle its role of global civilian and economic actor could provide results more easily in the Maghreb than in the Middle East because the Maghreb countries are less involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Europe's chance to play a primary political role in the Maghreb remains predicated on the relatively minor involvement of this regions' countries in the Arab-Israeli conflict on the one hand, and their especially important economic ties with Europe (trade, oil, migration) on the other. Thanks to this combination, in the Maghreb case, Europe's economic and civilian identity can generate political results in ways which it cannot in the Middle East.

In this sense, Europe should opt for a special and enhanced framework of partnership with the Maghreb rather than an ad hoc system of political arrangements in the region. Talks should include all of the Greater Maghreb countries and have a two-tier structure. On one track, the bilateral Maghreb-EU relationship should address the economic, human, and social dimension, including soft security issues. On the other track, the Maghreb countries should set up multilateral negotiating desks on significant regional issues, such as reviving and revamping the AMU, establishing a regional cooperative security regime, and attempting to resolve the Western Sahara dispute. When appropriate, as in the case of the Western Sahara dispute, non-regional actors, such as the EU, the US and the UN, should be involved in talks. There should be a conditional link between the two tiers of negotiations, in the sense that the institution of the special EU-Maghreb partnership would depend on significant improvements in and the success of multilateral talks on security and political issues. This strategy could help Europe realize its expected and potential role in the Maghreb. Furthermore, it would provide consistency and cohesion to transatlantic relations.

For this policy to be implemented, the EU must initiate bold rethinking about the all-Mediterranean policy it adopted with the Barcelona Declaration in 1995. This policy, blocked by the stalemate of the Middle East peace process, has proved very rigid and has prevented the EU from using its instruments according to necessities and circumstances. It should be remembered today that, before the EU policy assumed the shape of the all-Mediterranean Barcelona process, there were proposals of and experiences with a European-Maghreb special relationship (the EU-

Maghreb approach adopted by the 1992 European Council in Lisbon and the Five-plus-Five group). This approach could be restored either in the form of a distinct EU-Maghreb partnership or in the form of a sub-regional approach within the all-Mediterranean Barcelona framework. Whichever path is chosen, it is altogether clear that a new direction is necessary.

Notes

[1] Michel Rousset, ed., "La Méditerranée: points de vue de la Rive Nord," *Cahiers du CEDSI* 14, 1993.

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[3] Luis Martinez, "Libye: la fin du purgatoire," *Politique Internationale* 89 (Automne 2000) pp. 307-320; Roberto Aliboni, "Including Libya? The EU, the Arab World and the US," Document IAI0001, paper presented at the United States Department of State Conference "Libya: Current Relations and Future Prospects," Washington D.C., 25 February 2000.

[4] See G.E. Fuller and I.O. Lesser, *A Sense of Siege: The Geopolitics of Islam and the West* (Boulder: Westview Press for RAND, 1995).

[5] Shireen T. Hunter, "The Rise of Islamist Movements and Western Response: Clash of Civilization or Clash of Interests?" in L. Guazzone, ed., *The Islamist Dilemma* (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1995) pp. 317-350.

[6] See Bruno Nascimbene, "Immigrazione e asilo nel diritto dell'Unione Europea," paper written for the International Affairs Institute research project on "Immigrazione e asilo nel quadro della politica italiana e nel contesto dell'Unione Europea," Rome, April 2000 (mimeo); P. Magrini and G. Sacerdoti, "L'evoluzione delle politiche europee nel settore della giustizia e degli affari interni" in R. Aliboni, F. Bruni, A. Colombo, and E. Greco, eds., *L'Italia e la politica internazionale, Edizione 2000,* Istituto Affari Internazionali e Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2000) pp. 83-100.

[7] M. Barbier, *Le conflit du Sahara Occidental* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1982); John Damis, *Conflict in Northern Africa Sahara Dispute* (Stanford: The Hoover Institute, 1983); Tony Hodges, "The Western Sahara File," *Third World Quarterly* 6, no. 1 (January, 1984): pp. 74-116.

[8] Charles Dunbar, "Saharan Stasis: Status and Prospects in the Western Sahara," *Middle East Journal* 54, no. 4 (Autumn 2000): pp. 522-545.

[9] Abderraouf Ounaïes, "Le Partenariat US/Maghreb. Le Projet Eizenstat," paper presented at the conference "Europe-Maghreb: Bilan et Perspectives," 19-20 April 2000, Tunis, (*Réalités*, June 2000): pp. 89-92.

Architecture, Politics, and Identity in the Berlin Republic

The *Stadtschloss* vs. *Palast der Republik*

Mathias Grude Eikseth

The fervent debate in Berlin on the future of the *Palast der Republik* and the reconstruction of the royal Hohenzollern castle (*Stadtschloss*) has raised the issue of the role of architecture in German politics and in the shaping of German identity after unification.[1] The *Stadtschloss-Debatte* emerges out of a fascinating story: in 1950 the East German Communists decided to destroy the monumental Prussian *Stadtschloss* situated in the heart of Berlin, as the GDR leadership regarded the structure as a prime symbol of Prussian militarism and decadent culture. In 1976 they constructed a modern multifunctional building that became a popular attraction among GDR citizens. After unification in 1990, the *Palast der Republik* was closed due to contaminating asbestos in the building. Shortly after this, the campaign for the reconstruction of the demolished *Stadtschloss* began and, at the same time, made the fate of the *Palast der Republik* highly uncertain.

As both buildings represent important symbols of two different societies, the debate has sometimes involved ideologically tinted arguments and evoked strong emotions. SPD politician Hermann Borghorst's comments about the reconstruction of the Hohenzollern *Stadtschloss* are an example of the importance of ideology in the debate:

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> The *Schloss* site is part of a unique formation of the historical center. The *Stadtschloss* belongs historically to the identity of the city. In Paris nobody would get the idea to demonize [it] as the symbol of absolutism.[2]

Such statements raise many questions: Should the ruptures in German history be reflected in ruptures in the urban structure? Or would it be more natural to "heal the scars" of Berlin by reconstructing the old order in the capital and the original *Stadtschloss*?

Other central issues revolve around the symbolic and political values attached to different architectural policies. The acceptance of Norman Foster's cupola of glass at the top of the old *Reichstag* building clearly shows that political messages, or symbols of identity can be read in architecture.[3] Yet, how is it that transparent materials of glass become attributed to abstract social phenomena like open democracies and old castles associated with the anti-democratic past?

The now ten-year debate has offered an interesting lens through which one can follow the unification of East and West. In order to better understand the actual relationship between architecture and politics and to grasp how ideology can be attached to different aesthetic programs, it is necessary to examine twentieth century German history, searching for the roots of the politization of architecture. As a framework for understanding the debate on the *Stadtschloss* vs. *Palast der Republik*, I will present a historical overview of the relationship between architecture and politics from the Weimar to the Berlin Republic. An examination of the background of the current architectural controversy will follow, leading to a final discussion on two important questions: Does this debate indicate changes in how the political elite wants to present the German capital and, given such changes, what factors can explain the transformation?

Architecture and Politics in Weimar Germany

The roots of the politicization of architecture in Germany and the answer to why Berlin today is different from other European capitals, such as Paris, are to be found in the Weimar Republic after the First World War. A group led by Walter Gropius created a radically new style in architecture, which appeared to be wholly without roots in the past. This style was to become famous under the label "Bauhaus," and its rejections of traditional styles in architecture represented a total break with the established, traditional order that they believed had led to the Great War. These architects, in Germany as well as in France, Switzerland, and Holland, shared the belief that the First World War spelled the end of an outmoded system of values.

The Bauhaus style was radical not only in its extensive use of new industrial materials, such as glass, steel, and reinforced concrete, but also in the way that it employed radically simplified cubic masses, assembled asymmetrically and without adornments. The stripping of traditional ornaments meant, for example, that

Bauhaus buildings had no sloped or visible roofs, no foundations, and hardly any window frames. The architecture was strictly functional and with its emphasis on abstract and geometric forms, there were no references to the past. The new architecture was to be universal, not bounded to particular historical and national traditions.

The reason why this movement became so controversial politically was the claim by Gropius that the Bauhaus presented a new, socially conscious architecture, which would play a part in the political revolution then occurring in Germany.[4] The link between radical design and radical politics was further strengthened as the movement received commissions from liberal and left-wing municipal governments to support new mass-housing projects in major German cities. The famous Bauhaus School of Architecture in Weimar, founded by Gropius, was itself the result of this kind of government patronage.

Right-wing newspapers and politicians began to charge the school with promoting "Bolshevist architecture." The controversy and public debate around Bauhaus in the 1920s made the movement a well-known exponent of radical, left-wing ideas, and after 1928 the Nazi Party, started attacking Bauhaus in order to expand the Party's national appeal. Shortly after coming to power in 1933, Hitler shut down the Bauhaus in Berlin and soon started promoting a new architecture that expressed national authority, strength, and power.

But, as Barbara Miller Lane points out, Nazi architecture consisted not of a clear and unified architectural program, but of different, and sometimes contradictory tendencies, as the modern and anti-modern elements coexisted side by side. The diversity included both a modernized neo-classical Greek-inspired architecture, a more rustic folk-inspired style, related to the Nazi romanticization of peasant country life, as well as buildings not particularly different from the new architecture of the 1920s. Yet, however diverse the manifestations of Nazi architecture were, one point was by Hitler stated unequivocally: Nazi architecture had to be heroic. For the Nazi dictator: "Such visible demonstrations of the higher qualities of a people will, as the experience of history proves, remain for thousands of years as an unquestionable testimony not only to the greatness of a people, but also to their moral right to exist."[5]

At the end of the Second World War, when the Federal Republic leadership decided to move the West German capital to Bonn, the political elite needed to mark a sharp break with the Nazi regime. This policy also became manifest in the style and presentation of public life. Michael Wise writes that after moving the new German government to Bonn the politicians "located the new national legislature, the *Bundestag*, inside a prime example of the Bauhaus architecture reviled by the Nazis."[6] The Bauhaus functional constructions of glass and steel had become symbols of a more "democratic" and anti-authoritarian system. Altogether, "West Germany's rehabilitation of Bauhaus design helped create a palatable new national

cultural identity since so many other areas of the German artistic legacy were tainted by association with Nazism."[7]

With the decision after unification to transfer the capital from Bonn to Berlin it was clear that the governing politicians would again be confronted with the past, not least through the city's architecture. German politicians and citizens knew that their steps in the unification process were closely observed from abroad and that the official architecture and urban planning for the capital would be read as symbols of a revised national identity.

Histories of the *Stadtschloss* and the *Palast der Republik*

The site of the Hohenzollern *Stadtschloss* lies in the historical center of *Berlin-Mitte* and is surrounded by Berlin's old Opera, the Cathedral, Humboldt University, and the "Altes Museum," all buildings central to the history of Berlin and Prussia. The Berlin *Stadtschloss* was constructed, re-designed and enlarged over a span of 500 years. A modest version was built in 1443 and later, in 1538, it was transformed into a renaissance castle. It acquired its monumental status as the largest baroque building north of the Alps only in the beginning of the eighteenth century when the Warschawer architect Andreas Schlüter magnified the *Stadtschloss* as a sign of the importance of the young Prussian kingdom under Frederick I. The *Stadtschloss* was clearly the most monumental building in Berlin and the dimensions were indeed impressive: the four story high quadrangle of 12,000 rooms covered an area of 37,000 square meters.[8] Thereafter, the *Stadtschloss* was home to all subsequent Hohenzollern kings. Emperor William II, the last Hohenzollern resident, announced the start of the First World War from the balcony of the *Stadtschloss*, a fact that makes the *Stadtschloss* connote both horror and glamour.

In the final Allied attacks on Berlin during the WWII the *Stadtschloss* was severely damaged, though not destroyed. After the war, the East German Communists regarded the *Stadtschloss* as a hated reminder of Prussian militarism and capitalist rule. In September 1950 the Communists, under the leadership of Walter Ulbricht, started the demolition of the *Stadtschloss*, despite loud protests by prominent art historians. The resulting void was difficult to fill, partly due to economic difficulties, and the space remained empty for about 25 years. But after years of homogeneous and cheap architecture construction in East Berlin, in 1976 a reaction came that paved the way for the building of the *Palast der Republik* designed by chief architect Heinz Graffunder.[9] Using materials like copper-tinted reflective glass and white marble, the architect strove for a "bright, festive elegance."[10] It occupied the area equal to the inner courtyard of the Hohenzollern palace and became a central landmark in the GDR. This multifunctional building housed the *Volkskammer*, or the Peoples' Chamber, an auditorium for theater and concerts, numerous restaurants, cafes and bars and a bowling alley. Open to the public for cultural events and leisure activities, the *Palast* became a public attraction. According to the *Verein zur Erhaltung des Palastes der Republik*, the building has been visited by 70 million people since its opening.[11]

In 1990, the same year that the *Volkskammer* approved the unification of the two German states, the government decided to shut down the building after finding it contaminated by large amount of asbestos fireproofing. East Germans protested immediately against the decision, as other similar buildings like the International Congress Centrum in West Berlin had used the same asbestos material and continued to operate.

The *Stadtschloss-Debatte*

Michael Wise describes how the campaign for replacing the *Palast der Republik* with a replica of the original royal Hohenzollern residence started soon after the closure of the building. A stream of books showing photographs and drawings of old Berlin found a market in the euphoria after the unification, and thus emerged the idea that the monarchical age of pre-WWI was the time of the city's greatest splendor. Another major event that triggered the enthusiasm for pre-war Berlin was the decision of a group of French artists led by Catharina Feff to cover the *Palast der Republik* with a large canvas depicting the old royal palace facade. After a year, the canvas illusion had given the Berliners a lasting impression and had shown the importance of the site in determining the city's identity.[12] From then on the debate about the site's future exploded.

While some advocates for the preservation of the *Palast der Republik* view it as ideologically neutral, referring to it as a "peoples' palace" open to all, an examination of some of the cultural events held there reveals that this is not necessarily the case. For example, the *Palast der Republik* hosted a three-day "Rock for Peace" program that presented assaults on NATO and its European commander.[13] Thus, to regard the *Palast der Republik* as a head quarters for communist propaganda seems plausible.

Since the work with the reconstruction of Berlin as Germany's new old capital started ten years ago, there have been countless arguments printed and uttered about the *Stadtschloss* site. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to examine all of the nuances of the debate, a hint of what is at stake can be understood in the following outline of the more common positions and arguments, including the opinions of three famous world architects:

Pro-Stadtschloss:

"Without the castle the heart of old Berlin won't beat." Philip Johnson, New York.[14]

- The Prussian *Stadtschloss* was the center of gravity in the old center of Berlin, whose importance for the surroundings can be compared with the sun, around which the other "planets" like the Cathedral, the Opera, etc. were positioned.

- The *Stadtschloss* site was crucial in defining Berlin as the capital of Prussia and later of Germany. The present void, with the ruin-like appearance of the *Palast der Republik*, is a reminder of a united German state with a still divided nation.

- As the historian Joachim Fest has suggested, if the destruction of the royal palace was to be the symbol of the victory of communist ideology, then reconstruction would be the symbol of its failure.[15]

- The demolition of the old Prussian *Stadtschloss* was a tragedy for the city, and it is both necessary and natural to reconstruct the monumental building to make the capital whole again.

Pro-Palast der Republik:

"Germany has neither a King nor a Kaiser . . . The building has therefore no sense, and there is a great danger that it will be a ghost building." Sverre Fehn, Oslo. [16]

- The *Stadtschloss* was built to host the Prussian royal family and to show the strength of its kingdom. Reconstructing it would be an architectonical anachronism, not reflecting the German democracy and society of today. The site therefore requires a new building to be constructed according to its future use, and demands a contemporary solution.

- A feature of the Prussian state was its militarist rule, culminating in the First World War under Emperor William II, and to reconstruct the *Stadtschloss* of the Hohenzollern monarchy would imply to glorify a dark part of German history.

- To demolish the *Palast der Republik* for the sake of the royal *Stadtschloss* would mean to ignore the feelings of thousands of Germans in the East and their positive memories attached to the building and past events there.

- The *Palast der Republik* was where East Germans gave their consent to the unification of the two German states. The building should therefore be respected as a valuable document of history.

Other central questions have also included: What should the *Stadtschloss* contain? What purpose and function should it serve? During the ten-year debate, there have been just as many proposals for possible functions of the new building as there have been arguments about the future of the site. Making the *Stadtschloss* into a congress center, a gallery, or a library have been common suggestions, but the idea of the president of *Stiftung Preussischer Kulturbesitz*, Klaus-Dieter Lehman, has recently won broad support in the public. He suggests moving the ethnographic museum from the Western suburb of Dahlem into the future building. Thus the argument that hosting a museum for other cultures would negate criticism over

Prussian nostalgia and nationalism has been seen as a clever move from the *Stadtschloss* supporters.

The *Stadtschloss* and Public Opinion

The opinion of Berliners and the other German citizens has been difficult to discern, and information from various newspapers often seems contradictory. Wolfgang Siedler, a well-known participant in the debate, writes in *Die Welt* that "the West-Berliners were early in favor of building the royal *Stadtschloss* . . . For the past two years there has also been a supporting majority in East Berlin."[17] *Die Zeit* has recently cited this notion as false. The newspaper first refers to a similar statement, this time from Antje Vollmer: "Berliners will have their *Schloss* back. Sooner or later they will get it." *Die Zeit* then cites an opinion poll from September 2000, commissioned by the pro-*Stadtschloss* newspaper *Berliner Morgenpost*, which reveals just the opposite: just 30 percent said they favored the *Stadtschloss* project, 22 percent in the East and 35 percent in the West. According to the same opinion poll those in favor of the castle are mainly Christian-Democratic voters over 60 years old. [18]

A more general opinion poll with respondents from the whole of Germany, commissioned by the Hamburg newspaper *Die Woche* in February 2001, also reveals a wide negative opinions about the *Stadtschloss*: 54 percent of the respondents were against and only 23 percent supported the eventual reconstruction.[19]

Political Leadership and The *Stadtschloss-Debatte*

If architects, art historians, and journalists are among the loudest in the debate, the main indicator for the final outcome is of course dependent upon what German politicians, interested in gaining votes, are saying about the future of the *Stadtschloss*. This group is also well aware of its responsibility in defining the image of Berlin as the capital of the unified Germany. Apparently, the political establishment seems to be reaching consensus in favor of the reconstruction of the *Stadtschloss*, although dissenting voices within some parties exist. Social Democratic Chancellor Gerhard Schröder expressed his enthusiasm for the total reconstruction of the castle in an interview with *Die Zeit* two years ago:

> From my office in the former *Staatsratsgebäude* I always have to look at the *Palast der Republik*. It is so monstrous that I would rather have a *Schloss* there . . . A facade would not be enough because then I would feel disappointed. It's all or nothing . . . If I could express a wish then I am in favor of the *Stadtschloss*. And that is simply because it is beautiful.[20]

In the city of Berlin, however, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) is split on the issue.[21] According to *Der Tagesspiegel* the resistance against the reconstruction of the *Stadtschloss* is due to an attempt to win votes from East Berliners and members of the ex-communist Party of Democratic Socialism. The new SPD Minister of

Culture, Julian Nida-Rümelin, is also critical of the idea of a true reconstruction and has expressed fear of a certain Americanization.[22]

The SPD's coalition partner in government, the Green Party, expressed in the spring of 2000 that it wanted the royal *Stadtschloss* reconstructed. The Greens wanted at the same time to modernize part of the *Palast der Republik*, at least the People's Chamber, as an important part of East German history.[23] The Christian Democrat / Christian Socialist (CDU/CSU) fraction in the *Bundestag* has also expressed their wish to see the *Stadtschloss* rebuilt, or at least the facades, an opinion which is consistent with the CDU party in Berlin.[24] The liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP) has joined the consensus on the political top level.[25]

The importance as well as the delicacy of the debate induced the *Bundestag* to employ an international and inter-disciplinary commission of experts with the purpose of finding a final concept and a concrete solution for the historical site by the end of this year. The commission, *Historische Mitte Berlin*, was appointed by the politicians last autumn and has been operating since January 2001.[26]

The *Stadtschloss-Debatte*, Politics, and Identity

Given the apparent consensus among the political elite on the reconstruction of the castle, do we now see a change in how German politicians view traditional buildings versus modern ones, in comparison with the Bonn era? If so, what can the reasons for the eventual shift be? The first question is answered with a resounding "yes." Politicians in Bonn acted with extreme caution when choosing the design of public architecture.

> When a 1970s landscaping plan for the Chancellery involved placing a large globelike sculpture in the forecourt, then-Chancellor Helmut Schmidt vetoed the scheme for fear that the work might be misinterpreted as a sign of renewed German international aspirations.[27]

As already noted, the policy was to embrace the international functionalist architecture with its roots from Bauhaus to demonstrate a rejection of the patriotic and powerful building style of the Nazi regime. The universal, rational and, at the same time, "low-key" style of the post-War architecture in Bonn was both intended and read as an expression of West German identity embedded in international co-operation and rationality. Official buildings connoting patriotism for German traditions were seen as troublesome.

Where the *Stadtschloss-Debatte* is concerned, it is evident that politicians in general now exhibit a more relaxed attitude towards monumental architecture that refers to past traditions, as is the case with the Hohenzollern *Stadtschloss*. In an article in *Die Welt* this year, Wolfgang Siedler supports the view of a general change in public opinion:

> Ten years ago, when the proposal of a reconstruction of the demolished building came up, the project was at best regarded as hopeless romanticism. Today, a person who in the name of modernity argues against the *Schloss* is almost an outsider. [28]

However mixed the picture of public opinion remains, as exemplified by the split within the Berlin fraction of the SPD, a rebuilt royal *Stadtschloss* in the center of the German capital, designed for public purposes, is a possible future outcome.

What can explain the fact that Germans no longer ban traditional architecture when creating an image of their capital? Two general factors of importance are (1) the new context of politics after unification and (2) the distance in time from WWII. After the birth of the Berlin Republic, it became more natural to speak of national interests in politics and of national identity in the cultural arena. As WWII becomes more and more distant, it is no longer taboo to cultivate certain past traditions. For several reasons, the process of uniting East and West also made the question of national identity highly relevant. Integrating the two German countries economically and socially proved very difficult and marked differences in worldviews have seemed hard to overcome. To find and to promote the symbols uniting the nation has therefore grown in importance.

The old Berlin *Stadtschloss*, though until now supported less among East than West Berliners, belongs to the common history of East and West and could therefore be a symbol of a shared destiny, whereas the *Palast der Republik* is a reminder of the divided nation and the Cold War. If politicians indeed want to eliminate the symbols of the divided nation, then it seems quite reasonable to replace the *Palast der Republik* with the *Stadtschloss*.

This reasoning springs out of the particular circumstances of the *Palast der Republik* and the royal *Stadtschloss* and the buildings' historical contents. But what about form, the aesthetic aspects, and the "ornament-is-crime" logic? As noted before, the history of Bauhaus in Weimar and the program of Albert Speer under Hitler explains why aesthetic programs have continued to be associated with views on power and politics in Bonn as well as in Berlin. But with the apparent consensus among the German political elite to reconstruct the *Stadtschloss* at the expense of the *Palast der Republik*, there seems to be a new policy at work, different from the one in Bonn in the decades after the Second World War. The *Palast der Republik* belongs to the international, modernistic mainstream architecture that won such broad acclaim by politicians in Bonn, while the *Stadtschloss* represents the clear opposite of the Bauhaus program. Interestingly, in the *Stadtschloss-Debatte* it is the modern, functionalist architecture that represents absolutism, rather than the older monumental style of the *Stadtschloss*. This is a complicating factor and alters the relationship between aesthetics and ideology in this debate, especially since it is also easy to view the *Stadtschloss* as yet another victim of the communist regime.

Another element that may explain some of the more startling political positions in the *Stadtschloss-Debatte* is that the underlying program related to modernist architecture has been challenged. During the reaction of postmodern architec-

ture in the 1980s, with its eclectic approach to history and tradition, the modernist Bauhaus tradition was blamed for becoming as rigid as the tradition it opposed in the 1920s. This may be a source of justification for a normally anti-bourgeois party like *Die Grüne*, which supports the reconstruction of the royal *Stadtschloss*. In terms of realpolitik, however, the presence of *Stadtschloss*-advocate Gerhard Schröder in government is likely to be a more decisive factor in the debate than the new logic within the architectural community.

Conclusions

In summary, the development of the radical Bauhaus movement and the right-wing reactions against it served as the primary reason why architecture has been so strongly associated with politics and ideologies in Germany. In examining the current *Stadtschloss-Debatte* in Berlin, it seems that architecture continues to play an important role in German politics and in the shaping of German identity. At the same time, it appears that architecture in the Berlin Republic, when compared to the post-War Bonn era, has become less attached to fixed worldviews and political ideologies. Because of the particular historical contents of the *Palast der Republik* and the royal *Stadtschloss*, the Bauhaus logic, regulating the relationship between aesthetical and political standpoints, seems to have been turned upside-down in this debate. To argue that the modern design of the *Palast der Republik* stands for a more open and democratic society than the monumental, baroque royal castle is obviously difficult. This can explain why traditional left-wing and anti-bourgeois parties like SPD and *Die Grüne* are inclined to see a powerful national symbol like the royal *Stadtschloss* back in the heart of the German capital.

The outcome of the debate has yet to be determined, and the premises for a solution now lie in the hands of the international *Historische Mitte Berlin* commission. It will by the end of this year decide whether the *Stadtschloss* shall be reconstructed completely, or only partially with its facades, and whether the *Palast der Republic* should be demolished or somehow integrated within the *Stadtschloss*. Or, it may recommend the construction of a completely new building of contemporary design. If the royal *Stadtschloss* is to be erected again, it will take four to six years to build, with construction beginning in 2003 and ending in 2009 just in time for the ten-year anniversary of Berlin as the capital of an again united Germany.

Notes

[1] Studying this topic, I have used two books of special relevance: Barbara Miller Lane, *Architecture and Politics in Germany, 1918-1945* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968) and Michael Z. Wise, *Capital Dilemma* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Architectural Press, 1998). The latter is a unique review of the debates on architecture, politics and national identity before and after the unification of Germany. The more up-to-date information on the "*Schloss-Debatte*" was provided from numerous German newspaper articles from *Der Tagesspiegel, Berliner Morgenpost, Die Welt,* and *Die Zeit,* in addition to <www.berliner-schloss.de>.

[2] "SPD-Vizechef Borghorst will die Residenz Friedrich 1. wiederaufbauen," *Der Tagesspiegel* 11 June 2000 <www.tagesspiegel.de/archiv/2000/06/097/ak-be-po-14296.html>.

[3] The British architect sir Norman Foster designed a new dome of glass for the German *Reichstag*, containing spiral viewing ramps open to the public, thereby placing German citizens symbolically above the politicians answerable to them. The skepticism against using the building, a reminder of the collapsed democracy in the Weimar Republic, was thereby eliminated.

[4] Miller Lane, p. 4

[5] Miller Lane, p. 188

[6] Wise, pp. 24-25.

[7] Wise, p. 29

[8] "Berlin-Der Neubau soll Ausstellungs- und Gästehaus werden," *Der Tagesspiegel* 15 April 2000 <www2.tagesspiegel.de/archiv/2000/04/14/ak-be-po-15357.html>.

[9] The Communist Party Politburo in 1968 declared that "bold and urbanistic and architectural solutions are needed to counteract monotony . . . in order to give built manifestations the optimism and strength with which our people create socialism." Wise, p. 51.

[10] Wise, p. 51.

[11] Information from the association website: <www.Palast der Republik _verein.de>.

[12] "One hundred and eighty thousand people visited an exhibition held within the canvas facade that documented the vanished building and proposals to rebuild it." Wise, p. 115.

[13] In the program notes for "Rock für den Frieden," January 1984, Alexander Craig, former commander of NATO forces in Europe, was assaulted for his "attack on human existence through the confrontational policies of the most aggressive circles of the USA and their NATO puppets. Wise, p.119.

[14] "Liegt die Zukunft in der Vergangenheit," *Die Welt* 28 January 2001 <www.welt-online.de/daten/2001/01/28/0128kar218502.htx>.

[15] Joachim Fest, "Plädoyer für den Wiederaufbau des Stadtschlosses," in Michael Mönninger, ed., *Das Neue Berlin: Baugeschichte und Stadtplanung der deutchen Hauptstadt* (Frankfurt: Insel Verlag, 1991) p. 118.

[16] "Leight die Zukunft . . ."

[17] Von Wolf Jobst Siedler, "Das Bedeutende überdauert den Zeitgeist," *Die Welt* 14 December 2000 <www.welt-online.de/daten/2000/12/14/1214kar209071.htx>.

[18] "Kulturbrief," *Die Zeit* no. 3 (2001) <www.zeit.de/2001/03/kultur/200103_kulturbrief_0116.html>.

[19] "Deutsche gegen Aufbau von Berliner Stadtschloss," *Berliner Morgenpost* 18 February 2001.

[20] *Die Zeit* 14 February 1999 as quoted in Brigitte Grundert, "Wie Schröders Stadtschloss-Wünsche zur Schlagzeile wurden," *Der Tagesspiegel* 12 January 2000 <http://195.170.124.152/archiv/2000/01/11/ak-be-st-15197.html>.

[21] "Beim Thema Schloss ist Berlins SPD gespalten," *Die Welt* 21 November 2000 < http://www.welt-online.de/daten/2000/11/21/1121b01204062.htx >.

[22] "Nida-Rümelin gegen original getreuen Wiederaufbau," *Der Tagesspiegel* 11 January 2001 <www2.tagesspiegel/de/archiv/2001/01/10/ak-ku-99973.html>.

[23] Tissy Bruns, "Bundestagsfraktion erwägt Wiederaufbau- Palast der Republik soll modernisiert werden," *Der Tagesspiegel* 23 March 2000 <www2.tagesspiegel/de/archiv/2000/03/22/ak-be-po-10750.html>.

[24] "Weil uns Mitte am Herzen liegt," *Der Tagesspiegel* 4 September 1999 <www2.tagesspiegel/de/archiv/1999/09/03/ak-be-po-10811.html>.

[25] Eva Schweitzer, "Ich bau dir ein Schloss- so wie im Märchen (Glosse)," *Der Tagesspiegel* 22 January 2000 < www2.tagesspiegel/de/archiv/2000/02/21/ak-be-st-10833.html>.

[26] Lothar Heinke and Benjamin Wagener, "Die Mehrheit ist für den Wiederaufbau," *Der Tagesspiegel* 15 September 2000 <www2.tagesspiegel.de/archiv/2000/09/14/ak-be-po-9001.html>.

[27] Wise, p. 17.

[28] "Heute ist fast schon ein Einzelgänger, wer im Namen der Modernität immer noch gegen ein wiederhergestelltes Schloss plädiert." Von Wolf Jobst Siedler, "Das Bedeutende überdauert den Zeitgeist," *Die Welt* 11 December 2000 <www.welt-online.de/daten/2000/12/14/1214kar209071.htx>.

Deutsche Leitkultur

A Debate on German Culture and Identity

Verena Ringler

"The Germans lose their minds whenever they want to find themselves."

-Kurt Tucholsky

In October 2000, Friedrich Merz, German Federal Parliament floor leader of the Christian Democratic coalition championed a controversial proposal that immigrants should adopt a *Deutsche Leitkultur*, translated as German "guiding culture" or "leading culture."[1] Backed by his party, CDU, and its conservative sister party, CSU, which have both been in opposition to the Social Democratic Party (SDP)/ Green Party coalition since 1998, Merz wants his appeal to be understood as a long-awaited acknowledgement by the conservative ranks[2] that Germany is a land of immigration thus necessitating the discussion of how to guarantee social peace given the expected relative decline of the ethnic German population in the decades ahead. Despite the seemingly good intentions of Merz' policy, the CDU, in deep crisis after Helmut Kohl's donations scandal, has in fact won votes in recent regional elections due to a more stringent anti-immigrant tone. Suspicion arises, and instantly, the ramifications of Merz' word creation penetrate all layers of German society and stir international reactions.[3] Numerous intellectuals, however, go beyond hackneyed ideological positions in their attempt to discuss serenely and sophisticatedly whether a *Deutsche Leitkultur* exists and what it comprises, whether it should exist, or must not exist.

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This essay attempts to unwrap the complex palimpsest underlying the idea of *Deutsche Leitkultur*. Five layers may be identified. The "zero" layer, an "invisible" layer, is a spontaneous conclusion from the point of view of an unknowing observer who takes *Deutsche Leitkultur* at face value. Being, as it is, unconscious for the observer, the layer is considered indiscernible. The first visible layer is the reality we witness: the debate itself, its background, conduct, and repercussions as well as the hype surrounding the ominous term *Deutsche Leitkultur*. The second, and deeper, layer is the historical context. Culture, in the course of German history, was often used either to bring about or to carry out the political projects connected with crucial moments in German history in 1871, 1918, 1933, 1945, and 1989. The third layer links the present point of history with the actual debate and includes four arguments against *Deutsche Leitkultur*. The fourth, or core, layer consists of the religious controversy, the fear of a loss of Christianity and an increased influence of Islam, which may be perceived as the real motivation for Merz' verbal outpouring. The conclusion leads to a call for democratic change on the part of the host country, and one for religious change on the part of the citizens having chosen this new home country. All layers except for the invisible one lead to a rejection of *Deutsche Leitkultur* due to bizarre rhetorical moves of the conservatives in the first layer, the abuse of a biased word in the second layer, the ignorance of social reality in the third layer, and the attempt to conceal a significant issue that Germany should discuss in a constructive manner in the fourth layer.

Appearance vs. Reality

The invisible layer includes three scenarios where a debate could be legitimate and fruitful under the title of *Deutsche Leitkultur*. The first setting is a neutral context of political ideas, where *Deutsche Leitkultur* could be accepted as the perspective of a strongly communitarian thinker. The second scenario envisions a setting of legal instability in which a parallel legal structure emerges and leads to, for example, Muslim immigrant communities exercising law and order in a subsystem indifferent to the German rule of law. The final example portrays a demographic change so drastic that perhaps a Muslim majority could, through democratic means, change the constitution and introduce the *sharia* for the state of Germany. Ultimately, however, it should be emphasized that such scenarios are altogether too theoretical and unrealistic to be sufficient to justify Merz' program.

The Uses and Abuses of History

The first visible layer reveals the actual debate at a level that we can observe. The real effect of Merz' linguistic creation has been to inspire not only a debate on admittance (*immigration*) and membership (*citizenship*) of non-Germans, but a fundamental debate on German identity and nationhood a decade after unification as well.[4] Commentary on the provocative term has emerged along the traditional ideological fault lines between left and right political parties, the media, and pressure groups. Even so, many conservatives both in and outside the Party claim bitter

opposition to Merz' word creation. Still, the CDU includes the need for *Deutsche Leitkultur* in its party program announced in November 2000. Despite the elimination of the more aggressive public statements of some leading Party figures (e.g. "against a random cultural mix," "we are still no traditional immigration country, and we never will or can be," "cultures must not meet on an equal basis in Germany"), the definition of *Deutsche Leitkultur* nevertheless is based on a set of values (*Wertekanon*) of Christian-occidental character, juxtaposed to a multi-cultural society and arbitrary values (*Wertebeliebigkeit*)."[5] Given the mutual consensus across ideological fault lines that immigrants must comply fully with German legal requirements of the state and should learn the German language, it is understandable that Merz' policy raises suspicion among Germans of all ranks and position. This is not only due to the offensive public statements that Merz and his followers express until widespread outcry forces them to retreat to the basics of constitutional patriotism. Citizens' own intuitive suspicions also tell them that if the CDU is so supportive of *Deutsche Leitkultur*, the concept must mean much more than what is immediately obvious and readily agreed upon.

Alert observers of the debate can discern that the true controversy is of a religious nature. What riles the Merz fraction is neither the competition between *döner kebab* and *würstel* nor the resuscitated and alarming aggression from far-right groups (on the contrary, many Germans even suggest that Merz' party aims to attract voters from the far-right through the *Deutsche Leitkultur* position). Rather, it is the fear of the decline of Christianity's moral and social penetration of German society both in absolute and relative terms as Islamic influence grows. This presents, in connection with the admittance and citizenship question, a new and different challenge for the Germans. Until last year, Germany defined immigration and citizenship through ethnicity and thus descent and bloodlines, in contrast to ex-colonial powers such as Great Britain and France, which have been deciding matters of inclusion or exclusion based on territory and democratic tradition.

The lines of the debate must be understood against the background of the German conservatives' relationship to the Holocaust. They tend to detest the idea that Auschwitz should be associated with anything specifically German as they attempt to build a positive, patriotic notion for generations to come. Furthermore, they have left the task of reconciliation with the Jews to the left. "No reproach from the well-known arsenal of political correctness in this country has been spared,"[6] Friedrich Merz declares angrily in defense of his use of terminology such as *Deutsche Leitkultur*. CDU party leader Angela Merkel resorts to an old conservative view that the Social Democrats had "a broken relationship to the German nation" (*ein gespaltenes Verhältnis zur Nation*).[7] It should be emphasized that in Germany, attitudes towards the Holocaust, questions of national identity, and opinions on immigration issues are a deeply interconnected triumvirate. Consequently, regarding immigration, the conservatives position themselves in favor of restriction, tight laws, and integration, which for many means assimilation. In short, the conservatives allow themselves to be proud of Germany more easily than their left-wing counterparts. The latter, including the current government in Berlin, are still often ac-

cused of shaping national identity, in the tradition of Nietzsche or the critical literary and political left-wing movements of the 1960s, around their hatred for Germany.[8] The Social Democrats and Green partisans despise the idea of *Deutsche Leitkultur* as an inflammatory departure from Germany's post-war embrace of a muted identity within a unifying Europe. "In Germany, you wave the flag and at a certain point, you arrive at the remembrance of Auschwitz," stated Joschka Fischer, the Green Foreign Minister. He continues: "You try to be a patriot here, you love your country, you accept the heritage, and then you discover you cannot love the heritage. It is always a broken patriotism born of a broken history."[9]

In addition to these political party reactions, the notion of *Deutsche Leitkultur* has stirred numerous other reactions. From the moment of its inception, the discussion has been intertwined with other issues prevalent in German domestic politics. Immediate repercussions are felt within the Jewish community, whose president Paul Spiegel announces full-scale opposition to the new terminology.[10] Commentators and scholars dwell on right wing extremism, on the crisis of the CDU, on the preponderance of American culture, and on the tendency for immigrant communities to evolve into ghettos. Some ask relentlessly, "What is 'German'?" and multiple essays culminate in the fragile question of whether Germans at any point in the future might and should be proud enough of themselves in order to provide a *Leitkultur* for others. The foreign press, especially the American and the French press, reacts with patronizing wrath.[11] They criticize the conservative thrust for bearing echoes of Nazi ideas of racial supremacy and for calling for German hegemony in Europe. Even the European Commission, under the auspices of Antonio Vitorino, Commissioner for Justice and Home Affairs, adds a special message for the German conservatives to a paper concerning migration issues: "although the Commission notes the importance of values and principles, it promotes openly a shift from a *Deutsche Leitkultur* idea towards a double-sided integration process, which requires mutual adoption from both the indigenous population and the foreign one."[12]

Despite its unclear definition,[13] the artificial word creation of *Deutsche Leitkultur* soon became a daily subject of discussion in German newspapers from the elegant *Feuilleton* to small provincial papers. The debate reached its peak in late November and early December 2000. Until the end of January 2001, *Deutsche Leitkultur* has been subject to analysis in well over 2000 German and international news articles. The term made a rapid advance towards achieving the status of a generally used term, so that one finds it in the realm of sports, music, and history. Not surprisingly, *Deutsche Leitkultur* received the most German votes to win the title of "anti-word of the year" (*Unwort des Jahres*).[14]

The *Deutsche Leitkultur* debate so far reveals, piece by piece, that the historical context exists as the second layer in the palimpsest. Culture in Germany had served as vehicle for multiple, often unadmirable, ideologies. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, first the German Enlightenment and then romanticism fostered the idea of the "cultural nation." The young European German Empire sought

an identifying glue to motivate people to fight for Prussia and to create a spirit of national identity which had not existed during the centuries of a lose and ever-changing patchwork of German states. Hence, since the beginning of the nineteenth century, culture had been the "emergency" factor in the creation of German national identity. Ethnic culture emerging of the home soil should, on a higher (central) level culminate in a national "folk spirit." The latter was to serve as the centerpiece in the Nazis' organized abuse of culture and be affirmed by federalist laws on cultural policy after 1945.[15]

The first and most articulate opponent against the early propaganda of German superiority was Nietzsche, who denounced German nationalism and racial hatred as "a scabies of the heart and blood poisoning."[16] He refused to participate in the "utterly false racial self-admiration and perversion which today displays itself in Germany."[17] He predicted that the new German national state would annihilate the German spirit. Hence Nietzsche emphasized repeatedly that it was specifically German that the Germans would never tire of asking themselves "What is 'German'?" His concept would have never been called *Deutsche Leitkultur,* however. Rather, Nietzsche insisted that the search for values be the fundamental and permanent concern of thoughtful men; values could not be defined once and for all, but had to be submitted to constant re-examination. His own supreme value was culture and its creation, and he would never tire of praising the artist, philosopher, or statesman who would, as a truly creative spirit, override old traditions by creating new laws and new forms.

This mirrors the flaw so often cited about Bismarckean Germany. Helmuth Plessner spoke in 1935 in his book, *The Belated Nation,* about Bismarck's Germany as an invention solely driven by power, as an "Empire without the idea of a state," without any cohesive force which had been rooted in Great Britain and France in their national pillars. But Bismarck knew perfectly well how to manipulate his policies with the word "culture." It was "the codeword for chauvinism, and hence a specific trait about the belated nation."[18] Bismarck used as a foothold the connotations of "culture" prepared so thoroughly by romanticist writers and under the label of *"Kulturkampf,"* as he embarked on a terrible fight against Catholics and Social Democrats which sealed Germany's constant confrontation with France.

This antagonistic relationship hurt Germany much more deeply than just politically, argues Gustav Seibt in an essay in the liberal German weekly *Die Zeit.* According to Seibt,

> France had been the nation which, in both attraction and repulsion, had provided the Germans with the most valuable cultural stimulation. Since the liberation wars against Napoleon, German nationalism has consolidated itself as a defense-mechanism, which is in its roots hostile against anything foreign and cosmopolitan.[19]

In what culminated in the over-estimated strength and pride of Germany on the eve of World War I, the elite enthusiastically called for "cultural mobilization" (*geistige Mobilmachung*). Full ranks of university professors subscribed to German

bellicosity. In addition, the view of "cultural pessimism," as promoted by Thomas Mann, gave impetus to an aggressive, superior Germany. Mann spoke strongly in favor of the war and of German tradition, thereby combining aggressively national- ist and racist notions of German superiority with democratic, supranational con- cepts. All of his ideas were connected to his adamant stance on the exemplary role of German art. He praised German musical, metaphysical, pedagogical, and subjec- tive culture, contrasting it with the more analytical, skeptical, political, and objec- tivist civilization of the West. Later, he was seen as a traitor because he suggested that cultural and political isolation would not serve the nation well.

With the historical break of 1933, Hitler merely had to modify the notion of "culture" in order to further intensify its function as a political tool. "German cul- ture" now epitomized racial supremacy and the justified battle of the indigenous German race for world hegemony. The "new human being" (neuer Mensch) should, without scruples and moral constraints, realize the futurist vision derived from the past.[20] Whether one considers "culture" in the narrow sense of art or in the wider sense of "civilization," the Nazis' aim was to eliminate individual opinion and spirit on all levels and to construct a monolithic German society which the Nazi regime praised for being perfectly cultivated, but was in fact neutered from all forces of pluralism, democracy, and tolerance.

The turning point, 1945, was one of German division and European integra- tion. Hence a quest for German identity was, especially through the policy of Konrad Adenauer, projected upon Europe, and the past was swiftly overshadowed by a concentration on economic recovery. Emphasis was also placed on the ideological divide between East and West, creating deep cultural differences in the realm of political and economic liberty. "For over forty years, division effectively guaranteed that two rival versions of German identity would coexist," writes William M. Chan- dler.[21] According to his analysis, the new integration and identity problem caused by unification following the historical break of 1989 is as important as the political and economic challenges associated with unification. Chandler states: "In political discourse, this version of the identity question has been concerned with immediate divergent priorities as well as with an indeterminate potential for a deep cultural divide between citizens in the old Federal Republic and those in the new Länder."[22] Furthermore, the hitherto unresolved question of how Germans and non-Germans relate to each other had gained importance due to then unresolved issues of immi- gration, citizenship, and multiculturalism. Post-unification, those topics have be- come even more deeply enmeshed within the evolving identity question.

History could mean that today, after the first truly democratic change of a government in a united Germany in 1998, there exists the chance to reconcile the repeated abuse of "culture" with the still unresolved issue of identity. But the gov- ernment efforts in this regard do not always find approval within the conservative opposition. One solution might be to promote constitutional patriotism, a simple consensus pattern of identity first proposed by the German philosopher Juergen Habermas in the 1960s.[23] This formulation of identity would involve the acceptance

of an inherently diverse Germany and a reliance on the legal system to answer certain questions about identity. With this and other identity concepts available, why, then, do Merz and his followers resort to the highly normative and historically biased term of "culture," especially when they talk about what it means to be "German."

Such a move could be seen as a form of resurrected German universalism. The idea that there is now an unchallenged and meta-historical tendency towards market economy, liberal democracy, economic well-being, and a high regard of the individual now dominates. Thus, post-unity (and particularly conservative-rank) Germany proclaims "federal republicanism" for all, a message intended especially for East Germany and for (an ever unifying) Europe. But in reconnecting with the cultural nationalism of the German Enlightenment, German universalism aims at new horizons of inclusion and thereby taboos the question of who may actually claim to be "we;" that is, who is one of ours and who remains a foreigner, who is a citizen and who is a co-opted resident. The cultural nation of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries answered this question by barbaric means. Today, the answer remains open.

Contradictions and Complications

The understanding of *Deutsche Leitkultur* now reaches the third layer, which will include four general arguments against Merz' conceptualization. The first argument, most broadly, is that I disapprove of a political debate being masked as a cultural one. Any debate on immigration and citizenship policy is of a purely political nature. The problem is that if *Deutsche Leitkultur* enters the fray, so may (and do) exclamations about the "over-infiltration of foreigners" (*Überfremdung*). Therefore, a call for *Leitkultur* is more a gift for rightist activists than a contribution to the vocabulary of people who seek to balance multi-culturalism and its danger of parallel societies with integration and its danger of forced assimilation of foreigners. *Deutsche Leitkultur* affirms the ideas of people who are prone to see their own heritage and behavior as the sole legitimate point of reference. Thus, I understand some critical voices that saw in the CDU's move an attempt to gain votes from the right. Even if Merz and his partisans had in mind a call upon tolerance, they chose a hopelessly wrong word.

But I cannot even give them this chance. As tolerance carries the connotation of the concrete acceptance of all existing differences, this would again preclude the active, thus assimilating, requirement of adoption of *Deutsche Leitkultur* that Merz has urged. Why then should he feel the need to invoke the notion of "culture" just at the moment when the bloodline nationalism of the citizenship laws of 1913 is not to be held anymore?[24] Inevitably, this term biased so deeply through romanticism, can be turned into a tool against the idea of individual autonomy. The attribute of "guiding" even goes beyond a reference to romanticism. It is in fact an example of the increasingly complex criteria of inclusion and exclusion. As Uwe Mattheis interprets, "the term '*Leitkultur*' defines a 'we' of absolute inclusion, which, when

economic utility demands it, can be enlarged by a selected group of persons of relative inclusion. Hence, Indian high-tech specialists are useful, political refugees are not."[25]

The second argument is the difficulty of finding the right dose when calling upon German self-esteem. One might question on whether what is considered "German" is worthy of serving as the guiding element in a pluralistic and open society. Many contributors to the debate acknowledge that "Germanness" is not necessarily an ideal point from which to claim leadership over anyone. This notion recalls almost instantly the parole: "Along the German spirit, the world should heal" (*Am deutschen Wesen soll die Welt genesen*) which, stemming again from romanticism, saw its most distorted realization of all in the terror of the twentieth century. Indeed, many surveys confirm that even today, the Germans display the weakest sense of national pride among European citizens. But should they adopt permanent self-effacement and detest instinctively any calls for a reconciled patriotism? I do not believe so. Nevertheless I assess a problematic and critical form of patriotism to be in fact more effective, morally justifiable, historically realistic, and more genuine than the jingoism displayed by German conservatives or the rightwing Freedom Party in Austria. Even if this concept of "enlightened" patriotism reflects the contradictions and tensions in national history, I prefer an inclusive patriotism with inherent conflicts to a sunshine patriotism with deliberate historical holes such as that promoted by German conservatives who defend *Deutsche Leitkultur*.

For Germany, the only opportunity to increase political influence or demonstrate national strength is by proving genuine progressiveness instead of perpetuating the notion of a national cohesion and homogeneity which neither exists nor is applauded abroad. It is neither economic strength nor jingoism which could support these justifications, as I assume the first to be too apolitical to constitute national strength entirely, and the latter to be the most obvious statement of national insecurity, masked with an instrumentalist use or abuse of history. A more trustworthy position of national strength, however, can be achieved by practicing a very advanced version of democracy,[26] which entails an equally advanced policy of immigration. It would mean the acceptance of ever more fluid interaction, loose alliances, and complex formations of identity.[27] As the publicist Norbert Bolz describes:

Is this also part of the *Deutsche Leitkultur*? The Love Parade, Berlin, July 8, 2000.
Photo: Cory Reinbold

"We have to learn these days to understand culture not as identity, but as difference."[28]   That this does not automatically entail pessimism has also been understood by Thomas Rosengarten, according to whom, "Germany, after Prussia and Weimar and the tragic history of assimilating German Jews which ended in catastrophe, has a second chance to learn how to deal with the *other*. But this means to discern what the *other* was and to be ready to let ourselves get confused and impressed by it. However, this has nothing to do with 'guiding' but with the tension between integration and the preservation of cultural identity."[29]

The third general argument against *Deutsche Leitkultur* is Merz' ignorance of trends in civilization, which show a decline of homogeneity derived from ethnic, territorial, or religious foundations. Thus this point puts into question the *prerequisites* for *Deutsche Leitkultur,* namely the existence of any social homogeneity. It leads to the conclusion that *Deutsche Leitkultur* is an obsolete wish given existing social patterns, and a backward-oriented view if Merz' aim is to see current patterns change. Americanism seems the most prevalent modern source for the formation of individual identity. The film producer Guenter Rohrbach Rosenberger sends a clear message to the advocates of *Deutsche Leitkultur* when he writes:

> The call upon this is a cunning idea to conserve national stocks. While the young elite is wooed away by global Americanism, new-coming Africans, Turks, or Indians are urged to comply with a cultural vestige under threat. Thus they are called to become conservators. At the end of the day, the foreigners should save not only our social system, but our culture as well.[30]

Rohrbach's statement touches on the fourth general argument against *Deutsche Leitkultur*: the issue of what is actually perceived by Germans and non-Germans as "German culture."[31] Josef Joffe, in a reactionary pamphlet in the liberal weekly *Die Zeit*, seems to be most thoroughly self-entertained when defining, under the title *Lust auf Leit* (The Lust for the Lead), that "German culture is metaphysics and folk character (*Volkstum*), it is Goethe on the shelf and the lime tree (*Linde*) above the bench."[32]   He concludes, "The Anglo-Saxons have a much easier task for culture. There, it is a wild potpourri. It is Shakespeare and language, Declaration of Independence and Queen, Coke and tea, blues and Britain, Donald Duck and Francis Bacon."[33] Mr. Joffe should consider himself lucky not to be standing for elections, as his brew thickens: "Even the firmest multiculti[34] cannot admit that every culture is of the same value and rights. Only the individual is."[35] Joffe does not stand alone in praising Germanness. In the debate, many elements of popular culture and petty issues from Michael Schuhmacher's cars to the TV-hit *Big Brother* are put forward. But while Joffe is serious on his theory, the latter contributions mostly stem from joking and cynical texts. The objective explanation is still a conundrum.

What is really perceived as the core of "culture" then? On the one hand, the strong influence of the *Länder* in Germany reveals in many ways that, again in the romanticist spirit, the naive, but well-intended, struggle to belong somewhere identifies countryside and religion, with their allegedly unsullied traditions and patterns of behavior as the ideal refuge. Hence to many Germans, this sheltered prov-

ince seems to be felt as the core of "culture." An important dimension of this province, religion, then, lies at the center of identity and the contemporary debate on *Deutsche Leitkultur*.

The Centrality of Religion

The fourth and core layer underneath the rhetoric move of "German guiding culture" is that of religion, as in Europe, the cleavage between an "host society" and a "guest society" can still be largely understood in terms of religion. For Germany, one may interpret the desperate call upon *Deutsche Leitkultur* as a defensive attempt by the waning power of Christianity and corresponding social and political disintegration to regain ground in the face of the strongly exercised power of Islamic societies. Merz has thus begun the attempt to rearrange the playing field where a group that is still considered inappropriate to shape German society for the future displays a relatively stronger cohesion and expected influence than the originally rooted society does and wants. The intuition is that Merz' mere statement of a *Leitkultur*, which implies the existence of a second, "guided," and hence inferior, culture, can well be interpreted as a demand that Christian legal and moral values should not be surrendered to Islamic influence. By its nature, a Christian conservative party such as Merz' CDU is rather inclined to preserve the traditional ideas than to embark on new ones. Still, new concepts do exist. But in Germany they are manifest in multiple secularized patterns of social cohesion. In addition, it is necessary to explain why particularly in Germany, religion deserves to be indicated as lying at the root of the debate on *Deutsche Leitkultur*: in Germany, the settlement of a religious quest for conserving power is much more deeply intertwined with a vision and definition of a future society than in other European countries.

Germany is enthusiastically defined as a secular nation. But the process of secularization is not yet complete, as the dismantling of the institutional forces of religious cohesion is still underway. Does this waning power directly translate into a vacuum? According to the German political theorist Max Weber, the answer would be "no," as he predicted that enlightenment and modernization would bring about the demystification of the world. Yet apparently he was wrong, as secular societies still display a longing for mystical and religious meaning. But in modern society the demand for religion is often realized in flexible, diverse, and oscillating forms, namely, in a variety of "cults." Whether these cults exist as a particular kind of sport, a codified rubric of partying and clubbing, a demand for esoteric practices, or a celebration of consumption, such cults provide new and sometimes strong formal parameters of integration. One may state therefore that the traditional religions today are judged by their functions, achievements, and values relative to the culture in which they are prevalent. That is, cultures are not judged by their religions, but religions are judged culturally.

If we agree that for a long time to come, we will we live in societies the frameworks of which are determined by religion, then the question arises how democracy and multiple "cults" can be reconciled with the process we would call culture. It

seems that democracy needs certain cults whereas the cults do not need democracy. Thus we face an asymmetry, the understanding of which is a political task. Do European, occidental political cultures understand this less than the mostly Islamic immigrant population? According to the German cardinal Josef Ratzinger, who represents the German Bishop Council in the Vatican, the failure to address this issue is indeed at the roots of current insecurity of Christianity, or more precisely, of a Christian Democratic party such as Mertz'. Ratzinger claims that the European Charter of Basic Rights (*Grundrechtscharta*) should have incorporated Christian values, because "the writing down of basic human rights and of rule of law include an image of humans (*Menschenbild*), a moral option and an idea of law that are not at all universal, but basic factors of European identity. These values can only be defended if a consciousness on their existence is constantly re-erected." Could Merz have meant this? A call upon the Christian legacy that should not be subsumed by an allegedly too dominant Islamic influence? It may well be, as even the opponents of theories of looming religious mega-confrontations and a clash of civilizations cannot deny, that particularly in Europe, all cohesive links previously binding the Christian churches have been unraveling rapidly in both absolute and relative terms. In contrast, these forces of cohesion seem to function extremely well among Islamic groups, who present the numerically strongest group of foreigners in Germany.

Who and what should change to overcome what is perceived as a social threat by the proponents of *Deutsche Leitkultur*? The German political scientist and scholar of Islam, Bassam Tibi writes:

> The German society needs to provide not only a passport, but a democratic identity. The Islamic side has to abstain from the religious implications of migration in order to build the prerequisite for the wish for integration. I detest any form of mission. And I see it as imperative for Muslim migrants to abandon the doctrine of *hidschra*,[36] even if it has to be acknowledged that the wave of migration of the twentieth century is no deliberate result of *hidschra* but of economic hardship.[37]

A well-known voice calling repeatedly for a reformation of Islam, Tibi knows he has foes in Germany. He accuses the Turk, and hence largely Muslim, population of practicing a more fundamental form of Islam than is prevalent in their country of origin. This behavior, according to Tibi, jeopardizes social integration through the building of exclaves. He emphasizes that Islam should only be accepted in the framework of religious pluralism in Europe, which requires loyalty to secular civil societies and pluralist democracy. But Tibi also accuses the German political culture of "taboo-zones" which inhibit an open discussion on the status of Islam. Tibi argues that Muslims, through political integration, can well adopt a European identity. Yet, this works only through political means, as double-citizenship is possible whereas double-religious membership is not.

That Islamic groups have not yet had the chance and have not yet taken the initiative to achieve secular and political integration opens an even wider gap between the two sides, as does the perceived vacuum of values and Christian legacy in today's Europe. But there is a second vacuum within the host society, one of political nature. The question arises as to why in Germany, but not in other European

countries, such as France or Great Britain, are these issues at the root of so much controversy? "Merz' word creation appears to identify a vacuum that exists in Germany on the spot where immigrant societies have an assimilatory attraction that enables them to integrate foreigners, but still to keep their own identity,"[38] writes Gustav Seibt. Of course, there has also been racism in France and Great Britain, but both established much earlier a more unconditional form of integration than Germany. France achieved it through the democracy-inspired concept of *citoyen* and with the attempt to develop a form of Islam with a European-French character. Great Britain practiced a policy of citizenship through the quasi-egalitarian Commonwealth idea of the *Muslim subject of the Empire*. This granted Muslims the British passport of the Commonwealth.[39] Coming back to Tibi, this suggests that even if Germany has finally abandoned the determination of German citizenship through ethnic exclusion, the general understanding still rests upon the view that qualifications for inclusion are hard to access for Muslims. Thus, the equation "non-German equals foreigner equals Turk equals Muslim equals political and economic underclass" still holds true, and there remain obstacles to a mutually acceptable form of integration.

The conclusion of this core layer is that change is needed on both sides to guarantee social peace and integration, and to preclude a need for a misplaced call upon *Deutsche Leitkultur*. Change means here more democratic inclusion from the host country, and less religious reference where social and economic openness are expected from the "hosted" population. This leads back to the very point of departure of this essay: as the conservatives feel, if positively interpreted, the need to set out patterns for peaceful integration of the growing Islamic population, they would do well to promote this debate but not deviate from its core ideas through bizarre and counter-productive rhetorical moves.

Notes

[1] The English language media are divided in the question of a proper translation of "*Leitkultur*." The term does not figure in any German dictionary. Some refer to it as "leading culture," others as "guiding culture," or as "predominant culture." I acknowledge that these three translations represent three different interpretations, which can also be deciphered in German from the word "*Leit*." Either one understands "*Leit-*" as leading in a narrow, illiberal and hence slightly threatening sense ("leading culture"), or in a more neutral, slightly benevolent sense ("guiding culture"). In my opinion, "predominant culture" might be the most adequate interpretation but it is too normative and passive a notion to reflect fully the present flavor of the debate.

[2] It should be noted that Merz himself despised his party being labeled conservative in a parliamentary debate on guiding culture. He insisted against chancellor Gerhard Schröder that the CDU/CSU block be understood as "Christian Democrats as parties of the center" (Juergen Kaube. "Neues von den Konservativen." *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* 24 January 2001). I consider the tendency of both left and right wing parties to claim that they occupy the center a trend and a rhetorical move rather than a deeply rooted dissolution of traditional cleavages. Thus I ignore Merz' statement in my essay and refer to the CDU and CSU as conservative parties.

[3] It took the CDU two weeks to generate a definition of what they consider to be guiding culture. Their text is so basic that it could be what America claims to find common consensus upon: the Basic Law (constitution) and the overall summary of European civilization. Friedrich Merz in fact retreated from his rebuke of the multicultural society in the context of *Deutsche Leitkultur* and insisted that the term merely had meant following the constitution and broad acceptance of national values such as the

emancipation of women. CDU party leader Angela Merkel was plainly troubled when asked by the weekly *Der Spiegel* to free-associate from the word "Germany." The flag, she ventured. The national anthem. That sense of home conjured by the emotive word *Heimat*. The constitution, yes, and certain landscapes. "For example," she explained, "when I am in Russia and I see birch woods, I know that what I am seeing is no German landscape." Both politicians quoted in Roger Cohen, "Call for 'Guiding Culture' Rekindles Political Debate in Germany," *The New York Times* 5 November 2000.

[4] The pragmatic background for the debate lies in the drastic demographic changes faced particularly by Germany, Italy, and Spain. According to the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW), current rates of immigration of 200,000 per year must be increased to 600,000 in order to stabilize the supply of labor in 2020. A delay of the legal age of retirement could only serve as corollary measure to dampen the shortage of labor in the long-term.

[5] CDU Party Programme, quoted in *Berliner Zeitung* 27 November 2000.

[6] Friedrich Merz, interviewed in *Die Welt* 31 October 2000.

[7] Merkel to chancellor Schröder during a parliamentary debate on *Deutsche Leitkultur,* quoted in *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* 30 November 2000.

[8] Wolf Biermann for example, a critical writer of the 1960s tradition, has often said, "We cannot but love this country we live in. That's why we hate it so much." ("Wir können doch gar nicht anders, als dieses Land, in dem wir leben, zu lieben. Deswegen hassen wir es auch so.") Biermann is quoted in Reinhard Mohr, "Operation Sauerbraten," *Der Spiegel* 6 November 2000.

[9] Fischer, as quoted in Cohen.

[10] During a huge demonstration against racism, xenophobia, and rightwing-radicalism on November 9, 2000 in Berlin, Spiegel said, "Does guiding culture mean chasing foreigners, burning down synagogues, and killing homeless?" ("Gehört es zur deutschen Leitkultur, Fremde zu jagen, Synagogen anzuzünden, Obdachlose zu töten?") and he then directly addressed top-representatives of the CDU who were present at the event, urging them to stop verbal provocation. Spiegel is quoted in Hans Michael Kloth, "Deutschland vertrauen?" *Der Spiegel* 15 December 2000.

[11] I deliberately use this term here because the outstandingly thorough and serene conduct of the debate and the expansion of the voice of such a vast majority of intellectuals and ordinary people show that Germany has developed a truly mature, articulate elite able to rebuke swiftly when it comes to provocative statements such as Merz'. Also, the overall state of democracy of today's Germany is impressive. There is common agreement on being an immigrant country. There is dual citizenship. Foreigners can be voted for as committee members in the works committee. And, last but not least, the same CDU that in mid-October had proclaimed the *Deutsche Leitkultur* idea called upon citizens to participate in a huge anti-racism, anti-xenophobia, and anti-right-wing radicalism demonstration. I speak as an Austrian having witnessed one year of governing of the right-wing coalition including Jörg Haider's Freedom Party. All of the above mentioned arguments for the maturity of German democracy are not valid in Austria. The government promotes "zero-immigration." There is no dual citizenship. Foreigners cannot become members of work committees. And, the governing Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) promotes containment of any demonstrations rather than supporting participation. Foreign media reactions were similar in the case of Austria and the case of Merz. Both times the foreign press resorted immediately to conjuring up Nazi players. But, if there is a question of criticism, I would rather accept if for the case of Austria than Germany. My point is that the majority of Germans are alert and articulate enough to combat the linguistic jaunts of Friedrich Merz.

[12] EU Commission paper, "CDU von EU-Kommission für 'Deutsche Leitkultur' kritisiert," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* 5 December 2000.

[13] Given the broad reactions, it is imperative to ask what actually inspired Merz to create a term which comprises so many political and ideological ways of interpretation. The term leaves totally unclear whether it appeals to "the guiding culture among Germans" or "the German culture that guides." Merz explains that he took *Deutsche Leitkultur* from a 1998 article by Theo Sommer, a famous staff writer of the liberal weekly *Die Zeit*. Sommer in turn says he borrowed it from Bassam Tibi, a German political scientist and Islam scholar. Tibi had in fact introduced the term in his book *Europe Without Identity* which was published in 1998. But there, he explains extensively that he means a "predominant culture," which seems to be a much more neutral term than what *Deutsche Leitkultur* implies. In fact, Tibi promotes very different concepts from Merz', as will be shown the investigation of the fourth layer.

[14] However, against all predictions the commission that carries out this linguistic competition each year finally voted for "nationally liberated zone," a term used by German Neo-Nazis.

[15] "Harmlosigkeitskult- Die Mythen des deutschen Kulturföderalismus," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* 23 December 2000.

[16] Norman Rich, *The Age of Nationalism and Reform, 1850-1890* (London/New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1977) p. 47.

[17] Ibid.

[18] E. Gujer, "Der 'Kampf gegen Rechts' und der Nationalbegriff," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* 8 December 2000.

[19] Gustav Seibt, "Kein schöner Land," *Die Zeit* 2 November 2000.

[20] Wolfgang Michalka, ed., *Deutsche Geschichte 1933-1945. Dokumente zur Innen- und Aussenpolitik* (Frankfurt: Fischer 1993) pp. 76-79.

[21] William M. Chandler, "Integration and Identity in German Politics," in Peter H. Merkl., ed., *The Federal Republic of Germany at Fifty: The End of a Century of Turmoil* (London: Macmillan Press, 1999) pp. 58-61.

[22] Ibid.

[23] It should be recalled that after the Nazi barbarism and during the Cold War, German politicians and citizens faced more impossible than probable parameters along which to create and promote a German identity.

[24] Earlier in 2000, the German government passed a new citizenship law which led to a fundamentally new definition on who is a German citizen, as children of immigrants born in Germany are now automatically Germans, and double-citizenship is possible at last.

[25] Uwe Mattheis, "Waren sind freier als Menschen; Ausländer, gibt's die noch im künftigen Superstaat Europa? Wer wird dann zum Hassobjekt der Zurückgebliebenen?" *Die Woche* 22 December 2000.

[26] This is something that Germany has achieved and tries to achieve in contrast to Austria.

[27] I borrow this view from one originally applied to the world order of post-modern states, which is pondered by Robert Cooper, a British diplomat currently working for the Defence and Overseas Secretariat of the British Cabinet Office in the book *The Post-Modern State and the World Order* (London, 2000). As the decline of the role of the nation state is deeply intertwined with the decline of traditional patterns of identity, I am convinced that Cooper's idea could also be applied to future social order (within states).

[28] Norbert Bolz, quoted in Reinhard Mohr, "Operation Sauerbraten," *Der Spiegel* 6 November 2000.

[29] Thomas Rosengarten, "Mit Fremdheit umgehen lernen," *Süddeutsche Zeitung* 22 December 2000.

[30] Günter Rohrbach, "'Ich' ist ein Amerikaner. Was ist deutsch an der deutschen Kultur?" *Süddeutsche Zeitung* 27 December 2000.

[31] Commentators often mention the contributions of Kant, Hegel, Goethe, Schiller, Wagner, Marx, and Mann as specifically German.

[32] Josef Joffe, "Lust auf Leit: Verlangt oder verfemt, ohne Leitkultur kommt ein Land nicht aus," *Die Zeit* 16 November 2000.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Joffe uses this derogatory term to describe a person who advocates multi-culturalism.

[35] Joffe.

[36] *Hidschra* describes originally the migration of Mohammed from Mecca to Medina in (the Christian year of) 622. It marks the beginning of the Muslim calendar and means not only the possibility, but the duty for Muslims to migrate to non-Islamic territory in order to spread Islam.

[37] Bassam Tibi, "Hidschra nach Europa," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* 18 December 2000.

[38] Gustav Seibt, "Kein schöner Land," *Die Zeit* 2 November 2000.

[39] A free summary of Tibi's point.

Old Symbols for New Times

Russia's Post-Soviet Search for Identity

Jane Buchanan

"The absurd in Russia is permanent, it just takes different forms."

-Vladimir Voinovich, Soviet Dissident Writer

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia not only lost its prevailing political, economic, and social structures, but the citizens of this vanquished empire faced a mental and psychological vacuum that has proven quite difficult to fill. For, until 1991, Russian national self-consciousness was great power consciousness, an identity founded on centuries of political influence and territorial conquest. Furthermore, Russian culture and traditions of most of the last century were subsumed and reformulated within the framework of communist ideology, which, through direct messages and simple images, imposed a Soviet identity for all individuals in the empire, regardless of heritage. Even for those dissidents and artists who rejected the dominant paradigms, their identity was nevertheless informed by and defined by its relation to the official culture. With the rejection of communism and the adoption of democratic, capitalist systems, it has proven problematic to determine both what, exactly, of state-sanctioned culture, traditions, and history can or should be repudiated and what might be available to readily replace that which is rejected outright. Russian intellectuals, the independent press, and Western capitalism have all attempted to fill this cultural void through various and conflicting messages, images, and products. Inevitably, the official leadership of the new Rus-

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sia has taken up the question as well, and this paper will explore a few of the many ways in which both the Yeltsin and Putin administrations have attempted to generate a new Russian identity as well as the repercussions of such efforts.

The democratic political structures now in place in Russia pose new challenges to political parties and governmental administrations accustomed to the ease with which the public was coerced under Soviet authoritarian practices and overarching ideology. Politicians are now faced with the task of acquiring political constituencies by actually winning the hearts and minds of citizens. To do so effectively, officials must engage in the question of identity; that is, they must strive to offer an answer to the pressing question of 'who are we as Russians in a post-Soviet age'? The reborn Communist Party of Russia consistently displays platforms rooted in one form or another of mythic nostalgia: "communist nostalgia for the order of Stalin and the supposedly dependable standard of living under Brezhnev, military nostalgia for the fear that the Soviet arsenal once aroused in the Western enemy, nationalist nostalgia for empire and higher spiritual purpose."[1] While for this party such a strategy is perhaps to be expected, what is more intriguing are attempts by the democratic Russian leadership to answer the question of identity by also recalling historical elements, including Soviet propaganda materials, state symbols, holidays, and centerpieces. Importantly, this identity retains the appearance of continuity with the past, yet, because it is generated under "democratic" auspices, it acquires a new meaning necessarily distinct from the now defunct ideology that formulated these cultural paradigms at the outset. For the public, these inventions and constructions offer a certain sense of stability and appeal to a wide spectrum of nostalgias, both misplaced and genuine, yet are nevertheless inherently problematic, contradictory, and often even absurd.

One certainly cannot spend any time in contemporary Russia without encountering the remnants of integral parts of the Soviet cultural landscape: images of peasant girls and heroic laborers; patriotic slogans and exhortations on building tops; and the ubiquitous hammers, sickles, and giant sheaves of wheat. All of these elements are simply manifestations of the mass-produced sentimentality that reinforced the symbols of the Soviet regime. They offered the answers to every question and provided an identity with wide appeal. They are, and remain, in essence, *kitsch*, whereby the feelings they invoke are of "a kind the multitudes can share [sic] [and] derive from the basic images people have engraved in their memories."[2] While the persistence of Soviet *kitsch* today is often incidental, simply a matter of buildings yet to be repainted or murals still to be replaced, it is nevertheless these same images which have found a unique niche in post-Soviet Russia, owing largely to government efforts. In a sense, this former *agitprop* (agitation/propaganda) exists for today's politicians as a ready-made body of material to be utilized in an entirely new context and framework, that of the Russian nation, rather than of the Soviet Empire.

Symbolizing the State

This tendency to adopt Soviet *kitsch* to the new Russia can be seen most clearly in the official symbols and holidays through which the government has intended to inspire patriotism and loyalty. In December 2000, in a move that many opponents considered an evasive ploy to distract national attention from governmental short-comings and failure to resolve pressing economic and social problems, President Vladimir Putin placed before the federal Duma the task of passing legislation on new state symbols, including a national anthem, flag, and emblem. While state symbols seem fundamental to a nation's identity, nine years of Yeltsin leadership in the Kremlin failed to establish any symbols officially. A nineteenth century tune lacking lyrics was only perfunctorily decreed as the temporary anthem.[3] Putin may have also had impetus for his decisive move to establish new symbols after receiving a letter from the prominent Spartak-Moscow football club, requesting a proper anthem for them to proudly sing before their matches.[4] Indeed, no nation seeking to establish its identity as a still preeminent force in the world can afford to have its sports heroes hanging their heads in the face of their opponents before the contest has even begun.

Thus, while there was both popular and official demand for a new Russian anthem, there proved to be little consensus on which anthem to select. One poll by the National Institute for Socio-Psychological Research revealed that 26 percent of Russians would choose the Soviet anthem, including the words, as Russia's state anthem. Twenty-five percent of respondents believe only the music of the Soviet anthem should be preserved, and 30 percent wanted entirely new music and new words. Ultimately, the Duma, dominated by Putin-loyalists of the Unity party and Communists, resoundingly approved the restoration of the old Soviet anthem, "Unbreakable Union," albeit with new lyrics, thus establishing the fifth new anthem since 1918.[5] During the debates on the state symbols legislation, veteran Communist Duma representative Anatoly Lukyanov stated emphatically that the adoption of the Soviet anthem cannot be seen "as compromising Russian statehood," but rather the package of symbols that also includes the tsarist tricolor flag and the double-headed eagle coat of arms unites Russians by "taking the best from their tumultuous history."[6] Many argue, however, that the Soviet anthem, although adopted on the eve of the Soviet Union's victory in World War II, is profoundly inappropriate, recalling an era of Stalinist repression and terror that hardly deserves glorification. Therein lies one of the most fundamental paradoxes of identity formation in the post-Soviet world: to what degree is it possible to recall elements of the nation's history selectively so as to provide continuity, while simultaneously demonstrating a clear break with a repudiated past?

The Soviet tune familiar to everyone may serve well to maintain the connection between past and present, yet many feel that the new lyrics simply replace the ideological anachronisms in the old anthem with uninspired phrases, the kind that might be found in a modern "anthem-generating" computer program.[7] Rather than seizing this unique opportunity to inspire people to be proud of their country, to

demonstrate a new point of departure into the twenty-first century after the nation's trials of the preceding decades, officials have offered a description of their homeland little more stirring than: "You are unique in the world, one of a kind."[8] Ironically, it is exactly this uniqueness that fails to stir much patriotism, but rather makes a coherent Russian sense of self that is difficult to define.

Celebrating the State

The absence of a clear national identity around which to formulate new symbols of the nation has resulted also in an odd amalgamation of holidays with ambiguous names, but which conveniently fall on the same calendar dates as the celebrations under communism. This is clearly more than a reflection of a "common desire to celebrate what is and has been great about Russia,"[9] but is rather a decidedly conscious effort to adapt old traditions into a new and changing present context. Some holidays, such as the "Soviet Army and Navy Day," now the more general "Defenders of the Motherland Day," have been easily altered for the new circumstances. Both "International Workers' Day" and the "Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution" have undergone more radical name changes, becoming "Spring Festival" and "Day of Accord and Reconciliation," respectively. Others, such as religious holidays, "International Women's Day," and World War II "Victory Day" have survived the transition intact, insofar as they reflect history or sentiments which transcend regime changes. Finally, new holidays have been introduced to celebrate the short democratic history of the new Russia, with both "Independence Day" and "Constitution Day."

This amalgamation, while intending to piece together numerous traditions that span several generations, has actually managed, in many cases, to create confusion and cultural disorientation. From the outset, most of the Soviet holidays, with the exception of "Victory Day," remained for decades ambiguous to many for various reasons. For example, the "Anniversary of the Great *October* Socialist Revolution" was celebrated on *November* 7, as per the modern Gregorian calendar, rather than the Julian calendar, which was used in Russia until 1918. The Julian calendar had placed the Revolution on October 24, 1917. "International Workers' Day" and "International Women's Day" proved to be equally problematic in that they referenced ideals, namely, proletarian emancipation and women's equality, that were, in practice, largely absent from Soviet society. Furthermore, the authorities frequently named holidays at random, whether to celebrate the completion of a Five-Year Plan (ahead of schedule, of course), a great leader's birthday, or a particular professional group, with "Miners' Day" or "Astronauts' Day." The 1995 film, "Burned By the Sun," by Nikita Mikhailkov (the son, incidentally, of Alexander Mikhailkov, the author of the lyrics for the Soviet anthem, both the 1944 and 2000 versions) centers on one family's celebration of a summer holiday extolling the virtues of Stalin just as the Purges gained their most vicious momentum in 1936. Significantly, most of the participants have little understanding of what, exactly, they are celebrating, with the matriarch of the family going so far as to proclaim, "I can't keep track of all these holidays, but Nadya [the youngest member of the family,

ever eager for the day when she comes of age to join the Pioneers youth league] knows all of them!"[10] Thus, while the manufactured sentimentality, the *kitsch*, that produced Soviet holidays provided plenty of days free from work and full of relaxation, they often failed to inspire a deep loyalty to the state, ideals, or personae which they were designed to celebrate, even when the regime functioned at its most. Transferring such traditions to the post-Soviet world, then, results in an inherent superficiality that appeals to a largely vacuous nostalgia.

Holidays, which have undergone name changes, pose even further complications to the creation of a coherent identity. That the November 7th October Revolution holiday is to now be celebrated as "Day of Accord and Reconciliation," seems so blatantly contradictory as to border on the absurd. The words themselves hold very little meaning in such an abstract formulation: reconciliation with what or with whom? The October Revolution professed to be anything but an attempt at "accord" or "reconciliation," and yet these two holidays are now inextricably linked for all Russian citizens born before 1990. One young Russian intellectual even went so far as to say that for him, this new holiday is so profoundly inappropriate as to be the equivalent of celebrating the "Day of Germanic-Judaic Friendship" on the anniversary of *Kristallnacht*.[11] While such a sentiment presses the issue a bit, ultimately, the point is clear: such an official reconstruction of holidays, while easily formulated through articulate wording and appealing to a sense of stability, can succeed more in confusing and frustrating than in its ultimate goal of providing a coherent identity rooted in a sense of stability.

Finally, holidays pertaining to the brief democratic history of the Russian nation, "Independence Day" and "Constitution Day" have presented other complications. While they unarguably have a rightful place in the national holidays listings for Russia, they fail to provide a solid foundation for the new Russian identity, as they, like "accord and reconciliation," in many ways produce more confusion than they alleviate. Because the regime change in the early 1990s came largely as an official coup d'etat in the name of a few abstract and foreign ideals, rather than as an organized public movement seeking genuine reform, most Russians fail to readily absorb the notions of independence and democratic constitution into their self-identity in the way that Americans or the French might. "We received independence from what, exactly? This notion of independence remains unclear to me," a Russian colleague stated bluntly in response to inquiries about her relation to certain state holidays.[12] "Constitution Day" can only prove to be even emptier, as few Russians have actually read their new constitution or understand the civil guarantees inherent in it. Throughout the Soviet era, citizens lived under a series of constitutions, which provided for the particular federal structure, but bore only a vague relationship to political realities and power and possessed a strong propagandistic message.[13] Thus, "constitution" is hardly a new word or concept, but somehow the post-Soviet democratic constitution is meant to inspire greater confidence in the state and its guarantees to citizens merely by virtue of a state-organized celebration of it.

The State and Its Heroes

The resurrection of Soviet symbols and traditions through political maneuverings has also led to a revival of discussion over what is to be done with the grand master and Soviet centerpiece himself, V.I. Lenin. The embalmed hero of the proletariat still remains on display in the mausoleum on Red Square and generates a great deal of conflict between left and right wing politicians, particularly in the wake of debates over the anthem. Undoubtedly, Lenin and his ideas were the most obvious and powerful force of continuity throughout the Soviet era. As Brezhnev articulated, "Today's accomplishments of the Soviet people are a direct continuation of the cause of October."[14] Through exhortations of all plans as fulfilling Lenin's behests and instructions, Soviet leaders were able to collapse the past, present, and future into one "continuously extending historical timelessness" of the Leninist general line, and thereby avoid existing problems which they could not comprehend theoretically.[15] The current Russian leadership seems most hesitant to relinquish such a longstanding tradition, as was Yeltsin, as if somehow Lenin's lingering presence absolves even the post-Soviet failings. More than anything, however, fears that removal of the body and a public burial would be too socially divisive, at least for now, hinder any decisive action in the near future. Even reformist lawmaker Grigory Yavlinsky stated that "Lenin's mausoleum remains a sacred place for many citizens of Russia."[16] Obviously, Lenin, like many Soviet symbols, has yet to be reduced simply to historical artifact, and for as long as he continues to dominate the Moscow landscape, so too will he persist in the landscape of Russian identity.

The Cult of War

There are, however, traditions even more persistent and pervasive than that of Lenin, the most obvious being that of the cult of war. Of all the major events in Soviet history, the one that remains most ingrained in the collective psyche, easily surpassing the Revolution in importance, is the unquestionable victory of the regime in the Great Patriotic War against Nazi Germany. For some, particularly the hard-line communists, victory in the war has long served to legitimize the brutal collectivization and industrialization campaigns and Stalinist repression that went before it. In recent decades, the Party's propagandists portrayed the war as proof of the system's ultimate strength,[17] a sentiment that persists today for many, with the nostalgia for military and superpower greatness.

While the valiant victory remains prominent in every day life both among those who can remember those tumultuous years and those who have simply grown up in a system that refuses to let the memories of the war and its millions of victims fade, the most public displays of the cult of war occur on the May 9th "Victory Day" holiday. Given the amount of support for and attention to this holiday, it has provided a rare opportunity for government officials to employ *kitsch* on a grand scale through parades, banners, souvenirs, and new monuments, particularly in 1995 on the fiftieth anniversary of the Soviet victory over the Nazis. Few would argue that

Russians do not deserve to celebrate this tremendous achievement, yet the government also recognizes the war celebrations as a most vulnerable reflection of the longing for the prestige and greatness of the nation and effectively utilizes the war nostalgia for its own purposes. During the 1996 Yeltsin election campaign, reprints of vintage war posters welcoming the Red Army soldiers home from the front covered shop windows and signposts throughout the capital and other cities. In this way, Yeltsin co-opted the Great Patriotic War for his own political purposes and successfully campaigned on images and ideals that signified both reform and democratization while appealing simultaneously to those who distrusted the reforms and clung tenaciously to the past.[18] Through such means, government officials sanction the selective forgetting of the dark moments of the nation's past and thereby obliterate linear history and transform it into a collective mythology that is both as uplifting and as coercive as the totalitarian *kitsch* of the Soviet years had been.

Both Yeltsin and Putin have further played on superpower nostalgia and the pride of Russia's might by pursuing military campaigns in the breakaway republic of Chechnya. Chechnya has long held a unique place in the Russian imagination as the paragon of Islamic defiance and the embodiment of the primitive, the cunning, and the elusive. For centuries, Russian and Soviet leaders, including democratically elected presidents, have tried to annihilate the Chechens, "first by war on horseback, then by deportation in cattle cars, and now by heavy artillery bombardment and carpet bombing."[19] Thus, the Chechens become an easy target for Russia's desire to prove its strength and greatness and its intent to suppress any further fracturing of the much-reduced empire. In 1991, Yeltsin risked virtually no popularity by starting the war in Chechnya, as he capitalized on the traditional rhetoric and demonology by describing the republic as a "criminal state." The war ultimately proved to be a humiliation for the Russian military, but nevertheless Vladimir Putin initiated the campaign anew largely out of a desire to rally the nation behind a common cause during the early days of his administration as Prime Minister. In this, he appealed to another dimension of the cult of war and military nostalgia: the wartime focus on working together in troubled times. After a series of bomb explosions in Moscow apartment buildings and public places, Russians felt vulnerable and the Putin administration was able to direct blame towards the historic enemy by describing the bombings as Islamic acts of terrorism. To this day no conclusive proof exists as to which organization is responsible for the attacks; more than a few "conspiracy" theories have gained popularity, which implicate government or intelligence circles as the real perpetrators. The ongoing conflict in Chechnya, then, takes on a much larger dimension, simply that of another post-Soviet war of succession. It is a reflection of the continuing strength of the notion of Russia as a military power, resolutely united, if by no other means, in opposition to the menace which threatens to undermine the great nation.

Conclusion

Altogether, Russia has experienced a most tumultuous decade of transition, seeking to redefine itself through a tentative embrace of the ideals of Western de-

mocracy, while naturally clinging to familiarity, something repeatable that recalls the myth of an established "home," regardless of whether that home was truly stable or even existed at all. The government strives to provide historical precedence and continuity to the new national identity through an ad hoc mixture of tsarist, Soviet, and democratic symbols and ideas, most of which plays on the public's nostalgia and willingness to accept state-manufactured sentiment and culture in its familiar *kitsch* forms. The result is often an ironic and confusing amalgamation that fails to fill the cultural void in which the "old" has been repudiated, but a breakthrough toward a unique "new" has yet to emerge. Undoubtedly, Russia will formulate a distinct post-Soviet identity eventually, but only through the long reflective process of facing its history, traditions, and culture in such a way as to produce a coherent narrative that continuous with the past, yet distinctly forward-looking.

Notes

[1] David Remnick, *Resurrection: The Struggle for a New Russia* (New York: Random House, 1997) p. 91.

[2] Milan Kundera, *The Unbearable Lightness of Being*, trans. Michael Heim (New York: Harper and Row, 1984) p. 278.

[3] Ron Popeski, "Russia Restores Soviet Anthem, Tsarist Flag," Johnson's Russia List News Service #4676. 8 December 2000 <davidjohnson@erols.com>.

[4] "Futbolisti trebuyut ot Putina gimna," ["Russian Football Players Demand a Hymn from Putin"], *SMU* 24 July 2000, <http://www.smi.ru/2000/07/24/964452025.html>.

[5] *The Soviet National Anthem Website*, 9 January 2001 <http://www.funet.fi/pub/culture/russian/html_pages/soviet.html>.

[6] Popeski.

[7] "This Hymn is Supposed to Move Us?"editorial, *The Moscow Times* 4 January 2001, Johnson's Russia List News Service #5006, 4 January 2001 <davidjohnson@erols.com>.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Theresa Sabonis-Chaffee, "Communism as Kitsch: Soviet Symbols in Post-Soviet Society," in Adele Marie Baker, ed., *Consuming Russia: Popular Culture, Sex and Society Since Gorbachev* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1999) p. 368.

[10] *Ytomlenie Solntsem*, [*Burned by the Sun*], Nikita Mikhailkov dir., Studio "Three T's," 1995.

[11] Author Interview with Piotr Kaznacheev, 30 January 2001.

[12] Author Interview with Olga Amsheeva, 22 December 2000.

[13] M.K. Dziewanowski, *A History of Soviet Russia* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1989) p. 366.

[14] Rachel Walker, "Language and the Politics of Identity in the USSR," in Michael Urban, ed., *Ideology and System Change in the USSR and East Europe. Selected Papers from the Fourth World Congress for Soviet and East European Studies, Harrogate, 1990* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992) p. 9.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Andrew Kramer, "Debate over Lenin's Body Put Off," Johnson's Russia List News Service #4690, 15 December 2000 <davidjohnson@erols.com>.

[17] David Remnick, *Lenin's Tomb: The Last Days of the Soviet Empire* (New York: Random House, 1993) p. 400.

[18] Sabonis-Chaffee, p. 368.

[19] Remnick, *Resurrection*, p. 266.

A Black Haven

African Americans and the Myth of a Colorblind France

Lua Kamál Yuille

"Society is held together with legend, myth . . . without it we will be hurled into that void, within which . . . the foundations of society are hidden."[1] Eric Hobsbawm defined "myth" or invented tradition as the aspect of society "of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek[s] to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior . . . which automatically impl[ies] continuity with the past."[2] Invented tradition can come in many forms, and from rituals and monuments to images and idioms; each nation has a wealth of invented traditions that shape and guide the beliefs, values, and behaviors of its society. For France, one of the most important invented traditions is expressed in three simple words: *Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité*. This phrase encompasses French pride in their government, art, comportment, and society. Not only has this expression shaped the French perception of the French for hundreds of years, it has also informed the world about France and manipulated its evaluation of the nation and its people. When French historian Henri Blet explained that "Frenchmen have never adopted racial doctrines affirming the superiority of white over men of color,"[3] no one found evidence to object, disagree, or reason to disbelieve because the image of a French society firmly committed to freedom, equality, and brotherhood was crystallized into the definition of France.

For African Americans living in a country that they perceive as overflowing with prejudice, France has come to represent the opportunity and security missing in America. France is seen as a Black Haven, a safe place. Given the chance, many

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have given up all they know and ventured into the comforting borders of the "City of Light," where they felt that all that was wrong in America would disappear. The most important, or more fittingly, the most renowned of these periods of flight to France occurred during the first half of the twentieth century when America was mired in societal norms that promoted white people over all others. Thus the inter-war and postwar periods are the most important eras for the African American experience in France, more specifically in Paris, the "Black Haven."

In the words of a World War I black American soldier, "French people don't bother with no color line business. They treat us so good that the only time I ever know I'm colored is when I look in the glass."[4] The sentiments of the soldier were clearly felt widely as evidenced by the number of African American soldiers who returned to France after the wars. Similarly, African American artists and per-formers during much of the early and mid-twentieth century chose to settle in Paris. From poets like Countee Cullen and Claude McKay to authors like Richard Wright and James Baldwin and performers like Josephine Baker and Kenny Clarke, much of America's prominent African American artist class lived in France between and after the wars in a desire to escape the prejudices they experienced across the At-lantic. Yet, the historical racism that was abhorred in the United States also ex-isted, at least to some extent, in France. Thus, the question arises as to which char-acteristics did French society, culture, and government possess (in practice or per-ception) that made it so popular to African Americans during the twentieth cen-tury? Why did black people choose France?

Visions of France

On the eve of World War I, France was more than just another country for most of America's black people. The European nation had played host to blacks and Africans for many years. Throughout the nineteenth century, well-to-do French speaking Louisiana Creoles sent their sons to France to enjoy the educational op-portunities from which they were excluded in the United States. Prominent mem-bers of the black American community visited France. Among the most recogniz-able names are Frederick Douglass, Booker T. Washington, James Weldon Johnson, and W.E.B. DuBois, all of whom returned home with glowing reviews of the open-minded receptions they had received. There were even some artists like Henry Ossawa Tanner, who had decided to venture across the Atlantic to take France as their permanent home. However, by the beginning of World War I, France had also produced some of the most important discriminatory literature including the overtly racist works of Georges Cuvier as well as the fairly innocent ignorance produced by Henri Grégoire and Louis Daubenton. In addition, late nineteenth century France produced Arthur de Gobineau, commonly known as the "Father of Racism." He published *The Inequality of Human Races* four years before Darwin produced his seminal work. Gobineau's writing, which would become the foundation for much of Hitler's ideology, explained that there exists an "original, clear-cut, and permanent inequality between the different races" that is unrelated to environment and cir-cumstance and that the "Negroid" peoples have no possibilities for improvement.[5]

More importantly, his influence was felt in the works of other racial scientists world-wide, whose "scholarship" condoned and promoted the subjugation of the African Diaspora and of Africans living on their continent.

A half-century after the era of slavery and two generations from the end of Reconstruction when most of the advances made by blacks began to be reversed, the average black Americans, still living as a sharecroppers in the rural South, had neither reflected upon nor held any illusions about France. For them, France was nothing more than simply another country; it might as well have been another planet. However, France (though not all French) had experience with blacks and Africans in this era, as it encountered the handful from the US and played host to Africans and blacks from its former colonies. Furthermore, blacks contributed to French society in areas as diverse as literature and the military and had been living in the country since Roman times. It is sufficient to say that the historic black presence in France was significant enough to prompt the adoption of the *Polices des Noirs* first in 1777, and then again in 1802.[6]

The American participation in World War I fundamentally changed the black perception of France. While fighting in France, American soldiers were able to experience for the first time a society free from the racial caste system that set black Americans upon the lowest rungs of the social ladder.[7] The perception was so fully disseminated that American military officials sought to deflect the possible repercussions of too much *Liberté, Egalité,* or *Fraternité* by issuing numerous memos and protocols, which sought to govern and restrict relations between black American soldiers and white French civilians.

Upon their return to the United States, black American soldiers found the racial caste still ferociously intact, arguably with more vigor. Black Doughboys had fond memories of "colorblind" France, which they related to the black community in America. The same would occur with black soldiers returning from France after World War II. They described the surprise and dismay of many Parisians over American bigotry toward blacks, highlighting dazzlingly the absence of a color line in France. To deal with the problem of American racism in France, columnist Georges de la Fouchardière recommended putting white Americans "under the subjection of negro customs officials . . . and conductors" and forming a brigade of black cops to train them to be civilized human beings.[8] The *Chicago Defender* ran a comic strip called "Bungleton Green" that praised France as a paradise of equal treatment, thus furthering the predominance of the myth for black Americans.[9] From this period forward, with a break only during World War II, a steady stream, or more accurately, a constant trickle, of blacks left the United States for France, a practice that continues today.[10]

The Crown Princess of Jazz in France

What was the motivation behind this "micro-exodus" that created a distinguishable African American community in Paris in the interwar and postwar years?

A symbol without promises?
Eiffel Tower, Paris
Photo: Cory Reinbold

To explore the possibilities, it seems fitting to turn to some examples of the "refugees" who went to Paris during the two "boom" periods. The first, Josephine Baker, the undeniable queen of the "jazz age," remains the most well known black American to renounce America for France and embodies the legend of the black experience in France. Other examples include Richard Wright and James Baldwin, two influential black authors, who personified the different sides of the brick which completed the façade of black America's triumph in France during the postwar years.

A girl from miserable beginnings, even for a "Negro," in the heart of racist Midwestern America, Josephine Baker never expected to leave America for France but, for all intents and purposes, never returned. [11] According to her own often-exaggerated accounts, she went to France for one reason: she was a performer, and her act was going to Paris. Offered a principle role in a show that would be called the *Revue Nègre* and a salary of $250 (twice what she was earning at the time), Baker eagerly accepted both the prospect of lucrative work as well as the chance to go to France, an opportunity that she could not pass up. [12] Recalling later, she would say that she dreamt of going there since she had been shown a postcard of the Eiffel Tower, "it looked different from the Statue of Liberty, but what did that matter? What was the good of having the statue with out the liberty, the freedom to go where one chose if one was held back by one's color? No, I preferred the Eiffel Tower which made no promises." [13] Having expected little, what Baker found in Paris would cause her to stay forever and eventually renounce her United States citizenship by adopting France as her nation and Paris as her city.

As a young girl, Baker grew up in poverty; she was forced to provide for her family from the age of eight. She was criticized by her own dark complexioned family for being too "light-skinned" and humiliated by the family of her first husband [14] and fellow performers for being too dark. That the "French experience" made an expatriate out of her should come as no surprise. As biographer Phyllis Rose explains, what better response could she have had? [15] For the French, she embodied a raw sexuality and primitivism as she danced clad only in feathers, nude from the waist up, in the *Danse Sauvage*, which had been included in the show to highlight Baker. The opening of the *Revue Nègre* was a huge success, and the pages of French newspapers were saturated with talk of the beguiling Baker, who was instantaneously the toast of Paris. Parisians loved her, which was sufficient not only to capture Baker's attention but also to keep her mesmerized.

As Baker perceived the situation, she was, for the first time, *the* measure of perfection. French women, who had valued pallid, pasty skin as a symbol of abso-

lute beauty, began to darken their complexions using walnut oil to match Baker's smooth, "café-au-lait" finish;[16] they copied her slicked black hairstyle using the namesake product, Bakerfix. The purpose was to emulate the enchantment of Baker.[17] One of her first activities in Paris was to pose nude for the young artist Paul Colin. While at first shy and reluctant, even obstinate, Baker soon felt comfortable with Colin. Colin was enchanted; "he could not stop looking at her and his eyes liked what they saw. She had hardly ever seen that . . . certainly not in the eyes of a white man."[18] Posing completely nude for him, she felt beautiful for the first time in her life. The pleasure Baker found in her newfound sexuality was made clear by the fact that once she was naked, it was a long time before she would put her clothes back on again. She is immortalized that way, in her "signature" costume consisting of a little skirt of plush, yellow bananas, which as she danced bare-breasted, came to life "like perky, good-natured phalluses."[19] French white men openly lusted after her and showered her with lavish gifts of both physical and material affection. In her eyes, she was given full run and control of French male sexuality and virility, an absolute impossibility in the United States. She took lovers and, eventually, husbands from any race she chose, and they felt privileged to have her.

Baker's attraction was fueled by more than the unadulterated sexuality that permeated the sphere of her life like a thick, noxious, yet intoxicating fog. On the personal side, she was able to become part, if only on the periphery, of the Parisian *haut monde*, both black and white. Baker was so eagerly accepted in the music halls of France and elsewhere in Europe that in a short time she was able to open her own jazz club, *Chez Josephine*, in Montmartre. She became the star not of "black entertainment" but of entertainment in general. While her performances in *Shuffle Along* and *Chocolate Dandies*, the first black shows to make Broadway prior to World War I, had not left her unknown, Paris made Josephine Baker a superstar. She came to represent all that Paris, a city bursting with the spirit and rhythm of jazz, wished to be during *les années folles*, its "crazy years."

For Josephine Baker and the others, mostly jazz musicians but also writers, artists, and ex-soldiers who came to Paris during the interwar years, France was a near perfect match. Like those of the "lost generation," America's relentless pursuit of "traditionalism" and tenacious adherence to established structures and attitudes were too much for Baker and her contemporaries to bear. In France, they found freedom — the freedom to love, work, and live as they wished, without many of the boundaries placed before them in the US.

The First "Black" Expatriate

During his exile Richard Wright said, "I live in voluntary exile in France and I like it. There is nothing in the life of America that I miss or yearn for."[20] However, like Josephine Baker, when Wright first set sail for Paris on May 1, 1946, he never believed that he would eventually make France his permanent home, giving up the United States which had, by that time, brought him inspiration for and success from his two most recognizable and highly acclaimed works, *Black Boy* and *Native*

Son. But Wright wanted to get away; he felt stifled in the United States. In his journal he wrote, "one could live and write like that only if one lived in Paris or in some out of the way spot where one could claim one's own soul."[21] So, again like Baker, Wright went to Paris for his work. Eventually, with an official invitation from the French government, initiated by an aging Gertrude Stein, he boarded a ship with his wife and young daughter eagerly anticipating his visit, but never believing he would stay.[22] Officially, Richard Wright first went to France to meet with the Cultural Relations Section of the French Foreign Ministry, and after nine months he returned home to a United States that was no longer and would never again be his home. The "virus" had infected him, too.

Wright wrote to a friend just before he returned to France in 1947,

> All the people I meet are longing to go to France . . . writers and painters who heard
> that Paris was where interesting work was being done . . . ex-soldiers who had
> sampled the pleasures of the city during the Liberation . . . jazz musicians who had
> heard that [Paris] was in the grip of a 'hot music craze' . . . all 'were longing to go' .
> . . but in any case I shall have Paris.[23]

For an ex-communist, and, more importantly, a black man married to a white woman,[24] who vocally condemned the hpyocrisies of American society in his popular literary works, America on the eve of the civil rights movement and Senator McCarthy's own version of Stalin's Great Terror, was not a safe haven. Wright became one of the first true black expatriates, following in the footsteps of his white literary brethren of a decade before, those who went to Paris to seek refuge from American rigidity and what, after World War II, seemed to be anachronistic racism.

As James Baldwin would later explain, Wright was fond of referring to Paris as "the city of refuge." Though he would be criticized greatly for the failures of his work after his voluntary exile to France, Wright discovered the opportunity to claim his soul in Saint-Germain-des-Prés, the community where he and most other refugees would settle. In his essay, "I Choose Exile" Wright explained, "To live in Paris is to allow one's sensibilities to be nourished." When he first went, he found that "*Angst* was not spelled b-l-a-c-k," a realization which not only made him feel, for the first time, fully like a man (instead of a black man), but also removed the blinders from his eyes enabling him to see dimensions of the human experience he had never before explored.[25] For Wright, Paris lifted from his back the corpse with which he had been burdened his entire life.

Once established in France, Wright became a fixture on the Left Bank, which had been home to the "lost generation." Although his work did not succeed as he had hoped it would, Parisian exile made Richard Wright the universally recognized king of a lively black expatriate community that flourished in Saint-Germain-des-Près.[26] The most famous of the postwar expatriates, he played host to blacks who came into the city setting them up with hotels and giving them their first instructions on life in the city. Furthermore, he found a society in which he could escape the constant fear that he felt in America every time he walked out of his home with

his wife on his arm, the fear that someone would "come up and shout 'Nigger lover' in her face."[27]

Wright represented the different kind of American who went to Paris in the postwar years. While in the interwar period, black Americans had embodied the fun and excitement of *les années folles*, the postwar blacks were mostly writers, who had come to France to escape America, living in a kind of exile. Instead of symbolizing good times, Wright, at the center of the black community, represented ideological consciousness and political engagement.[28] He created the model for black American life in Paris and was considered the father of the black American community there after World War II. Although he played a fundamental *literary* role for blacks in the US, Wright could never have enjoyed the position as the "voice" or leader of the people in America. The black community there already had a plethora of vocal and outspoken leaders to fill the position. Furthermore, he was finally able to look at the fundamental problem in his life, racism, from a broader, international perspective. He began to address the universal, worldwide problem of the color line and even saw his views on America and racism in a new light.

Like Baker, the comfortable life, the important societal position, and the personal growth that Wright experienced and attributed to his life in France provided ample justification for his choice to relocate and support for the conceptualization of the colorblind France. Frederick Douglass wrote that the principle problem facing America was that of the color line. Wright's experiences and those of the many other black Americans, not just writers but also musicians, artists, businessmen, and even scientists, proved that without the barricade created by the color line black people could enjoy (or suffer through) their lives as white people did, proving that, for Wright, Douglass' assessment was correct.

A Different Breed of Expatriate

Though not considered the father (and for many not even a member) of the black expatriate community of the postwar years, James Baldwin went to France for his own particular reasons as well as for reasons common to most expatriates of his time. Of the three famed francophiles presented here, Baldwin would be the only one who did not make the decision to become an expatriate quickly, leaving the United States permanently only in the 1960s after having returned to assist the Civil Rights Movement. His experiences also help to illustrate the impetus for the black exile in France.

James Baldwin's decision to leave the United States demonstrates that there were many reasons for accepting the expatriate existence. Though he spoke of "'a violent anarchic, hostility-breeding' pattern, with race at the bottom of it, which was eroding the fabric of his identity,"[29] he, surprisingly, had more motivating, or urgent, grounds for fleeing to France. As he explains, "I wasn't really choosing France, I was getting out of America. I had no idea what would happen to me in France, but I was very clear as to what would happen if I remained in New York."[30] From the

writings of many others, it is clear that this same stimulus motivated them as well; France for them was not so much a refuge as it was an *escape*. For each, France became the choice for a different reason, but Baldwin went to France to face the many aspects of his social identity which had remained unexplored within the restrictive social structures of the US.[31]

Life was not easy for Baldwin. He arrived in France with only $40 and no prospects for work. He also had to come to terms with his homosexuality while living in poverty and managed to strain relations between himself and other black expatriates living in Paris by building up debts. Unlike others, he did not see the Negro community in France as a community saying, "only Negro entertainers are able to maintain a useful and unquestioning comradeship with other Negroes."[32] However, Paris did keep its promise to Baldwin. It provided the vital stimulation he needed to create the critical and commercial masterpiece *Go Tell it on a Mountain*, and his experiences there provided needed subject matter for his collections of essays including *The Fire Next Time, Notes of a Native Son*, and *Nobody Knows My Name*. Furthermore, Baldwin found in Paris a place where he could be judged as an individual rather than as the "sum of his various social identities."[33] This freedom allowed him to mature and grow to understand those various identities.

When explaining Wright's vision of Paris as a refuge, Baldwin concurred saying "it certainly was, God knows, for the likes of us."[34] Baldwin's life abroad fueled his creative genius and propelled him into stardom. It allowed him to develop his personal strength and confidence, and prompted him to explore and accept himself. When he returned to the United States, he was, according to his own accounts and those of others, a stronger and better man for his experiences in Paris.[35]

What Josephine, Richard, and James found may have been that which they had imagined in the basements of small Midwestern homes, that which they had longed for between the lines of incendiary commentaries and that which they had needed in order to break free from the shackles placed upon them by an unwitting though not always unwilling society. In an early testament of the magnificence of France, James Weldon Johnson said that in France he was "suddenly free; free from a sense of impending discomfort, insecurity, danger . . . free from special scorn, special tolerance, special condescension, special commiseration; free to be merely a man."[36] Richard Wright echoed this statement by saying that in Paris he was able to live in a "normal" human atmosphere. However, this does not mean that one should accept their evaluations of France without looking for counterevidence.

Hopes Realized or Dreams Deferred?

Josephine and her jazz era compatriots like Bricktop, Langston Hughes, Claude McKay, Sidney Bechet, and Arthur Briggs accepted Wright and Johnson's evaluations of France. For most of the blacks in Paris during the 1920s, the city most likely lived up to their greatest expectations, but exactly how different was France from America during the jazz age? How was Montmartre different from Harlem? To

answer these questions, one would need to examine all of the contextual elements that comprised the environment in which the jazz age occurred, a task too large for the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, one can begin to have some idea of the true nature of the black experience in France from even a cursory examination of the perceptions presented by expatriates. When this is done, it seems that the life that Baker found was not as exceptional as it seemed, notwithstanding her immense fame.

At first glance, it appears that Baker was completely adored in Parisian society; however, a less overwhelming dialogue of clearly racist contempt tempered the praise that was showered upon her. Most notably De Fluer, an influential reviewer for the popular conservative newspaper *Le Figaro*, declared the *Revue Négre* to be a "lamentable transatlantic exhibitionism which makes us revert to the ape in less time than it took us to descend from it."[37] Others expressed their support of De Fluer's displeasure with what Baker and "others like her," meaning black jazz performers, brought to France. "All masterworks of the human spirit will be thrown in to a great bonfire around which savages will dance naked," lamented one writer.[38] A distinguished dance critic explained, "the Negro stepper . . . pounds the platform with unremitting rigor, producing an infernal racket."[39] In France and the United States the opinion of the "black aesthetic" in entertainment was divided, and it is clear that Josephine Baker was in the Parisian spotlight at least as much for her race as for any other quality.

Furthermore, and more importantly, even the majority, which did seem to consider Baker the "toast of the town," was not entirely free from prejudices as was imagined. The artist Paul Colin, for whom Baker had posed nude during her first days in Paris, produced from his sessions with her a promotional poster for the *Revue Nègre*. His poster, which featured Baker, displayed her with "bug eyes" and grossly exaggerated lips accompanied by two enormous black men who clearly resembled apes. This representation, which fails to rise above the level of stereotypical "Sambo" art, used Pickeniny images of black people, which were no less degrading than those which appeared in the United States in the same period.

The positive descriptions of Baker in her performance are no less degrading than the poster used to promote it. To read reviews and articles about Baker's shows was to find oneself emerged in animal imagery and primitive imaginations. One insightful French critic explained, "these blacks feed our double taste for exoticism and mystery . . . We are charmed and upset by them, and most satisfied when they mix something upsetting in with their enchantments."[40] Baker herself would say, "the white imagination sure is something when it comes to blacks."[41] Parisians thought she was from the jungle saying of the excitement caused by the *Revue Nègre*, "their lips must have the taste of pickled watermelon, coconut, sweet pepper, and guava. One sips through the sweet saltiness of their perspiration, the sweat of a hamadryad bounding across jungles filled with poisonous flowers."[42] Interestingly, the *Revue Nègre* was supposed to explore black culture in American Harlem. The *Danse Sauvage* was the biggest hit of the night and the only thing on stage

designed to bring "jungle" into the mind. The dance featuring Baker was added to "authenticate" or "blacken" the show which, coming from New York, was considered too "white" for Parisian audiences for whom the vision of "Negroes" dancing in a precision chorus line was not believable. "Blacks . . . were instinctive dancers, incapable of discipline"[43] and the show, not adhering to this stereotype, seemed to put on airs.

In addition, the true liberty of Josephine Baker's wild, salt and pepper love life comes into question. While it seems that Baker did enjoy an active sexual life with men from both Parisian high society and Montmartre's American performance society, the wealthy men who were happy to sleep with her were none too eager to marry her. In the same sense, "while the French *haut monde* liked having her around, it never really accepted her."[44] To illustrate, when Baker went to the mother of one of her upper middle class French lovers and asked the woman if she could marry her son, the woman treated her suggestion as a joke, saying, "It is true there have been some scapegraces in our family but . . . nothing like this. No, no, what you want is quite impossible."[45] Even those who did seem willing to marry Baker sometimes had less than pure motives. One aim behind her imaginary "marriage in spirit" to Robert Brady, an American artist, was to shock his conservative Basque neighbors in Cuernavaca by bringing a "black woman to swim in their pools."[46] This is another aspect of Baker's Parisian experience that shaped aspects of American society in the same period. As evidenced by the spectrum of colors and shades that could be seen in the black American community, white men often had sexual encounters and even love affairs with black women, but marriage was "quite impossible."

Searching for Salvation or Better Alternatives?

Similarly, what did the Left Bank and Saint-Germain-des-Près offer artists like Ollie Harrington, Kenny Clarke, William Gardner Smith, Arthur Briggs, and Bill Coleman who met Wright and Baldwin in Paris? For many, the answer was clear, even considering that the label "expatriate" was, in fact, a misnomer, given that these artists had never been accepted in American society. "One must belong before one may then not belong. I belong in Paris. I am able to realize myself here. I am no expatriate."[47] But there is evidence, which suggests that acceptance was not forthcoming in France either.

Wright sought freedom from racism, and while he encountered little racial prejudice in France, it is clear that racism and racial stratification were iniquities existing in French society. From the mistreatment of Arabs to the relegation of the Algerians, the "Negroes of France,"[48] and the Senegalese to positions of menial labor, one could conclude that color played an important role in France, and only black *Americans* were immune to French bigotry. Yet even this assessment is not entirely accurate. While throughout the interwar and postwar periods, African Americans were normally permitted into and given service at any establishment, some restaurants and hotels did bar entrance to black people. It must, however, be

stated that many such establishments, though not all, were highly frequented by white American clientele to whom they claimed to be catering. Regardless, it is telling that establishments could be so easily influenced if they truly held to the colorblind ideals supposedly accepted as fundamental aspects of their society.[49] Baldwin came to France to free himself of the rigidity of conservative American life, as Baker did by enjoying relations with black and white men and women. However, Baldwin was not completely free. In Paris, like in the New York, homosexuality was not to be flaunted, and though in artist circles it was acceptable to be open about one's homosexual tendencies, there was no escape from the epithet "faggot."[50]

Some never believed the myth of the colorblind France. Chester Himes clearly expresses his motivations for going to France:

> I received a deluge of letters . . . of how pleasant and stimulating life was in Paris . . . This was my first experience with black expatriates who have become self-appointed civic boosters for their favorite European capital. All this I took with a grain of salt; I didn't expect any utopia . . . I didn't expect the Europeans to be greatly different . . . I just wanted out of the United States, that was all. I had had it.[51]

Those who came expecting nothing other than an alternative to America were not disappointed either. In a letter to a friend, Himes wrote, "I didn't find any great welcome by the French girls . . . The American Negroes . . . sleep with the Swedish, Norwegian and American girls."[52] Regardless of finding the situation "dull and unimpressive,"[53] Himes still chose France over the United States, which pays great tribute to the power of the myth of a better life in France.

The Strength of the Myth

In the *Fire Next Time*, James Baldwin wrote, "I do not know many Negroes who are eager to be "accepted" by white people, still less to be loved by them; they, the blacks, simply don't wish to be beaten over the head by the whites every instant of our brief passage on this planet."[54] During the interwar period, black American jazz artists flocked to Paris; a generation later, in the postwar years, writers replaced the musicians, who had all hoped to find a society that resembled Baldwin's description. During both periods artists were not the only blacks to leave the States. American soldiers benefiting from the GI bill, students, chemists, and businessmen all came to France to experience the legend of *Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité*, which for black Americans manifest itself in the form of a colorblind society. What they found was not always what they had expected (regardless of whether they realized or admitted it), and even superficial scrutiny of French society during its history shows that it has been anything but colorblind. Nonetheless, the image survives and counterevidence has not served to deter the multitude of black people coming to the city.

It was as if the black expatriate had gone "in effect, to a city which exist[ed] only in his mind . . . refusing . . . to recognize Paris at all, but clinging instead to its image."[55] Explanations for the ability of the charm of legend to prove itself capable

of withstanding evidence pointing to the contrary are complex and have yet to be fully explored.[56] However, there are many possibilities. In both periods the number of blacks was always minuscule in comparison to the white population of the city. Estimates for the 1920s are around 500, with only 13 GIs actually using their benefits to return to France. During the 1950s, the number jumped to 1500, but in a city as large as Paris, this was still a negligible community. Furthermore, except for a few cases, there was not that much significant contact between blacks and whites, and certainly not in any large numbers. This sort of evidence suggests both that the black community in France was able to insulate itself from any negative experiences by remaining within the bounds of comfort created by its comparatively close-knit community, and the white community was able to continue its normal existence unaffected by the presence of a handful of darker Americans.

Another explanation for the strength of the Parisian myth seems equally compelling and infinitely more interesting. A biographer of Josephine Baker proposes that the sheer novelty of the black American in Paris, either as a representative of the modernity and the free spirited liberty of Parisian society or as the embodiment of the sentiments of equality and brotherhood, served to perpetuate the already well-founded image of France as a colorblind society. In other words, blacks represented all that was exotic and distinctive about France, and that was acceptable for black Americans.

> Compared to racism, exoticism is merely decorative and superficial . . . exoticism cares mostly about its own amusement and tends to find differences of color amusing where as racism finds them threatening. Exoticism is frivolous, hangs out at nightclubs, will pay anything to have a black . . . sit at his table. Racism is like a poor kid who grew up needing someone to hurt. Exoticism grew up rich and a little bored.[57]

The difference between the black experience in America and that in France, according to this view, is that while one's color is very significant, the stereotypes attached to one's blackness will be fundamentally different. In the "Jazz Age" it was primitivism, savage beauty, fun, and entertainment; in the 1950s, it was struggle, pain, and even anti-Americanism. In any case, however, blacks were still objects, personifications of concepts and emotions.

Why then would the myth of a color blind Paris persist? In the context that was important for black Americans, it was true. As Wright wrote, black Americans "have been oppressed for centuries — oppressed for so long that their oppression has become . . . a kind of culture."[58] But in France, black Americans were not generally and systematically hated and degraded because of the color of their skin. The racism and stereotypes of blacks held in the societies in which they became immersed were not tied, inextricably, to negativism. The logic is simple, "if one is to be treated as a thing, one would rather be treated as a rare and pretty thing than as a disgusting or dangerous one."[59] If one is going to always be seen in terms of his or her color why not prefer to be unique and special rather than indistinguishable and evil.

Today, as a result of the influx of African blacks and the societal clashes over race that have emerged in French culture recently, the myth of a colorblind France is not as compelling as it was in the first half of the twentieth century. Nevertheless, most black people in America still equate the French nation with the invented tradition that it prizes above all *Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité*. For it was these values which provided many African American artists and non-artists alike unique opportunities for creativity, expression, and camraderie unavailable to them on the other side of the Atlantic.

Notes

[1] James Campbell, *Paris Interzone: Richard Wright, Lolita, Boris Vian and Others on the Left Bank, 1946*-60 (London: Martin Secker & Warburg Ltd., 1994) p. 33.

[2] Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) p. 1.

[3] Roanne Edwards and Johnathon Edwards, "France: A Country in Western Europe Where Blacks Have Had A Presence For Centuries." <http:www.africana.comt/t_355.htm>.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Arthur comte de Gobineau, *The Inequality of Human Races*, trans. Adrian Collins (New York: Howard Fertig, Inc., 1967) p.36.

[6] The laws were abandoned following the French Revolution in 1794 and brought back by Napoleon.

[7] African Americans occupied this position with only Native Americans who enjoyed a similarly debased position in society.

[8] Tyler Edward Stovall, *Paris Noir: African Americans in the City of Light* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1996) p. 74.

[9] Ibid.

[10] If you look at the numbers of black Americans who arrived in France in comparison to either the number of black people in America or in France, the less than 3000 black people who took up residence over a 50 year period was quite small.

[11] At the turn of the century, virtually any part of America could, without exaggeration or bias, be considered sufficiently racist to deserve the qualification; judgment for present day America is another subject all together.

[12] Phyllis Rose, *Jazz Cleopatra: Josephine Baker in her Time* (1991) pp. 61-79.

[13] Stovall, p. 52.

[14] Josephine Baker married Willie Baker, from whom she took her name, at age 13.

[15] Rose, p. 15.

[16] Stovall, p. 55.

[17] Rose, pp.100-101 and Stovall, p. 115. Other Josephine Baker products included pomades, dolls, and perfumes.

[18] Rose, p. 7.

[19] Ibid., p. 97.

[20] Stovall, p. 189.

[21] Campbell, p. 4.

[22] Ibid., p. 5. The US government wanted it to make it as difficult for him to leave the country as possible, asking why a Negro "would want to go 'abroad' anyway?"

[23] Ibid., p. 15.

[24] Wright's wife, Ellen, was of Polish descent and Jewish background, placing her quite low on the social ladder of the 1940s, but she was considered to be white the day she married a black man.

[25] Campbell, p. 12.

[26] Stovall, p. 199.

[27] Campbell, p. 13.

[28] Stovall, pp. 134-36.

[29] Campbell, p. 26.

[30] Stovall, p. 183.

[31] Campbell, p. 27.

[32] James Baldwin, *Notes of a Native Son* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955) p. 118.

[33] Campbell, pp.27-28.

[34] James Baldwin, *Nobody Knows My Name* (New York: Penguin Books USA, Inc., 1993) p. 152.

[35] Stovall, p. 205.

[36] Stovall, pp.200-201.

[37] Rose, p. 32.

[38] Ibid., p. 33.

[39] Ibid., p. 31.

[40] Ibid., p. 23.

[41] Ibid., p. 81.

[42] Ibid., p. 23.

[43] Ibid., p. 30.

[44] Ibid., p. 175.

[45] Ibid., p. 176.

[46] Ibid., p. 256.

[47] Stovall, p. 181.

[48] Campbell, pp. 222-23.

[49] Stovall, pp. 152-53.

[50] Campbell, pp. 34-36.

[51] Ibid., pp. 117-119.

[52] Ibid., p. 118.

[53] Ibid., p. 118.

[54] James Baldwin, *The Fire Next Time* (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1962) p. 35.

[55] James Baldwin, *Notes of a Native Son,* p. 127.

[56] Ibid., p. 128.

[57] Rose, p. 44.

[58] Richard Wright quoted in Campbell, p. 205.

[59] Rose, p. 44.

The New Face of European Anti-Americanism

Zach Messite

The idea that American political values were the wave of the future has long been part of Western Europe's collective consciousness. It was placed there, perhaps, by Alexis de Tocqueville, who argued that the defining aspect of the new American society represented an "equality of conditions as the creative element from which each particular fact derived."[1] In the past few years, European voices have been challenging the idea that the American political tradition is a model for Europe. Behind the giggling over Monica Lewinsky, puritanical right-wing zealots, the O.J. Simpson trial, banana republic-like election results, tanking dot coms, and the California energy crisis, a new European consensus is building that is more persistent than prior incarnations of European anti-Americanism. The difference is the range of grievances with US policy, not only the intensity of the feelings. The array of disputes, ranging from the environment and the American justice system to missile defense and trade policy, is the new variable in the anti-US equation that makes today's apprehensions unlike the Vietnam War and the anti-missile demonstrations of the 1960s and 1980s.

Paradoxically, the reaction comes at a time when America has never been more accepted by Europeans. American cultural and military dominance is already yesterday's news. More Europeans live, work, relax, eat, and dress like Americans than ever before. MTV broadcasts music videos throughout Europe, and it is easy to catch the National Basketball Association Game of the Week on Eurosport. It is no longer enough to say that America is less popular than the cultural products it

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exports. The new European fear is that the strength of the American *hyperpuissance* or "hyper power," as French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine calls it, will impose unwanted political changes as well.

This helps to explain the European media and political elite's preoccupation with American support for the death penalty, its lack of universal health care coverage, its permissive gun laws, and its apathetic internationalism, including the perception of abdication on global warming, the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty-busting missile defense plans, and a self-interested commitment to free trade policy. Throw in the American mistrust of international organizations such as the United Nations and the International Criminal Court (ICC), charges of industrial espionage, and American grumbling about EU plans to develop its own 60,000-member Rapid Reaction Force, and the political hyper-power is born. Not surprisingly, not a single one of these issues, so important to Europe, was more than a blip in the recent US presidential elections.

President George W. Bush, who visited Europe only once in 1998, said in the second Presidential debate that he did not think the world should look to America with "envy." Instead, he argued, "I just don't think it's the role of the United States to walk into a country and say, 'We do it this way, so should you.'"[2] As much as the Bush administration might like to be able to turn off the American example, it will not be so easy. However, the new Bush administration does have one advantage in its quest to become unenviable. The new president's guiding foreign policy principles distinctively embody much of what Europeans have come to loathe about American politics.

A German parliamentarian recently stated, "What we know about the new president is just two things. He is the son of President Bush, and he has sent 150 people to their deaths in Texas, including the mentally ill."[3] Jack Lang, the French Education Minister and candidate for mayor of Paris, traveled to Texas to break bread with convicted murderer Odell Barnes, Jr. in order to score political points at home. Thousands of Italians, whose government has been at the forefront of calls for a worldwide moratorium on the death penalty, marched in Rome during the height of the election last fall to protest the execution of an Italian-American in Virginia. The marchers were supported by a broad coalition of politicians and the Pope. The Italian national television station, RAI, aired the film *Dead Man Walking* and provided live media coverage from outside the execution site in Virginia. The subtext of the debate in general was: how could America, of all countries, find common ground with the Iraqis, the Taliban, and the repressive State Law and Order Restoration Committee in Myanmar by using death in the name of equal justice under law. America is supposed to be better than that.

On the environment, both President Bush and Vice President Cheney have been clear about their views of America's energy policy and international responsibilities. Both are former oilmen, and neither will be quick to back conservation or ready to push research into alternative forms of energy. The Europeans rightly

blamed American intransigence for the collapse of the November 2000 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the follow-up to the Kyoto Convention. The role of the United States is the key to moving the Kyoto process forward. The United States, with about four percent of the world's population, emits more than 20 percent of the world's carbon dioxide. President Bush's opposition to the Kyoto process is already on the record. Europeans do not understand why the US should be given exceptions in meeting its greenhouse gas reduction targets without actually cutting carbon emissions that negatively impact the entire world. The Republicans ceaselessly mocked former Vice President Gore during the campaign for his concern about global warming, and they are now ready to drill in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge in Alaska for new fossil fuel resources. Couple these issues with Bush's defense of the American gun culture, his advocacy of national missile defense, his opposition to the ICC, and an election victory that seemed anything but democratic, and you have the makings of a poster boy for European anti-Americanism.

The Office of the President is already a flashpoint for what America stands for in the age of globalization. Consider the range of recent European responses to President Bill Clinton. On his farewell tour in Ireland, he was mobbed by fawning well-wishers, many of them students lining the streets to wait for his motorcade to pass in the early morning hours. In Germany, he was welcomed by mostly cheering crowds when he became the third American after Marshall and Kissinger to receive the Charlemagne Prize for his efforts to promote peace in Europe. However at the same time, a few protestors pointed out that he had actually waged war in the former Yugoslavia. Rewind to 1999, when the same President was forced to cut short his visit to Greece: a NATO ally, EU member, and a country that has sent millions to the United States to live and work. There he was greeted by thousands of angry protestors, including many students, lining the streets of Athens and throwing Molotov cocktails. The protestors even coined a special word to describe the American President: *planitarchis*, or ruler of the planet. As one demonstrator told *The New York Times*, "He is the *planitarchis,* so of course he should visit Greece. It's a province of his empire."[4]

While the American President may be welcomed enthusiastically in Aachen and not in Athens, it does not necessarily mean that all Germans approve of the American-led bombing campaign in the former Yugoslavia or that all Greeks disapprove of Hollywood. The Greeks are resentful of American foreign policy interventions, whereas the Irish are pleased by President Clinton's personal interest in trying to solve their domestic troubles. However, some basic mistrust of American political power now runs the European political spectrum. Social democrats find fault in the American *über*-capitalist mindset that ignores the destitute; conservatives attack self-interested American trade policy and cheap cultural exports; and Greens despise American efforts to undermine global environmentalism.

The new government in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia looks to Europe to bolster its own anti-American political strength. President Vojislav Kostunica re-

A McDonald's on every corner. Piazza Maggiore, Bologna
Photo: Kevin Cuddy

cently said that he likes being recognized as a "democratic nationalist," someone able to stand up to what he describes as the American "orientation of foreign policy." That he identifies General Charles DeGaulle as a role model is not surprising.[5] DeGaulle's nationalism, anti-Americanism, and attempts to restore France's civilizing mission tapped into a unique connection between the French nation and its place in the world. According to Renan, mankind has learned the French principle of nationality.

However, polls conducted in the last few years suggest that the French are not alone in having deep reservations about the United States. Approximately 68 percent of Frenchmen said they were worried about America's status as a superpower. Germans, Spaniards, and Britons all had their fears as well. Even a majority of Italians, who consistently poll as among the most pro-American of Europeans, said that they should not look to America for inspiration in their way of life or culture.[6]

The negative feelings about America in Europe are no longer geared at a single, specific policy but rather at a feeling that globalization has an American face and is a danger to the European view of how to govern a society. There is the sense that America with its extraordinary power can crush everything in its way. In France, the reduction of the work week to 35 hours, the attack on McDonald's restaurants to prove a point about hormone-injected beef, the blockage of Pepsi's takeover of Orangina, the passage of laws about English language television and film programming, and the backlash against the use of English words in French (franglais) are instinctive national reactions to American power.

Greece is another example of a country that claims special reasons for being resentful of American power. Greece's contribution to democracy, history, and the culture of civilization are essential parts of its national sense of honor. This link to past glory is constantly stressed to Greeks and foreigners alike. Greek politicians routinely emphasize the heavy responsibilities associated with the nation's dedication to liberty and the invention of democracy, as well as the special complexities of Greek history and its role in shaping the modern world. The perception that American power has been, and will continue to be, the key to the stalemate division of

Cyprus, relations with Turks, and the balance of power in the Balkans upsets these principles. In February 1994, when the US was debating whether to recognize the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as an independent nation, there were massive demonstrations at the US Consulate in Thessaloniki. The Greeks claimed that Macedonia was appropriating "Greek" names and symbols for its new country.

Even the national response to the most visible of Greek anti-American terrorist groups, November 17th, testifies to a political distrust of the United States. Over the past three decades, the group has killed five American Embassy officials, including the CIA Chief of Station. However, November 17th is so small, perhaps no more than a dozen people, that it is difficult to gauge a national Greek sentiment towards America based on this group's actions alone. Yet, what seems to be more telling is the general neglect that Greek society has shown towards cracking down on the terrorist group. The government claims that no arrests have been made due to the incompetence of national security forces or the cunning of the group itself, rather than because of any lack of political will to curb the violence. However, during President Clinton's 1999 trip to Greece, where the President also apologized for past transgressions against Greek domestic political life, the Simitis Government shied away from signing an agreement to cooperate on terrorism. Greek officials explained that any suggestion that the government was caving into American demands would be politically embarrassing. Nationalists in parliament asserted that the treaty would oblige Greece to give data to Washington that could then be relayed to the Turks.

European political nationalists are not alone in their uneasiness with the American model. The romantic European left remains one of the most vocal of the anti-American voices. The French film director Jean-Luc Godard recently said that the 1945 landings in Normandy are directly connected to the invasion of American cinema in the past half-century. "To my mind, I think that's even the reason why the Americans landed, it's for the American film . . . the first thing is always the films. Cheese, airplanes—those come later." Godard lays much of the blame on America for the loss of the past and the failure of modern European popular culture.[7]

While European pop culture still has its share of bad American knock-offs, it is hard to argue which part of the French past has been lost irretrievably due to the popularity of, say, the Senegalese-born rap star MC Solaar, who spins out his Brooklyn-influenced, but unique, hip-hop tunes in French and English. Is he any less a part of today's cultural France than Edith Piaf was more than half century ago? Is the Italian opera singer and pop star, Andrea Bocelli, somehow inferior to the great Italian tenors of the past because of American influence? Both MC Solaar and Andrea Bocelli have large followings around the world.

If America has succeeded in invading Europe culturally, it is because there was, and continues to be, money to be made in selling movies, jeans, and hamburgers. Before the emergence of mad cow disease complicated things, McDonald's, the

French culinary Death Star, was a raging success. The first McDonald's opened in Strasbourg, France in September 1979. Today there are 760 restaurants with 30,000 employees throughout France. They have adapted to French foods such as salads and yogurts and offer more ambiance than the American drive-thru versions.[8]

Of perhaps greater importance is the growing European acceptance of American business practices and economic success based on entrepreneurial spirit and the rapid application of technological breakthroughs. European markets have become more open and competitive by adopting American business practices. The American model of low taxes, the privatization of state-owned monopolies, minimal wage increases, and more flexible labor markets contributed to the EU's robust 3.4 percent economic growth in 2000. EU unemployment is below 10 percent for the first time since 1991. However, there is still the general perception that if the United States slides into a recession, the European economy will be pulled down with it.

The fear of recession has not deterred the increasing tide of young Europeans coming to America to start their careers or study in a variety of graduate programs. The journey has become something of a pilgrimage for the middle class and university educated, bent on subverting the world of *pantouflage* and old money connections. The benefits an American graduate degree can bring back home and the mandatory nature of English-language fluency in the economic and political world drives this phenomenon. Winning the green card lottery is even better since it sanctifies the possibility of interesting jobs and living wages in the United States for Europeans in their 20s and 30s. All of this adds up to a convergence of lifestyles with Europeans becoming more comfortable with American cultural power, while at he same time, rebelling against the threat of American political domination.

Today's spasms of European anti-Americanism are taking place as a result of a perceived imbalance between the promise of American political values and the reality of current policies. Now what Europeans seem to crave is more respect for their own political ideals, rather than merely a greater dialogue with Washington. They need to receive reassurances that they will be treated as allies and full partners, instead of satellite states. The visit of President Bush's new Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, to Europe in the first month of the new administration attempted to defuse opposition to missile defense. This trip shows that there is at least some recognition that there will be no free ride from European allies on this issue, but it also shows little recognition of how domestic and unilateral international policy decisions threaten European political principles and raise the anti-American volume.

If President Bush truly wants to make good on his debate promise that it is no longer the role of the United States to "walk into a country and say, 'We do it this way, so should you,'" then Washington needs to find a middle ground on the European Union's opposition to missile defense, carbon emissions, etc. Otherwise, given the interconnectedness of today's policy issues, there will be more of the same, and

the Bush administration may do little more than continue to listen respectfully before hyper-powering ahead.

Notes

1 Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (New York: Harper Collins, 2000) p. 9.

2 Text of the Second Gore-Bush Presidential Debate, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, 11 October 2000.

3 T.R. Reid, "Many Europeans See Bush as Executioner Extraordinaire," *The Washington Post* 17 December 2000.

4 Alessandra Stanley, "Huge March in Athens Protests Visit by Clinton," *The New York Times* 18 November 1999.

5 Tim Judah, "Goodbye to Yugoslavia?" *The New York Review of Books* (8 February 2001).

6 Suzanne Daley, "More and More, Europeans Find Fault with U.S.," *The New York Times* 9 April 2000.

7 Richard Brody, "An Exile in Paradise," *The New Yorker* (20 November 2000).

8 See <http://mcdonalds.com/countries/france/index.html>.

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